Entries Tagged "cybersecurity"

Page 1 of 24

Ransomware Gang Files SEC Complaint

A ransomware gang, annoyed at not being paid, filed an SEC complaint against its victim for not disclosing its security breach within the required four days.

This is over the top, but is just another example of the extreme pressure ransomware gangs put on companies after seizing their data. Gangs are now going through the data, looking for particularly important or embarrassing pieces of data to threaten executives with exposing. I have heard stories of executives’ families being threatened, of consensual porn being identified (people regularly mix work and personal email) and exposed, and of victims’ customers and partners being directly contacted. Ransoms are in the millions, and gangs do their best to ensure that the pressure to pay is intense.

Posted on November 17, 2023 at 11:31 AMView Comments

New York Increases Cybersecurity Rules for Financial Companies

Another example of a large and influential state doing things the federal government won’t:

Boards of directors, or other senior committees, are charged with overseeing cybersecurity risk management, and must retain an appropriate level of expertise to understand cyber issues, the rules say. Directors must sign off on cybersecurity programs, and ensure that any security program has “sufficient resources” to function.

In a new addition, companies now face significant requirements related to ransom payments. Regulated firms must now report any payment made to hackers within 24 hours of that payment.

Posted on November 3, 2023 at 7:01 AMView Comments

EPA Won’t Force Water Utilities to Audit Their Cybersecurity

The industry pushed back:

Despite the EPA’s willingness to provide training and technical support to help states and public water system organizations implement cybersecurity surveys, the move garnered opposition from both GOP state attorneys and trade groups.

Republican state attorneys that were against the new proposed policies said that the call for new inspections could overwhelm state regulators. The attorney generals of Arkansas, Iowa and Missouri all sued the EPA—claiming the agency had no authority to set these requirements. This led to the EPA’s proposal being temporarily blocked back in June.

So now we have a piece of our critical infrastructure with substandard cybersecurity. This seems like a really bad outcome.

Posted on October 24, 2023 at 7:02 AMView Comments

Security Vulnerability of Switzerland’s E-Voting System

Online voting is insecure, period. This doesn’t stop organizations and governments from using it. (And for low-stakes elections, it’s probably fine.) Switzerland—not low stakes—uses online voting for national elections. Andrew Appel explains why it’s a bad idea:

Last year, I published a 5-part series about Switzerland’s e-voting system. Like any internet voting system, it has inherent security vulnerabilities: if there are malicious insiders, they can corrupt the vote count; and if thousands of voters’ computers are hacked by malware, the malware can change votes as they are transmitted. Switzerland “solves” the problem of malicious insiders in their printing office by officially declaring that they won’t consider that threat model in their cybersecurity assessment.

But it also has an interesting new vulnerability:

The Swiss Post e-voting system aims to protect your vote against vote manipulation and interference. The goal is to achieve this even if your own computer is infected by undetected malware that manipulates a user vote. This protection is implemented by special return codes (Prüfcode), printed on the sheet of paper you receive by physical mail. Your computer doesn’t know these codes, so even if it’s infected by malware, it can’t successfully cheat you as long as, you follow the protocol.

Unfortunately, the protocol isn’t explained to you on the piece of paper you get by mail. It’s only explained to you online, when you visit the e-voting website. And of course, that’s part of the problem! If your computer is infected by malware, then it can already present to you a bogus website that instructs you to follow a different protocol, one that is cheatable. To demonstrate this, I built a proof-of-concept demonstration.

Appel again:

Kuster’s fake protocol is not exactly what I imagined; it’s better. He explains it all in his blog post. Basically, in his malware-manipulated website, instead of displaying the verification codes for the voter to compare with what’s on the paper, the website asks the voter to enter the verification codes into a web form. Since the website doesn’t know what’s on the paper, that web-form entry is just for show. Of course, Kuster did not employ a botnet virus to distribute his malware to real voters! He keeps it contained on his own system and demonstrates it in a video.

Again, the solution is paper. (Here I am saying that in 2004.) And, no, blockchain does not help—it makes security worse.

