Schneier on Security
A blog covering security and security technology.
March 2008 Archives
The more trusted a thief is, the harder he is to catch.
An article from The Washington Post:
Federal authorities hope N-DEx will become what one called a "one-stop shop" enabling federal law enforcement, counterterrorism and intelligence analysts to automatically examine the enormous caches of local and state records for the first time.
France's National Museum of Natural History on Tuesday unveiled the world's first "plastinated" squid -- a 6.5-metre-long (21.25-feet) deep-sea beast donated by New Zealand and named in honour of a creature featuring in Maori legend.
If you ever need an example to demonstrate that security is a function of agenda, use this story about speed cameras. Cities that have installed speed cameras are discovering motorists are driving slower, which is decreasing revenues from fines. So they're turning the cameras off.
Perhaps a better solution would be to raise the fines to the remaining speeders to make up for the lost revenue?
EDITED TO ADD (3/31): Too many people thought that above comment was serious. It's not. The whole incident illustrates why fines should never be considered part of a revenue stream: it gives the police a whole new agenda.
Good list of common corporate security pitfalls.
Frightening sting operation by the FBI. They posted links to supposed child porn videos on boards frequented by those types, and obtained search warrants based on access attempts.
This seems like incredibly flimsy evidence. Someone could post the link as an embedded image, or send out e-mail with the link embedded, and completely mess with the FBI's data -- and the poor innocents' lives. Such are the problems when the mere clicking on a link is justification for a warrant.
This is embarrassing.
My guess is that it's the Chinese government.
The U.S. has a new cyber-security czar, Rod A. Beckstrom, who has no cyber-security experience.
EDITED TO ADD (3/31): A more informed opinion.
Okay, this is weird:
Police in Italy have issued footage of a man who is suspected of hypnotising supermarket checkout staff to hand over money from their cash registers.
This article from The Wall Street Journal outlines how the NSA is increasingly engaging in domestic surveillance, data collection, and data mining. The result is essentially the same as Total Information Awareness.
According to current and former intelligence officials, the spy agency now monitors huge volumes of records of domestic emails and Internet searches as well as bank transfers, credit-card transactions, travel and telephone records. The NSA receives this so-called "transactional" data from other agencies or private companies, and its sophisticated software programs analyze the various transactions for suspicious patterns. Then they spit out leads to be explored by counterterrorism programs across the U.S. government, such as the NSA's own Terrorist Surveillance Program, formed to intercept phone calls and emails between the U.S. and overseas without a judge's approval when a link to al Qaeda is suspected.
Barry Steinhardt of the ACLU comments:
I mean, when we warn about a "surveillance society," this is what we're talking about. This is it, this is the ballgame. Mass data from a wide variety of sources -- including the private sector -- is being collected and scanned by a secretive military spy agency. This represents nothing less than a major change in American life -- and unless stopped the consequences of this system for everybody will grow in magnitude along with the rivers of data that are collected about each of us -- and that's more and more every day.
This is a weird story: someone posts a hoax Craigslist ad saying that the owner of a home had to leave suddenly, and this his belongings were free for the taking. People believed the ad and starting coming by and taking his stuff.
But Robert Salisbury had no plans to leave. The independent contractor was at Emigrant Lake when he got a call from a woman who had stopped by his house to claim his horse.
This doesn't surprise me at all. People just don't think of authenticating this sort of thing. And what if they did call a phone number listed on a hoax ad? How do they know the phone number is real? On the other hand, a phone number on the hoax ad would give the police something to find the hoaxer with.
At least this guy is getting some of his stuff back.
EDITED TO ADD (4/1): A couple have been charged with posting the ad; they allegedly used it to cover up their own thefts.
At the DISI conference last December, Martin Hellman gave a lecture on the invention of public-key cryptography. A video is online (it's hard to find, search for his name), along with PowerPoint slides.
(Unfortunately, the video isn't set up for streaming; in order to view the it, you'll have to download the ten files, then use a fairly recent version of WinZip to concatenate the files.)
EDITED TO ADD (3/26): Now on Google Video.
Uncle Milton Industries has been selling ant farms to children since 1956. Some years ago, I remember opening one up with a friend. There were no actual ants included in the box. Instead, there was a card that you filled in with your address, and the company would mail you some ants. My friend expressed surprise that you could get ants sent to you in the mail.
I replied: "What's really interesting is that these people will send a tube of live ants to anyone you tell them to."
