Entries Tagged "malware"

Page 1 of 42

Serious MacOS Vulnerability Patched

Apple just patched a MacOS vulnerability that bypassed malware checks.

The flaw is akin to a front entrance that’s barred and bolted effectively, but with a cat door at the bottom that you can easily toss a bomb through. Apple mistakenly assumed that applications will always have certain specific attributes. Owens discovered that if he made an application that was really just a script—code that tells another program what do rather than doing it itself—and didn’t include a standard application metadata file called “info.plist,” he could silently run the app on any Mac. The operating system wouldn’t even give its most basic prompt: “This is an application downloaded from the Internet. Are you sure you want to open it?”

More.

Posted on April 30, 2021 at 7:38 AMView Comments

Malware Hidden in Call of Duty Cheating Software

News article:

Most troublingly, Activision says that the “cheat” tool has been advertised multiple times on a popular cheating forum under the title “new COD hack.” (Gamers looking to flout the rules will typically go to such forums to find new ways to do so.) While the report doesn’t mention which forum they were posted on (that certainly would’ve been helpful), it does say that these offerings have popped up a number of times. They have also been seen advertised in YouTube videos, where instructions were provided on how gamers can run the “cheats” on their devices, and the report says that “comments [on the videos] seemingly indicate people had downloaded and attempted to use the tool.”

Part of the reason this attack could work so well is that game cheats typically require a user to disable key security features that would otherwise keep a malicious program out of their system. The hacker is basically getting the victim to do their own work for them.

“It is common practice when configuring a cheat program to run it the with the highest system privileges,” the report notes. “Guides for cheats will typically ask users to disable or uninstall antivirus software and host firewalls, disable kernel code signing, etc.”

Detailed report.

Posted on April 2, 2021 at 6:00 AMView Comments

System Update: New Android Malware

Researchers have discovered a new Android app called “System Update” that is a sophisticated Remote-Access Trojan (RAT). From a news article:

The broad range of data that this sneaky little bastard is capable of stealing is pretty horrifying. It includes: instant messenger messages and database files; call logs and phone contacts; Whatsapp messages and databases; pictures and videos; all of your text messages; and information on pretty much everything else that is on your phone (it will inventory the rest of the apps on your phone, for instance).

The app can also monitor your GPS location (so it knows exactly where you are), hijack your phone’s camera to take pictures, review your browser’s search history and bookmarks, and turn on the phone mic to record audio.

The app’s spying capabilities are triggered whenever the device receives new information. Researchers write that the RAT is constantly on the lookout for “any activity of interest, such as a phone call, to immediately record the conversation, collect the updated call log, and then upload the contents to the C&C server as an encrypted ZIP file.” After thieving your data, the app will subsequently erase evidence of its own activity, hiding what it has been doing.

This is a sophisticated piece of malware. It feels like the product of a national intelligence agency or — and I think more likely — one of the cyberweapons arms manufacturers that sells this kind of capability to governments around the world.

Posted on March 30, 2021 at 10:00 AMView Comments

On Not Fixing Old Vulnerabilities

How is this even possible?

…26% of companies Positive Technologies tested were vulnerable to WannaCry, which was a threat years ago, and some even vulnerable to Heartbleed. “The most frequent vulnerabilities detected during automated assessment date back to 2013-­2017, which indicates a lack of recent software updates,” the reported stated.

26%!? One in four networks?

Even if we assume that the report is self-serving to the company that wrote it, and that the statistic is not generally representative, this is still a disaster. The number should be 0%.

WannaCry was a 2017 cyberattack, based on a NSA-discovered and Russia-stolen-and-published Windows vulnerability. It primarily affects older, no-longer-supported products like Windows 7. If we can’t keep our systems secure from these vulnerabilities, how are we ever going to secure them from new threats?

Posted on March 9, 2021 at 6:16 AMView Comments

Mysterious Macintosh Malware

This is weird:

Once an hour, infected Macs check a control server to see if there are any new commands the malware should run or binaries to execute. So far, however, researchers have yet to observe delivery of any payload on any of the infected 30,000 machines, leaving the malware’s ultimate goal unknown. The lack of a final payload suggests that the malware may spring into action once an unknown condition is met.