Posted on October 17, 2023 at 7:11 AMView Comments

NSA AI Security Center

The NSA is starting a new artificial intelligence security center:

The AI security center’s establishment follows an NSA study that identified securing AI models from theft and sabotage as a major national security challenge, especially as generative AI technologies emerge with immense transformative potential for both good and evil.

Nakasone said it would become “NSA’s focal point for leveraging foreign intelligence insights, contributing to the development of best practices guidelines, principles, evaluation, methodology and risk frameworks” for both AI security and the goal of promoting the secure development and adoption of AI within “our national security systems and our defense industrial base.”

He said it would work closely with U.S. industry, national labs, academia and the Department of Defense as well as international partners.

Posted on October 2, 2023 at 12:40 PMView Comments

On the Cybersecurity Jobs Shortage

In April, Cybersecurity Ventures reported on extreme cybersecurity job shortage:

Global cybersecurity job vacancies grew by 350 percent, from one million openings in 2013 to 3.5 million in 2021, according to Cybersecurity Ventures. The number of unfilled jobs leveled off in 2022, and remains at 3.5 million in 2023, with more than 750,000 of those positions in the U.S. Industry efforts to source new talent and tackle burnout continues, but we predict that the disparity between demand and supply will remain through at least 2025.

The numbers never made sense to me, and Ben Rothke has dug in and explained the reality:

…there is not a shortage of security generalists, middle managers, and people who claim to be competent CISOs. Nor is there a shortage of thought leaders, advisors, or self-proclaimed cyber subject matter experts. What there is a shortage of are computer scientists, developers, engineers, and information security professionals who can code, understand technical security architecture, product security and application security specialists, analysts with threat hunting and incident response skills. And this is nothing that can be fixed by a newbie taking a six-month information security boot camp.

[…]

Most entry-level roles tend to be quite specific, focused on one part of the profession, and are not generalist roles. For example, hiring managers will want a network security engineer with knowledge of networks or an identity management analyst with experience in identity systems. They are not looking for someone interested in security.

In fact, security roles are often not considered entry-level at all. Hiring managers assume you have some other background, usually technical before you are ready for an entry-level security job. Without those specific skills, it is difficult for a candidate to break into the profession. Job seekers learn that entry-level often means at least two to three years of work experience in a related field.

That makes a lot more sense, and matches what I experience.

Posted on September 20, 2023 at 7:06 AMView Comments

Remotely Stopping Polish Trains

Turns out that it’s easy to broadcast radio commands that force Polish trains to stop:

…the saboteurs appear to have sent simple so-called “radio-stop” commands via radio frequency to the trains they targeted. Because the trains use a radio system that lacks encryption or authentication for those commands, Olejnik says, anyone with as little as $30 of off-the-shelf radio equipment can broadcast the command to a Polish train­—sending a series of three acoustic tones at a 150.100 megahertz frequency­—and trigger their emergency stop function.

“It is three tonal messages sent consecutively. Once the radio equipment receives it, the locomotive goes to a halt,” Olejnik says, pointing to a document outlining trains’ different technical standards in the European Union that describes the “radio-stop” command used in the Polish system. In fact, Olejnik says that the ability to send the command has been described in Polish radio and train forums and on YouTube for years. “Everybody could do this. Even teenagers trolling. The frequencies are known. The tones are known. The equipment is cheap.”

Even so, this is being described as a cyberattack.

Posted on August 28, 2023 at 7:05 AMView Comments

White House Announces AI Cybersecurity Challenge

At Black Hat last week, the White House announced an AI Cyber Challenge. Gizmodo reports:

The new AI cyber challenge (which is being abbreviated “AIxCC”) will have a number of different phases. Interested would-be competitors can now submit their proposals to the Small Business Innovation Research program for evaluation and, eventually, selected teams will participate in a 2024 “qualifying event.” During that event, the top 20 teams will be invited to a semifinal competition at that year’s DEF CON, another large cybersecurity conference, where the field will be further whittled down.