Security requires a particular mindset. Security professionals -- at least the good ones -- see the world differently. They can't walk into a store without noticing how they might shoplift. They can't use a computer without wondering about the security vulnerabilities. They can't vote without trying to figure out how to vote twice. They just can't help it.
SmartWater is a liquid with a unique identifier linked to a particular owner. "The idea is for me to paint this stuff on my valuables as proof of ownership," I wrote when I first learned about the idea. "I think a better idea would be for me to paint it on your valuables, and then call the police."
Really, we can't help it.
This kind of thinking is not natural for most people. It's not natural for engineers. Good engineering involves thinking about how things can be made to work; the security mindset involves thinking about how things can be made to fail. It involves thinking like an attacker, an adversary or a criminal. You don't have to exploit the vulnerabilities you find, but if you don't see the world that way, you'll never notice most security problems.
I've often speculated about how much of this is innate, and how much is teachable. In general, I think it's a particular way of looking at the world, and that it's far easier to teach someone domain expertise -- cryptography or software security or safecracking or document forgery -- than it is to teach someone a security mindset.
Which is why CSE 484, an undergraduate computer-security course taught this quarter at the University of Washington, is so interesting to watch. Professor Tadayoshi Kohno is trying to teach a security mindset.
You can see the results in the blog the students are keeping. They're encouraged to post security reviews about random things: smart pill boxes, Quiet Care Elder Care monitors, Apple's Time Capsule, GM's OnStar, traffic lights, safe deposit boxes, and dorm room security.
One recent one is about an automobile dealership. The poster described how she was able to retrieve her car after service just by giving the attendant her last name. Now any normal car owner would be happy about how easy it was to get her car back, but someone with a security mindset immediately thinks: "Can I really get a car just by knowing the last name of someone whose car is being serviced?"
The rest of the blog post speculates on how someone could steal a car by exploiting this security vulnerability, and whether it makes sense for the dealership to have this lax security. You can quibble with the analysis -- I'm curious about the liability that the dealership has, and whether their insurance would cover any losses -- but that's all domain expertise. The important point is to notice, and then question, the security in the first place.
The lack of a security mindset explains a lot of bad security out there: voting machines, electronic payment cards, medical devices, ID cards, internet protocols. The designers are so busy making these systems work that they don't stop to notice how they might fail or be made to fail, and then how those failures might be exploited. Teaching designers a security mindset will go a long way toward making future technological systems more secure.
That part's obvious, but I think the security mindset is beneficial in many more ways. If people can learn how to think outside their narrow focus and see a bigger picture, whether in technology or politics or their everyday lives, they'll be more sophisticated consumers, more skeptical citizens, less gullible people.
If more people had a security mindset, services that compromise privacy wouldn't have such a sizable market share -- and Facebook would be totally different. Laptops wouldn't be lost with millions of unencrypted Social Security numbers on them, and we'd all learn a lot fewer security lessons the hard way. The power grid would be more secure. Identity theft would go way down. Medical records would be more private. If people had the security mindset, they wouldn't have tried to look at Britney Spears' medical records, since they would have realized that they would be caught.
There's nothing magical about this particular university class; anyone can exercise his security mindset simply by trying to look at the world from an attacker's perspective. If I wanted to evade this particular security device, how would I do it? Could I follow the letter of this law but get around the spirit? If the person who wrote this advertisement, essay, article or television documentary were unscrupulous, what could he have done? And then, how can I protect myself from these attacks?
The security mindset is a valuable skill that everyone can benefit from, regardless of career path.
This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.
EDITED TO ADD (4/30): Another comment.
Build your own paper Enigma machine.
If you're fearful, you think you're more at risk than if you're angry:
In the aftermath of September 11th, we realized that, tragically, we were presented with an opportunity to find out whether our lab research could predict how the country as a whole would react to the attacks and how U.S. citizens would perceive future risks of terrorism. We did a nationwide field experiment, the first of its kind. As opposed to the participants in our lab studies, the participants in our nationwide field study did have strong feelings about the issues at stake -- September 11th and possible future attacks -- and they also had a lot of information about these issues as well. We wondered whether the same emotional carryover that we found in our lab studies would occur -- whether fear and anger would still have opposing effects.
So, to summarize: we should not be fearful of future terrorist attacks, we should be angry that our government has done such a poor job safeguarding our liberties. And that if we take this second approach, we are more likely to respond effectively to future terrorist attacks.
