Earlier this month I made fun of a company called Crown-Sterling, for...for...for being a company that deserves being made fun of.
This morning, the company announced that they "decrypted two 256-bit asymmetric public keys in approximately 50 seconds from a standard laptop computer." Really. They did. This keylength is so small it has never been considered secure. It was too small to be part of the RSA Factoring Challenge when it was introduced in 1991. In 1977, when Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adelman first described RSA, they included a challenge with a 426-bit key. (It was factored in 1994.)
The press release goes on: "Crown Sterling also announced the consistent decryption of 512-bit asymmetric public key in as little as five hours also using standard computing." They didn't demonstrate it, but if they're right they've matched a factoring record set in 1999. Five hours is significantly less than the 5.2 months it took in 1999, but slower than would be expected if Crown-Sterling just used the 1999 techniques with modern CPUs and networks.
Is anyone taking this company seriously anymore? I honestly wouldn't be surprised if this was a hoax press release. It's not currently on the company's website. (And, if it is a hoax, I apologize to Crown Sterling. I'll post a retraction as soon as I hear from you.)
EDITED TO ADD: First, the press release is real. And second, I forgot to include the quote from CEO Robert Grant: "Today's decryptions demonstrate the vulnerabilities associated with the current encryption paradigm. We have clearly demonstrated the problem which also extends to larger keys."
People, this isn't hard. Find an RSA Factoring Challenge number that hasn't been factored yet and factor it. Once you do, the entire world will take you seriously. Until you do, no one will. And, bonus, you won't have to reveal your super-secret world-destabalizing cryptanalytic techniques.
Maria Farrell has a really interesting framing of information/device privacy:
What our smartphones and relationship abusers share is that they both exert power over us in a world shaped to tip the balance in their favour, and they both work really, really hard to obscure this fact and keep us confused and blaming ourselves. Here are some of the ways our unequal relationship with our smartphones is like an abusive relationship:
- They isolate us from deeper, competing relationships in favour of superficial contact -- 'user engagement' -- that keeps their hold on us strong. Working with social media, they insidiously curate our social lives, manipulating us emotionally with dark patterns to keep us scrolling.
- They tell us the onus is on us to manage their behavior. It's our job to tiptoe around them and limit their harms. Spending too much time on a literally-designed-to-be-behaviorally-addictive phone? They send company-approved messages about our online time, but ban from their stores the apps that would really cut our use. We just need to use willpower. We just need to be good enough to deserve them.
- They betray us, leaking data / spreading secrets. What we shared privately with them is suddenly public. Sometimes this destroys lives, but hey, we only have ourselves to blame. They fight nasty and under-handed, and are so, so sorry when they get caught that we're meant to feel bad for them. But they never truly change, and each time we take them back, we grow weaker.
- They love-bomb us when we try to break away, piling on the free data or device upgrades, making us click through page after page of dark pattern, telling us no one understands us like they do, no one else sees everything we really are, no one else will want us.
- It's impossible to just cut them off. They've wormed themselves into every part of our lives, making life without them unimaginable. And anyway, the relationship is complicated. There is love in it, or there once was. Surely we can get back to that if we just manage them the way they want us to?
Nope. Our devices are basically gaslighting us. They tell us they work for and care about us, and if we just treat them right then we can learn to trust them. But all the evidence shows the opposite is true.
I am in search of a strategic thought partner: a person who can work closely with me over the next 9 to 12 months in assessing what's needed to advance the practice, integration, and adoption of public-interest technology.
All of the details are in the RFP. The selected strategist will work closely with me on a number of clear deliverables. This is a contract position that could possibly become a salaried position in a subsequent phase, and under a different agreement.
I'm working with the team at Yancey Consulting, who will follow up with all proposers and manage the process. Please email Lisa Yancey at email@example.com.
Expandpass is a string expansion program. It's "useful for cracking passwords you kinda-remember." You tell the program what you remember about the password and it tries related passwords.
I learned about it in this article about Phil Dougherty, who helps people recover lost cryptocurrency passwords (mostly Ethereum) for a cut of the recovered value.
Not that serious, but interesting:
In late 2011, Intel introduced a performance enhancement to its line of server processors that allowed network cards and other peripherals to connect directly to a CPU's last-level cache, rather than following the standard (and significantly longer) path through the server's main memory. By avoiding system memory, Intel's DDIOshort for Data-Direct I/Oincreased input/output bandwidth and reduced latency and power consumption.
Now, researchers are warning that, in certain scenarios, attackers can abuse DDIO to obtain keystrokes and possibly other types of sensitive data that flow through the memory of vulnerable servers. The most serious form of attack can take place in data centers and cloud environments that have both DDIO and remote direct memory access enabled to allow servers to exchange data. A server leased by a malicious hacker could abuse the vulnerability to attack other customers. To prove their point, the researchers devised an attack that allows a server to steal keystrokes typed into the protected SSH (or secure shell session) established between another server and an application server.
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:
- I'm speaking at University College London on September 23, 2019.
- I'm speaking at World's Top 50 Innovators 2019 at the Royal Society in London on September 24, 2019.
- I'm speaking at Cyber Security Nordic in Helsinki, Finland on October 3, 2019.
- I'm speaking at the Australian Cyber Conference 2019 in Melbourne on October 9, 2019.
The list is maintained on this page.
As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven't covered.
Read my blog posting guidelines here.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.