Worldwide Encryption Products Survey

Today I released my worldwide survey of encryption products.

The findings of this survey identified 619 entities that sell encryption products. Of those 412, or two-thirds, are outside the U.S.-calling into question the efficacy of any US mandates forcing backdoors for law-enforcement access. It also showed that anyone who wants to avoid US surveillance has over 567 competing products to choose from. These foreign products offer a wide variety of secure applications­ -- voice encryption, text message encryption, file encryption, network-traffic encryption, anonymous currency­ -- providing the same levels of security as US products do today.

Details:

  • There are at least 865 hardware or software products incorporating encryption from 55 different countries. This includes 546 encryption products from outside the US, representing two-thirds of the total.

  • The most common non-US country for encryption products is Germany, with 112 products. This is followed by the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Sweden, in that order.

  • The five most common countries for encryption products­ -- including the US­ -- account for two-thirds of the total. But smaller countries like Algeria, Argentina, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, Chile, Cyprus, Estonia, Iraq, Malaysia, St. Kitts and Nevis, Tanzania, and Thailand each produce at least one encryption product.

  • Of the 546 foreign encryption products we found, 56% are available for sale and 44% are free. 66% are proprietary, and 34% are open source. Some for-sale products also have a free version.

  • At least 587 entities­ -- primarily companies -- ­either sell or give away encryption products. Of those, 374, or about two-thirds, are outside the US.

  • Of the 546 foreign encryption products, 47 are file encryption products, 68 e-mail encryption products, 104 message encryption products, 35 voice encryption products, and 61 virtual private networking products.

The report is here, here, and here. The data, in Excel form, is here.

Press articles are starting to come in. (Here are the previous blog posts on the effort.)

I know the database is incomplete, and I know there are errors. I welcome both additions and corrections, and will be releasing a 1.1 version of this survey in a few weeks.

Posted on February 11, 2016 at 11:05 AM24 Comments

AT&T Does Not Care about Your Privacy

AT&T's CEO believes that the company should not offer robust security to its customers:

But tech company leaders aren't all joining the fight against the deliberate weakening of encryption. AT&T CEO Randall Stephenson said this week that AT&T, Apple, and other tech companies shouldn't have any say in the debate.

"I don't think it is Silicon Valley's decision to make about whether encryption is the right thing to do," Stephenson said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. "I understand [Apple CEO] Tim Cook's decision, but I don't think it's his decision to make."

His position is extreme in its disregard for the privacy of his customers. If he doesn't believe that companies should have any say in what levels of privacy they offer their customers, you can be sure that AT&T won't offer any robust privacy or security to you.

Does he have any clue what an anti-market position this is? He says that it is not the business of Silicon Valley companies to offer product features that might annoy the government. The "debate" about what features commercial products should have should happen elsewhere -- presumably within the government. I thought we all agreed that state-controlled economies just don't work.

My guess is that he doesn't realize what an extreme position he's taking by saying that product design isn't the decision of companies to make. My guess is that AT&T is so deep in bed with the NSA and FBI that he's just saying things he believes justifies his position.

Here's the original, behind a paywall.

Posted on February 10, 2016 at 1:59 PM41 Comments

The 2016 National Threat Assessment

It's National Threat Assessment Day. Published annually by the Director of National Intelligence, the "Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community" is the US intelligence community's one time to publicly talk about the threats in general. The document is the results of weeks of work and input from lots of people. For Clapper, it's his chance to shape the dialog, set up priorities, and prepare Congress for budget requests. The document is an unclassified summary of a much longer classified document. And the day also includes Clapper testifying before the Senate Armed Service Committee. (You'll remember his now-famous lie to the committee in 2013.)

The document covers a wide variety of threats, from terrorism to organized crime, from energy politics to climate change. Although the document clearly says "The order of the topics presented in this statement does not necessarily indicate the relative importance or magnitude of the threat in the view of the Intelligence Community," it does. And like 2015 and 2014, cyber threats are #1 -- although this year it's called "Cyber and Technology."