Really good blog post on the future potential of quantum computing and its effects on cryptography:
To factor a 4096-bit number, you need 72*4096^3 or 4,947,802,324,992 quantum gates. Lets just round that up to an even 5 trillion. Five trillion is a big number. We're only now getting to the point that we can put about that many normal bits on a disk drive. The first thing this tells me is that we aren't going to wake up one day and find out that someone's put that many q-gates on something you can buy from Fry's from a white-box Taiwanese special.
Definitely worth watching, especially the squid's security countermeasures near the end of the video.
This sort of story is nothing new:
Hannaford said credit and debit card numbers were stolen during the card authorization process and about 4.2 million unique account numbers were exposed.
But it's rare that we see statistics about the actual risk of fraud:
The company is aware of about 1,800 cases of fraud reported so far relating to the breach.
And this is interesting:
"Visa and MasterCard have stipulated in their contracts with retailers that they will not divulge who the source is when a data breach occurs," Spitzer said. "We've been engaged in a dialogue for a couple years now about changing this rule.... Without knowing who the retailer is that caused the breach, it's hard for banks to conduct a good investigation on behalf of their consumers. And it's a problem for consumers as well, because if they know which retailer is responsible, they can rule themselves out for being at risk if they don't shop at that retailer."
Force everyone to wear a bracelet that, when remotely activated, gives the person a debilitating shock.
No, really. A company is trying to commercialize this idea.
The mind boggles.
Minneapolis -- the city I live in -- has an acoustic system that automatically detects and locates gunshots. It's been in place for a year and a half.
The main system being considered by Minneapolis is called ShotSpotter. It could cost up to $350,000, and some community groups are hoping to pitch in.
That seems like a bargain to me.
Recently, I was asked about this system on Winnipeg radio. Actually, I kind of like it. I like it because it's finely tuned to one particular problem: detecting gunfire. It doesn't record everything. It doesn't invade privacy. If there's no gunfire, it's silent. But if there is a gunshot, it figures out the location of the noise and automatically tells police.
From a privacy and liberties perspective, it's a good system. Now all that has to be demonstrated is that it's cost effective.
Despite "heartbeat sensors, CO2 probes to detect exhaled breath and "passive millimetre wave" scanners which can 'see through vehicles," it's easy to sneak into the UK from Calais due to inadequate fencing.
A suggestion from the UK of putting primary-school children in a DNA database if they "exhibit behaviour indicating they may become criminals in later life."
Pugh's call for the government to consider options such as placing primary school children who have not been arrested on the database is supported by elements of criminological theory. A well-established pattern of offending involves relatively trivial offences escalating to more serious crimes. Senior Scotland Yard criminologists are understood to be confident that techniques are able to identify future offenders.
Thankfully, the article contains some reasonable reactions:
Shami Chakrabarti, director of the civil rights group Liberty, denounced any plan to target youngsters. 'Whichever bright spark at Acpo thought this one up should go back to the business of policing or the pastime of science fiction novels,' she said. 'The British public is highly respectful of the police and open even to eccentric debate, but playing politics with our innocent kids is a step too far.'
Props to the writer who came up with the first sentence of the story:
A raw turnip was at the root of a bomb scare that last for hours at a law office.
And a follow-up.
New research on how the brain estimates risk:
Using functional imaging in a simple gambling task in which risk was constantly changed, the researchers discovered that an early activation of the anterior insula of the brain was associated with mistakes in predicting risk.
The first is about the difficulty of implementing REAL ID in areas so remote they don't have a permanent DMV. The second is about airport security at airports so remote they average only two passengers per flight. The third -- and this is the best -- is Brian Schweitzer, Montana's governor, speaking about his opposition to REAL ID.
EDITED TO ADD (3/24): More on Montana and REAL-ID.
A British company has developed a camera that can detect weapons, drugs or explosives hidden under people's clothes from up to 25 meters away in what could be a breakthrough for the security industry.
If this is real, it seems much less invasive than backscatter X ray.
Looks like lousy cryptography.
Note that this is the same card -- maybe a different version -- that was used in the Dutch transit system, and was hacked back in January. There's another hack of that system (press release here, and a video demo), and many companies -- and government agencies -- are scrambling in the wake of all these revelations.
Seems like the Mifare system (especially the version called Mifare Classic -- and there are billions out there) was really badly designed, in all sorts of ways. I'm sure there are many more serious security vulnerabilities waiting to be discovered.