[…]

To secure the top spot in DARPA’s new competition, participants will have to develop security solutions that do some seriously novel stuff. “To win first-place, and a top prize of $4 million, finalists must build a system that can rapidly defend critical infrastructure code from attack,” said Perri Adams, program manager for DARPA’s Information Innovation Office, during a Zoom call with reporters Tuesday. In other words: the government wants software that is capable of identifying and mitigating risks by itself.

This is a great idea. I was a big fan of DARPA’s AI capture-the-flag event in 2016, and am happy to see that DARPA is again inciting research in this area. (China has been doing this every year since 2017.)

Posted on August 21, 2023 at 7:10 AMView Comments

China Hacked Japan’s Military Networks

The NSA discovered the intrusion in 2020—we don’t know how—and alerted the Japanese. The Washington Post has the story:

The hackers had deep, persistent access and appeared to be after anything they could get their hands on—plans, capabilities, assessments of military shortcomings, according to three former senior U.S. officials, who were among a dozen current and former U.S. and Japanese officials interviewed, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the matter’s sensitivity.

[…]

The 2020 penetration was so disturbing that Gen. Paul Nakasone, the head of the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command, and Matthew Pottinger, who was White House deputy national security adviser at the time, raced to Tokyo. They briefed the defense minister, who was so concerned that he arranged for them to alert the prime minister himself.

Beijing, they told the Japanese officials, had breached Tokyo’s defense networks, making it one of the most damaging hacks in that country’s modern history.

More analysis.

Posted on August 14, 2023 at 7:02 AMView Comments

Microsoft Signing Key Stolen by Chinese

A bunch of networks, including US Government networks, have been hacked by the Chinese. The hackers used forged authentication tokens to access user email, using a stolen Microsoft Azure account consumer signing key. Congress wants answers. The phrase “negligent security practices” is being tossed about—and with good reason. Master signing keys are not supposed to be left around, waiting to be stolen.

Actually, two things went badly wrong here. The first is that Azure accepted an expired signing key, implying a vulnerability in whatever is supposed to check key validity. The second is that this key was supposed to remain in the the system’s Hardware Security Module—and not be in software. This implies a really serious breach of good security practice. The fact that Microsoft has not been forthcoming about the details of what happened tell me that the details are really bad.

I believe this all traces back to SolarWinds. In addition to Russia inserting malware into a SolarWinds update, China used a different SolarWinds vulnerability to break into networks. We know that Russia accessed Microsoft source code in that attack. I have heard from informed government officials that China used their SolarWinds vulnerability to break into Microsoft and access source code, including Azure’s.

I think we are grossly underestimating the long-term results of the SolarWinds attacks. That backdoored update was downloaded by over 14,000 networks worldwide. Organizations patched their networks, but not before Russia—and others—used the vulnerability to enter those networks. And once someone is in a network, it’s really hard to be sure that you’ve kicked them out.

Sophisticated threat actors are realizing that stealing source code of infrastructure providers, and then combing that code for vulnerabilities, is an excellent way to break into organizations who use those infrastructure providers. Attackers like Russia and China—and presumably the US as well—are prioritizing going after those providers.

News articles.

EDITED TO ADD: Commentary:

This is from Microsoft’s explanation. The China attackers “acquired an inactive MSA consumer signing key and used it to forge authentication tokens for Azure AD enterprise and MSA consumer to access OWA and Outlook.com. All MSA keys active prior to the incident—including the actor-acquired MSA signing key—have been invalidated. Azure AD keys were not impacted. Though the key was intended only for MSA accounts, a validation issue allowed this key to be trusted for signing Azure AD tokens. The actor was able to obtain new access tokens by presenting one previously issued from this API due to a design flaw. This flaw in the GetAccessTokenForResourceAPI has since been fixed to only accept tokens issued from Azure AD or MSA respectively. The actor used these tokens to retrieve mail messages from the OWA API.”

Posted on August 7, 2023 at 7:03 AMView Comments

1 2 3 24

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.