The consequences of innovation and increased reliance on information technology in the next few years on both our society's way of life in general and how we in the Intelligence Community specifically perform our mission will probably be far greater in scope and impact than ever. Devices, designed and fielded with minimal security requirements and testing, and an ever -- increasing complexity of networks could lead to widespread vulnerabilities in civilian infrastructures and US Government systems. These developments will pose challenges to our cyber defenses and operational tradecraft but also create new opportunities for our own intelligence collectors.

Especially note that last clause. The FBI might hate encryption, but the intelligence community is not going dark.

The document then calls out a few specifics like the Internet of Things and Artificial Intelligence -- so surprise, considering other recent statements from government officials. This is the "...and Technology" part of the category.

More specifically:

Future cyber operations will almost certainly include an increased emphasis on changing or manipulating data to compromise its integrity (i.e., accuracy and reliability) to affect decisionmaking, reduce trust in systems, or cause adverse physical effects. Broader adoption of IoT devices and AI ­-- in settings such as public utilities and health care -- will only exacerbate these potential effects. Russian cyber actors, who post disinformation on commercial websites, might seek to alter online media as a means to influence public discourse and create confusion. Chinese military doctrine outlines the use of cyber deception operations to conceal intentions, modify stored data, transmit false data, manipulate the flow of information, or influence public sentiments -­ all to induce errors and miscalculation in decisionmaking.

Russia is the number one threat, followed by China, Iran, North Korea, and non-state actors:

Russia is assuming a more assertive cyber posture based on its willingness to target critical infrastructure systems and conduct espionage operations even when detected and under increased public scrutiny. Russian cyber operations are likely to target US interests to support several strategic objectives: intelligence gathering to support Russian decisionmaking in the Ukraine and Syrian crises, influence operations to support military and political objectives, and continuing preparation of the cyber environment for future contingencies.

Comments on China refer to the cybersecurity agreement from last September:

China continues to have success in cyber espionage against the US Government, our allies, and US companies. Beijing also selectively uses cyberattacks against targets it believes threaten Chinese domestic stability or regime legitimacy. We will monitor compliance with China's September 2015 commitment to refrain from conducting or knowingly supporting cyber -- enabled theft of intellectual property with the intent of providing competitive advantage to companies or commercial sectors. Private -- sector security experts have identified limited ongoing cyber activity from China but have not verified state sponsorship or the use of exfiltrated data for commercial gain.

Also interesting are the comments on non-state actors, which discuss both propaganda campaigns from ISIL, criminal ransomware, and hacker tools.

Posted on February 9, 2016 at 3:25 PM17 Comments

Large-Scale FBI Hacking

As part of a child pornography investigation, the FBI hacked into over 1,300 computers.

But after Playpen was seized, it wasn't immediately closed down, unlike previous dark web sites that have been shuttered" by law enforcement. Instead, the FBI ran Playpen from its own servers in Newington, Virginia, from February 20 to March 4, reads a complaint filed against a defendant in Utah. During this time, the FBI deployed what is known as a network investigative technique (NIT), the agency's term for a hacking tool.

While Playpen was being run out of a server in Virginia, and the hacking tool was infecting targets, "approximately 1300 true internet protocol (IP) addresses were identified during this time," according to the same complaint.

The FBI seems to have obtained a single warrant, but it's hard to believe that a legal warrant could allow the police to hack 1,300 different computers. We do know that the FBI is very vague about the extent of its operations in warrant applications. And surely we need actual public debate about this sort of technique.

Also, "Playpen" is a super-creepy name for a child porn site. I feel icky just typing it.

Posted on February 9, 2016 at 6:25 AM45 Comments

Data and Goliath Published in Paperback

Today, Data and Goliath is being published in paperback.

Everyone tells me that the paperback version sells better than the hardcover, even though it's a year later. I can't really imagine that there are tens of thousands of people who wouldn't spend $28 on a hardcover but are happy to spend $18 on the paperback, but we'll see. (Amazon has the hardcover for $19, the paperback for $11.70, and the Kindle edition for $14.60, plus shipping, if any. I am still selling signed hardcovers for $28 including domestic shipping -- more for international.)

I got a box of paperbacks from my publisher last week. They look good. Not as good as the hardcover, but good for a trade paperback.