There's an underground economy of boosted books. These values are commonly understood and roundly agreed upon through word of mouth, and the values always seem to be true. Once, a scruffy, large man approached me, holding a folded-up piece of paper. "Do you have any Buck?" He paused and looked at the piece of paper. "Any books by Buckorsick?" I suspected that he meant Bukowski, but I played dumb, and asked to see the piece of paper he was holding. It was written in crisp handwriting that clearly didn't belong to him, and it read:
This is impressive:
With Winlockpwn, the attacker connects a Linux machine to the Firewire port on the victim's machine. The attacker then gets full read-and-write memory access and the tool deactivates Windows's password protection that resides in local memory. Then he or she has carte blanche to steal passwords or drop rootkits and keyloggers onto the machine.
Full disk encryption seems like the only defense here.
Ross Anderson, Rainer Böhme, Richard Clayton, and Tyler Moore have published a major report on security and economics: "Security, Economics, and the Internal Market," published by the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA). It's 114 pages long, and I just printed it out to read.
This both is and isn't news. In the security world, we knew that replacing credit card signatures with chip and PIN created new vulnerabilities. In this paper (see also the press release and FAQ), researchers demonstrated some pretty basic attacks against the system -- one using a paper clip, a needle, and a small recording device. This BBC article is a good summary of the research.
And also, there's also this leaked chip and PIN report from APACS, the UK trade association that has been pushing chip and PIN.
Okay, so this could be big news:
But a team of computer security researchers plans to report Wednesday that it had been able to gain wireless access to a combination heart defibrillator and pacemaker.
There's only a little bit of hyperbole in the New York Times article. The research is being conducted by the Medical Device Security Center, with researchers from Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Harvard Medical School, the University of Massachusetts Amherst, and the University of Washington. They have two published papers:
This is from the FAQ for the second paper (an ICD is a implantable cardiac defibrillator):
As part of our research we evaluated the security and privacy properties of a common ICD. We investigate whether a malicious party could create his or her own equipment capable of wirelessly communicating with this ICD.
Of course, we all know how this happened. It's a story we've seen a zillion times before: the designers didn't think about security, so the design wasn't secure.
The researchers are making it very clear that this doesn't mean people shouldn't get pacemakers and ICDs. Again, from the FAQ:
We strongly believe that nothing in our report should deter patients from receiving these devices if recommended by their physician. The implantable cardiac defibrillator is a proven, life-saving technology. We believe that the risk to patients is low and that patients should not be alarmed. We do not know of a single case where an IMD patient has ever been harmed by a malicious security attack. To carry out the attacks we discuss in our paper would require: malicious intent, technical sophistication, and the ability to place electronic equipment close to the patient. Our goal in performing this study is to improve the security, privacy, safety, and effectiveness of future IMDs.
I agree with this answer. The risks are there, but the benefits of these devices are much greater. The point of this research isn't to help people hack into pacemakers and commit murder, but to enable medical device companies to design better implantable equipment in the future. I think it's great work.
Of course, that will only happen if the medical device companies don't react like idiots:
Medtronic, the industry leader in cardiac regulating implants, said Tuesday that it welcomed the chance to look at security issues with doctors, regulators and researchers, adding that it had never encountered illegal or unauthorized hacking of its devices that have telemetry, or wireless control, capabilities.
Just because you have no knowledge of something happening does not mean it's not a risk.
The general moral here: more and more, computer technology is becoming intimately embedded into our lives. And with each new application comes new security risks. And we have to take those risks seriously.
The Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe said cyber spying violated individuals' right to privacy and could be used only in exceptional cases.
Germany's Federal Constitutional Court has rejected provisions adopted by the State of North Rhine-Westphalia that allowed investigators to covertly search PCs online. In its ruling, the court creates a new right to confidentiality and integrity of personal data stored on IT systems; the ruling expands the current protection provided by the country's constitutional rights for telecommunications privacy and the personal right to control private information under the German constitution.
So, you're sitting around the house with your buddies, playing World of Warcraft. One of you wonders: "How can we get paid for doing this?" Another says: "I know; let's pretend we're fighting terrorism, and then get a government grant."
Having eliminated all terrorism in the real world, the U.S. intelligence community is working to develop software that will detect violent extremists infiltrating World of Warcraft and other massive multiplayer games, according to a data-mining report from the Director of National Intelligence.