Also curious, the malware comes with a mechanism to completely remove itself, a capability that’s typically reserved for high-stealth operations. So far, though, there are no signs the self-destruct feature has been used, raising the question of why the mechanism exists.

Besides those questions, the malware is notable for a version that runs natively on the M1 chip that Apple introduced in November, making it only the second known piece of macOS malware to do so. The malicious binary is more mysterious still because it uses the macOS Installer JavaScript API to execute commands. That makes it hard to analyze installation package contents or the way that package uses the JavaScript commands.

The malware has been found in 153 countries with detections concentrated in the US, UK, Canada, France, and Germany. Its use of Amazon Web Services and the Akamai content delivery network ensures the command infrastructure works reliably and also makes blocking the servers harder. Researchers from Red Canary, the security firm that discovered the malware, are calling the malware Silver Sparrow.

Feels government-designed, rather than criminal or hacker.

Another article. And the Red Canary analysis.

Posted on March 2, 2021 at 6:05 AMView Comments

Twelve-Year-Old Vulnerability Found in Windows Defender

Researchers found, and Microsoft has patched, a vulnerability in Windows Defender that has been around for twelve years. There is no evidence that anyone has used the vulnerability during that time.

The flaw, discovered by researchers at the security firm SentinelOne, showed up in a driver that Windows Defender — renamed Microsoft Defender last year — uses to delete the invasive files and infrastructure that malware can create. When the driver removes a malicious file, it replaces it with a new, benign one as a sort of placeholder during remediation. But the researchers discovered that the system doesn’t specifically verify that new file. As a result, an attacker could insert strategic system links that direct the driver to overwrite the wrong file or even run malicious code.

It isn’t unusual that vulnerabilities lie around for this long. They can’t be fixed until someone finds them, and people aren’t always looking.

Posted on February 24, 2021 at 6:19 AMView Comments

Dependency Confusion: Another Supply-Chain Vulnerability

Alex Birsan writes about being able to install malware into proprietary corporate software by naming public code files the same as internal code files. From a ZDNet article:

Today, developers at small or large companies use package managers to download and import libraries that are then assembled together using build tools to create a final app.

This app can be offered to the company’s customers or can be used internally at the company as an employee tool.

But some of these apps can also contain proprietary or highly-sensitive code, depending on their nature. For these apps, companies will often use private libraries that they store inside a private (internal) package repository, hosted inside the company’s own network.

When apps are built, the company’s developers will mix these private libraries with public libraries downloaded from public package portals like npm, PyPI, NuGet, or others.

[…]

Researchers showed that if an attacker learns the names of private libraries used inside a company’s app-building process, they could register these names on public package repositories and upload public libraries that contain malicious code.

The “dependency confusion” attack takes place when developers build their apps inside enterprise environments, and their package manager prioritizes the (malicious) library hosted on the public repository instead of the internal library with the same name.

The research team said they put this discovery to the test by searching for situations where big tech firms accidentally leaked the names of various internal libraries and then registered those same libraries on package repositories like npm, RubyGems, and PyPI.

Using this method, researchers said they successfully loaded their (non-malicious) code inside apps used by 35 major tech firms, including the likes of Apple, Microsoft, PayPal, Shopify, Netflix, Yelp, Uber, and others.

Clever attack, and one that has netted him $130K in bug bounties.

More news articles.

Posted on February 23, 2021 at 6:18 AMView Comments

Malicious Barcode Scanner App

Interesting story about a barcode scanner app that has been pushing malware on to Android phones. The app is called Barcode Scanner. It’s been around since 2017 and is owned by the Ukrainian company Lavabird Ldt. But a December 2020 update included some new features:

However, a rash of malicious activity was recently traced back to the app. Users began noticing something weird going on with their phones: their default browsers kept getting hijacked and redirected to random advertisements, seemingly out of nowhere.

Generally, when this sort of thing happens it’s because the app was recently sold. That’s not the case here.

