EU Still Concerned about Windows 10 Privacy Settings

We all should be concerned about the privacy settings in Windows 10. And we should be glad that the EU has the regulatory authority to do something about it.

Posted on February 28, 2017 at 6:25 AM19 Comments

Adm. Rogers Talks about Buying Cyberweapons

At a talk last week, the head of US Cyber Command and the NSA Mike Rogers talked about the US buying cyberweapons from arms manufacturers.

"In the application of kinetic functionality -- weapons -- we go to the private sector and say, 'Build this thing we call a [joint directed-attack munition], a [Tomahawk land-attack munition].' Fill in the blank," he said.

"On the offensive side, to date, we have done almost all of our weapons development internally. And part of me goes -- five to ten years from now is that a long-term sustainable model? Does that enable you to access fully the capabilities resident in the private sector? I'm still trying to work my way through that, intellectually."

Businesses already flog exploits, security vulnerability details, spyware, and similar stuff to US intelligence agencies, and Rogers is clearly considering stepping that trade up a notch.

Already, Third World countries are buying from cyberweapons arms manufacturers. My guess is that he's right and the US will be doing that in the future, too.

Posted on February 27, 2017 at 2:28 PM16 Comments

A Survey of Propaganda

This is an excellent survey article on modern propaganda techniques, how they work, and how we might defend ourselves against them.

Cory Doctorow summarizes the techniques on BoingBoing:

...in Russia, it's about flooding the channel with a mix of lies and truth, crowding out other stories; in China, it's about suffocating arguments with happy-talk distractions, and for trolls like Milo Yiannopoulos, it's weaponizing hate, outraging people so they spread your message to the small, diffused minority of broken people who welcome your message and would otherwise be uneconomical to reach.

As to defense: "Debunking doesn't work: provide an alternative narrative."

Posted on February 27, 2017 at 6:24 AM51 Comments

My TEDMED Talk on Medical Data Privacy

Last November, I gave a talk at the TEDMED Conference on health and medical data privacy. The talk is online.

Posted on February 24, 2017 at 1:36 PM17 Comments

SHA-1 Collision Found

The first collision in the SHA-1 hash function has been found.

This is not a surprise. We've all expected this for over a decade, watching computing power increase. This is why NIST standardized SHA-3 in 2012.

EDITED TO ADD (2/24): Website for the collision. (Yes, this brute-force example has its own website.)

Posted on February 23, 2017 at 3:29 PM29 Comments

NSA Using Cyberattack for Defense

These days, it's rare that we learn something new from the Snowden documents. But Ben Buchanan found something interesting. The NSA penetrates enemy networks in order to enhance our defensive capabilities.

The data the NSA collected by penetrating BYZANTINE CANDOR's networks had concrete forward-looking defensive value. It included information on the adversary's "future targets," including "bios of senior White House officials, [cleared defense contractor] employees, [United States government] employees" and more. It also included access to the "source code and [the] new tools" the Chinese used to conduct operations. The computers penetrated by the NSA also revealed information about the exploits in use. In effect, the intelligence gained from the operation, once given to network defenders and fed into automated systems, was enough to guide and enhance the United States' defensive efforts.

This case alludes to important themes in network defense. It shows the persistence of talented adversaries, the creativity of clever defenders, the challenge of getting actionable intelligence on the threat, and the need for network architecture and defenders capable of acting on that information. But it also highlights an important point that is too often overlooked: not every intrusion is in service of offensive aims. There are genuinely defensive reasons for a nation to launch intrusions against another nation's networks.

[...]

Other Snowden files show what the NSA can do when it gathers this data, describing an interrelated and complex set of United States programs to collect intelligence and use it to better protect its networks. The NSA's internal documents call this "foreign intelligence in support of dynamic defense." The gathered information can "tip" malicious code the NSA has placed on servers and computers around the world. Based on this tip, one of the NSA's nodes can act on the information, "inject[ing a] response onto the Internet towards [the] target." There are a variety of responses that the NSA can inject, including resetting connections, delivering malicious code, and redirecting internet traffic.

Similarly, if the NSA can learn about the adversary's "tools and tradecraft" early enough, it can develop and deploy "tailored countermeasures" to blunt the intended effect. The NSA can then try to discern the intent of the adversary and use its countermeasure to mitigate the attempted intrusion. The signals intelligence agency feeds information about the incoming threat to an automated system deployed on networks that the NSA protects. This system has a number of capabilities, including blocking the incoming traffic outright, sending unexpected responses back to the adversary, slowing the traffic down, and "permitting the activity to appear [to the adversary] to complete without disclosing that it did not reach [or] affect the intended target."

These defensive capabilities appear to be actively in use by the United States against a wide range of threats. NSA documents indicate that the agency uses the system to block twenty-eight major categories of threats as of 2011. This includes action against significant adversaries, such as China, as well as against non-state actors. Documents provide a number of success stories. These include the thwarting of a BYZANTINE HADES intrusion attempt that targeted four high-ranking American military leaders, including the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the NSA's network defenders saw the attempt coming and successfully prevented any negative effects. The files also include examples of successful defense against Anonymous and against several other code-named entities.

I recommend Buchanan's book: The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust and Fear Between Nations.

Posted on February 22, 2017 at 6:21 AM102 Comments

German Government Classifies Doll as Illegal Spyware

This is interesting:

The My Friend Cayla doll, which is manufactured by the US company Genesis Toys and distributed in Europe by Guildford-based Vivid Toy Group, allows children to access the internet via speech recognition software, and to control the toy via an app.

But Germany's Federal Network Agency announced this week that it classified Cayla as an "illegal espionage apparatus". As a result, retailers and owners could face fines if they continue to stock it or fail to permanently disable the doll's wireless connection.

Under German law it is illegal to manufacture, sell or possess surveillance devices disguised as another object.

Another article.

Posted on February 20, 2017 at 6:55 AM75 Comments

Friday Squid Blogging: The Strawberry Squid's Lopsided Eyes

The evolutionary reasons why the strawberry squid has two different eyes. Additional articles.

Original paper.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven't covered.

Posted on February 17, 2017 at 4:03 PM184 Comments

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