You just can't make this stuff up.
EDITED TO ADD (3/13): Funny.
I don't know how big a deal this really is, but it is amusing nonetheless:
According to the investigation, 122 Federal Aviation Administration safety inspector badges have been stolen or lost in the past five years. The credentials are one of the few forms of identification that give complete and unfettered access to airport facilities, including the cockpits of planes in flight.
When I write and speak about privacy, I am regularly confronted with the mutual disclosure argument. Explained in books like David Brin's The Transparent Society, the argument goes something like this: In a world of ubiquitous surveillance, you'll know all about me, but I will also know all about you. The government will be watching us, but we'll also be watching the government. This is different than before, but it's not automatically worse. And because I know your secrets, you can't use my secrets as a weapon against me.
This might not be everybody's idea of utopia -- and it certainly doesn't address the inherent value of privacy -- but this theory has a glossy appeal, and could easily be mistaken for a way out of the problem of technology's continuing erosion of privacy. Except it doesn't work, because it ignores the crucial dissimilarity of power.
You cannot evaluate the value of privacy and disclosure unless you account for the relative power levels of the discloser and the disclosee.
If I disclose information to you, your power with respect to me increases. One way to address this power imbalance is for you to similarly disclose information to me. We both have less privacy, but the balance of power is maintained. But this mechanism fails utterly if you and I have different power levels to begin with.
An example will make this clearer. You're stopped by a police officer, who demands to see identification. Divulging your identity will give the officer enormous power over you: He or she can search police databases using the information on your ID; he or she can create a police record attached to your name; he or she can put you on this or that secret terrorist watch list. Asking to see the officer's ID in return gives you no comparable power over him or her. The power imbalance is too great, and mutual disclosure does not make it OK.
You can think of your existing power as the exponent in an equation that determines the value, to you, of more information. The more power you have, the more additional power you derive from the new data.
Another example: When your doctor says "take off your clothes," it makes no sense for you to say, "You first, doc." The two of you are not engaging in an interaction of equals.
This is the principle that should guide decision-makers when they consider installing surveillance cameras or launching data-mining programs. It's not enough to open the efforts to public scrutiny. All aspects of government work best when the relative power between the governors and the governed remains as small as possible -- when liberty is high and control is low. Forced openness in government reduces the relative power differential between the two, and is generally good. Forced openness in laypeople increases the relative power, and is generally bad.
Seventeen-year-old Erik Crespo was arrested in 2005 in connection with a shooting in a New York City elevator. There's no question that he committed the shooting; it was captured on surveillance-camera videotape. But he claimed that while being interrogated, Detective Christopher Perino tried to talk him out of getting a lawyer, and told him that he had to sign a confession before he could see a judge.
Perino denied, under oath, that he ever questioned Crespo. But Crespo had received an MP3 player as a Christmas gift, and surreptitiously recorded the questioning. The defense brought a transcript and CD into evidence. Shortly thereafter, the prosecution offered Crespo a better deal than originally proffered (seven years rather than 15). Crespo took the deal, and Perino was separately indicted on charges of perjury.
Without that recording, it was the detective's word against Crespo's. And who would believe a murder suspect over a New York City detective? That power imbalance was reduced only because Crespo was smart enough to press the "record" button on his MP3 player. Why aren't all interrogations recorded? Why don't defendants have the right to those recordings, just as they have the right to an attorney? Police routinely record traffic stops from their squad cars for their own protection; that video record shouldn't stop once the suspect is no longer a threat.
Cameras make sense when trained on police, and in offices where lawmakers meet with lobbyists, and wherever government officials wield power over the people. Open-government laws, giving the public access to government records and meetings of governmental bodies, also make sense. These all foster liberty.
Ubiquitous surveillance programs that affect everyone without probable cause or warrant, like the National Security Agency's warrantless eavesdropping programs or various proposals to monitor everything on the internet, foster control. And no one is safer in a political system of control.
This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.
Commentary by David Brin.
Israel is implementing an IFF (identification, friend or foe) system for commercial aircraft, designed to differentiate legitimate planes from terrorist-controlled planes.
The news article implies that it's a basic challenge-and-response system. Ground control issues some kind of alphanumeric challenge to the plane. The pilot types the challenge into some hand-held computer device, and reads back the reply. Authentication is achieved by 1) physical possession of the device, and 2) typing a legitimate PIN into the device to activate it.