It is frightening that with one update an app can turn malicious while going under the radar of Google Play Protect. It is baffling to me that an app developer with a popular app would turn it into malware. Was this the scheme all along, to have an app lie dormant, waiting to strike after it reaches popularity? I guess we will never know.

Posted on February 16, 2021 at 6:13 AMView Comments

NoxPlayer Android Emulator Supply-Chain Attack

It seems to be the season of sophisticated supply-chain attacks.

This one is in the NoxPlayer Android emulator:

ESET says that based on evidence its researchers gathered, a threat actor compromised one of the company’s official API (api.bignox.com) and file-hosting servers (res06.bignox.com).

Using this access, hackers tampered with the download URL of NoxPlayer updates in the API server to deliver malware to NoxPlayer users.

[…]

Despite evidence implying that attackers had access to BigNox servers since at least September 2020, ESET said the threat actor didn’t target all of the company’s users but instead focused on specific machines, suggesting this was a highly-targeted attack looking to infect only a certain class of users.

Until today, and based on its own telemetry, ESET said it spotted malware-laced NoxPlayer updates being delivered to only five victims, located in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Sri Lanka.

I don’t know if there are actually more supply-chain attacks occurring right now. More likely is that they’ve been happening for a while, and we have recently become more diligent about looking for them.

Posted on February 8, 2021 at 6:34 AMView Comments

More SolarWinds News

Microsoft analyzed details of the SolarWinds attack:

Microsoft and FireEye only detected the Sunburst or Solorigate malware in December, but Crowdstrike reported this month that another related piece of malware, Sunspot, was deployed in September 2019, at the time hackers breached SolarWinds’ internal network. Other related malware includes Teardrop aka Raindrop.

Details are in the Microsoft blog:

We have published our in-depth analysis of the Solorigate backdoor malware (also referred to as SUNBURST by FireEye), the compromised DLL that was deployed on networks as part of SolarWinds products, that allowed attackers to gain backdoor access to affected devices. We have also detailed the hands-on-keyboard techniques that attackers employed on compromised endpoints using a powerful second-stage payload, one of several custom Cobalt Strike loaders, including the loader dubbed TEARDROP by FireEye and a variant named Raindrop by Symantec.

One missing link in the complex Solorigate attack chain is the handover from the Solorigate DLL backdoor to the Cobalt Strike loader. Our investigations show that the attackers went out of their way to ensure that these two components are separated as much as possible to evade detection. This blog provides details about this handover based on a limited number of cases where this process occurred. To uncover these cases, we used the powerful, cross-domain optics of Microsoft 365 Defender to gain visibility across the entire attack chain in one complete and consolidated view.

This is all important, because MalwareBytes was penetrated through Office 365, and not SolarWinds. New estimates are that 30% of the SolarWinds victims didn’t use SolarWinds:

Many of the attacks gained initial footholds by password spraying to compromise individual email accounts at targeted organizations. Once the attackers had that initial foothold, they used a variety of complex privilege escalation and authentication attacks to exploit flaws in Microsoft’s cloud services. Another of the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)’s targets, security firm CrowdStrike, said the attacker tried unsuccessfully to read its email by leveraging a compromised account of a Microsoft reseller the firm had worked with.

On attribution: Earlier this month, the US government has stated the attack is “likely Russian in origin.” This echos what then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in December, and the Washington Post‘s reporting (both from December). (The New York Times has repeated this attribution — a good article that also discusses the magnitude of the attack.) More evidence comes from code forensics, which links it to Turla, another Russian threat actor.

And lastly, a long ProPublica story on an unused piece of government-developed tech that might have caught the supply-chain attack much earlier:

The in-toto system requires software vendors to map out their process for assembling computer code that will be sent to customers, and it records what’s done at each step along the way. It then verifies electronically that no hacker has inserted something in between steps. Immediately before installation, a pre-installed tool automatically runs a final check to make sure that what the customer received matches the final product the software vendor generated for delivery, confirming that it wasn’t tampered with in transit.

I don’t want to hype this defense too much without knowing a lot more, but I like the approach of verifying the software build process.

Posted on February 3, 2021 at 6:10 AMView Comments

1 2 3 42

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.