Posted on February 8, 2016 at 2:11 PM16 Comments

Exploiting Google Maps for Fraud

The New York Times has a long article on fraudulent locksmiths. The scam is a basic one: quote a low price on the phone, but charge much more once you show up and do the work. But the method by which the scammers get victims is new. They exploit Google's crowdsourced system for identifying businesses on their maps. The scammers convince Google that they have a local address, which Google displays to its users who are searching for local businesses.

But they involve chicanery with two platforms: Google My Business, essentially the company's version of the Yellow Pages, and Map Maker, which is Google's crowdsourced online map of the world. The latter allows people around the planet to log in to the system and input data about streets, companies and points of interest.

Both Google My Business and Map Maker are a bit like Wikipedia, insofar as they are largely built and maintained by millions of contributors. Keeping the system open, with verification, gives countless businesses an invaluable online presence. Google officials say that the system is so good that many local companies do not bother building their own websites. Anyone who has ever navigated using Google Maps knows the service is a technological wonder.

But the very quality that makes Google's systems accessible to companies that want to be listed makes them vulnerable to pernicious meddling.

"This is what you get when you rely on crowdsourcing for all your 'up to date' and 'relevant' local business content," Mr. Seely said. "You get people who contribute meaningful content, and you get people who abuse the system."

The scam is growing:

Lead gens have their deepest roots in locksmithing, but the model has migrated to an array of services, including garage door repair, carpet cleaning, moving and home security. Basically, they surface in any business where consumers need someone in the vicinity to swing by and clean, fix, relocate or install something.

What's interesting to me are the economic incentives involved:

Only Google, it seems, can fix Google. The company is trying, its representatives say, by, among other things, removing fake information quickly and providing a "Report a Problem" tool on the maps. After looking over the fake Locksmith Force building, a bunch of other lead-gen advertisers in Phoenix and that Mountain View operation with more than 800 websites, Google took action.

Not only has the fake Locksmith Force building vanished from Google Maps, but the company no longer turns up in a "locksmith Phoenix" search. At least not in the first 20 pages. Nearly all the other spammy locksmiths pointed out to Google have disappeared from results, too.

"We're in a constant arms race with local business spammers who, unfortunately, use all sorts of tricks to try to game our system and who've been a thorn in the Internet's side for over a decade," a Google spokesman wrote in an email. "As spammers change their techniques, we're continually working on new, better ways to keep them off Google Search and Maps. There's work to do, and we want to keep doing better."

There was no mention of a stronger verification system or a beefed-up spam team at Google. Without such systemic solutions, Google's critics say, the change to local results will not rise even to the level of superficial.

And that's Google's best option, really. It's not the one losing money from these scammers, so it's not motivated to fix the problem. Unless the problem rises to the level of affecting user trust in the entire system, it's just going to do superficial things.

This is exactly the sort of market failure that government regulation needs to fix.

Posted on February 8, 2016 at 6:52 AM31 Comments

Friday Squid Blogging: Squid Knitting Pattern

Surprisingly realistic for a knitted stuffed animal.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven't covered.

Posted on February 5, 2016 at 4:55 PM68 Comments

NSA Reorganizing

The NSA is undergoing a major reorganization, combining its attack and defense sides into a single organization:

In place of the Signals Intelligence and Information Assurance directorates ­ the organizations that historically have spied on foreign targets and defended classified networks against spying, respectively ­ the NSA is creating a Directorate of Operations that combines the operational elements of each.

It's going to be difficult, since their missions and culture are so different.

The Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) seeks to build relationships with private-sector companies and help find vulnerabilities in software ­ most of which officials say wind up being disclosed. It issues software guidance and tests the security of systems to help strengthen their defenses.

But the other side of the NSA house, which looks for vulnerabilities that can be exploited to hack a foreign network, is much more secretive.

"You have this kind of clash between the closed environment of the sigint mission and the need of the information-assurance team to be out there in the public and be seen as part of the solution," said a second former official. "I think that's going to be a hard trick to pull off."

I think this will make it even harder to trust the NSA. In my book Data and Goliath, I recommended separating the attack and defense missions of the NSA even further, breaking up the agency. (I also wrote about that idea here.)

And missing in their reorg is how US CyberCommmand's offensive and defensive capabilities relate to the NSA's. That seems pretty important, too.

EDITED TO ADD (2/11): Commentary.

Posted on February 5, 2016 at 3:15 PM36 Comments

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