The article talks about a distress mode, where the pilot signals that a terrorist is holding a gun to his head. Likely, that's done by typing a special distress PIN into the device, and reading back whatever the screen displays.
The military has had this sort of system -- first paper-based, and eventually computer-based -- for decades. The critical issue with using this on commercial aircraft is how to deal with user error. The system has to be easy enough to use, and the parts hard enough to lose, that there won't be a lot of false alarms.
We know what we don't like about buying consolidated product suites: one great product and a bunch of mediocre ones. And we know what we don't like about buying best-of-breed: multiple vendors, multiple interfaces, and multiple products that don't work well together. The security industry has gone back and forth between the two, as a new generation of IT security professionals rediscovers the downsides of each solution.
The real problem is that neither solution really works, and we continually fool ourselves into believing whatever we don't have is better than what we have at the time. And the real solution is to buy results, not products.
Honestly, no one wants to buy IT security. People want to buy whatever they want -- connectivity, a Web presence, email, networked applications, whatever -- and they want it to be secure. That they're forced to spend money on IT security is an artifact of the youth of the computer industry. And sooner or later the need to buy security will disappear.
It will disappear because IT vendors are starting to realize they have to provide security as part of whatever they're selling. It will disappear because organizations are starting to buy services instead of products, and demanding security as part of those services. It will disappear because the security industry will disappear as a consumer category, and will instead market to the IT industry.
The critical driver here is outsourcing. Outsourcing is the ultimate consolidator, because the customer no longer cares about the details. If I buy my network services from a large IT infrastructure company, I don't care if it secures things by installing the hot new intrusion prevention systems, by configuring the routers and servers as to obviate the need for network-based security, or if it uses magic security dust given to it by elven kings. I just want a contract that specifies a level and quality of service, and my vendor can figure it out.
IT is infrastructure. Infrastructure is always outsourced. And the details of how the infrastructure works are left to the companies that provide it.
This is the future of IT, and when that happens we're going to start to see a type of consolidation we haven't seen before. Instead of large security companies gobbling up small security companies, both large and small security companies will be gobbled up by non-security companies. It's already starting to happen. In 2006, IBM bought ISS. The same year BT bought my company, Counterpane, and last year it bought INS. These aren't large security companies buying small security companies; these are non-security companies buying large and small security companies.
If I were Symantec and McAfee, I would be preparing myself for a buyer.
This is good consolidation. Instead of having to choose between a single product suite that isn't very good or a best-of-breed set of products that don't work well together, we can ignore the issue completely. We can just find an infrastructure provider that will figure it out and make it work -- who cares how?
This seems not to be a joke.
The Transportation Security Administration is interested in evaluating -- and eventually approving –- the design of certain laptop bags, so travelers would be permitted to pass through security checkpoints without having to remove their laptops.
Doesn't sound like a particularly useful laptop bag.
A whole article about a bomb in Times Square without ever mentioning the "t" word.
Along with this, maybe we're turning a corner. Probably not....
Dread is a powerful force. The problem with dread is that it leads to terrible decision-making.
SurveillanceSaver is a screensaver for OS X and Windows that shows live images of over 400 network surveillance cameras worldwide.
When I wrote this essay -- "Portrait of the Modern Terrorist as an Idiot" -- I thought a lot about the government inventing terrorist plotters and entrapping them, to make the world seem scarier. Since then, it's been on my list of topics to write about someday.
Rolling Stone has this excellent article on the topic, about the Joint Terrorism Task Forces in the U.S.:
But a closer inspection of the cases brought by JTTFs reveals that most of the prosecutions had one thing in common: The defendants posed little if any demonstrable threat to anyone or anything. According to a study by the Center on Law and Security at the New York University School of Law, only ten percent of the 619 "terrorist" cases brought by the federal government have resulted in convictions on "terrorism-related" charges -- a category so broad as to be meaningless. In the past year, none of the convictions involved jihadist terror plots targeting America. "The government releases selective figures," says Karen Greenberg, director of the center. "They have never even defined 'terrorism.' They keep us in the dark over statistics."
Presenting: Goolag Scanner from the Cult of the Dead Cow.
I've seen a lot of pre-release scanning results from these guys, and it's pretty amazing what they've found.
There's a new version of TrueCrypt, the free open-source disk encryption software.
Kind of an interview.
To automatically inventory the tools a truck is carrying.
To find misrouted luggage at an airport.
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