Entries Tagged "managed security"
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In the past, our relationship with our computers was technical. We cared what CPU they had and what software they ran. We understood our networks and how they worked. We were experts, or we depended on someone else for expertise. And security was part of that expertise.
This is changing. We access our email via the web, from any computer or from our phones. We use Facebook, Google Docs, even our corporate networks, regardless of hardware or network. We, especially the younger of us, no longer care about the technical details. Computing is infrastructure; it’s a commodity. It’s less about products and more about services; we simply expect it to work, like telephone service or electricity or a transportation network.
Infrastructures can be spread on a broad continuum, ranging from generic to highly specialized. Power and water are generic; who supplies them doesn’t really matter. Mobile phone services, credit cards, ISPs, and airlines are mostly generic. More specialized infrastructure services are restaurant meals, haircuts, and social networking sites. Highly specialized services include tax preparation for complex businesses; management consulting, legal services, and medical services.
Sales for these services are driven by two things: price and trust. The more generic the service is, the more price dominates. The more specialized it is, the more trust dominates. IT is something of a special case because so much of it is free. So, for both specialized IT services where price is less important and for generic IT services—think Facebook—where there is no price, trust will grow in importance. IT is becoming a reputation-based economy, and this has interesting ramifications for security.
Some years ago, the major credit card companies became concerned about the plethora of credit-card-number thefts from sellers’ databases. They worried that these might undermine the public’s trust in credit cards as a secure payment system for the internet. They knew the sellers would only protect these databases up to the level of the threat to the seller, and not to the greater level of threat to the industry as a whole. So they banded together and produced a security standard called PCI. It’s wholly industry-enforced by an industry that realized its reputation was more valuable than the sellers’ databases.
A reputation-based economy means that infrastructure providers care more about security than their customers do. I realized this 10 years ago with my own company. We provided network-monitoring services to large corporations, and our internal network security was much more extensive than our customers’. Our customers secured their networks—that’s why they hired us, after all—but only up to the value of their networks. If we mishandled any of our customers’ data, we would have lost the trust of all of our customers.
I heard the same story at an ENISA conference in London last June, when an IT consultant explained that he had begun encrypting his laptop years before his customers did. While his customers might decide that the risk of losing their data wasn’t worth the hassle of dealing with encryption, he knew that if he lost data from one customer, he risked losing all of his customers.
As IT becomes more like infrastructure, more like a commodity, expect service providers to improve security to levels greater than their customers would have done themselves.
In IT, customers learn about company reputation from many sources: magazine articles, analyst reviews, recommendations from colleagues, awards, certifications, and so on. Of course, this only works if customers have accurate information. In a reputation economy, companies have a motivation to hide their security problems.
You’ve all experienced a reputation economy: restaurants. Some restaurants have a good reputation, and are filled with regulars. When restaurants get a bad reputation, people stop coming and they close. Tourist restaurants—whose main attraction is their location, and whose customers frequently don’t know anything about their reputation—can thrive even if they aren’t any good. And sometimes a restaurant can keep its reputation—an award in a magazine, a special occasion restaurant that “everyone knows” is the place to go—long after its food and service have declined.
The reputation economy is far from perfect.
This essay originally appeared in The Guardian.
We know what we don’t like about buying consolidated product suites: one great product and a bunch of mediocre ones. And we know what we don’t like about buying best-of-breed: multiple vendors, multiple interfaces, and multiple products that don’t work well together. The security industry has gone back and forth between the two, as a new generation of IT security professionals rediscovers the downsides of each solution.
The real problem is that neither solution really works, and we continually fool ourselves into believing whatever we don’t have is better than what we have at the time. And the real solution is to buy results, not products.
Honestly, no one wants to buy IT security. People want to buy whatever they want—connectivity, a Web presence, email, networked applications, whatever—and they want it to be secure. That they’re forced to spend money on IT security is an artifact of the youth of the computer industry. And sooner or later the need to buy security will disappear.
It will disappear because IT vendors are starting to realize they have to provide security as part of whatever they’re selling. It will disappear because organizations are starting to buy services instead of products, and demanding security as part of those services. It will disappear because the security industry will disappear as a consumer category, and will instead market to the IT industry.
The critical driver here is outsourcing. Outsourcing is the ultimate consolidator, because the customer no longer cares about the details. If I buy my network services from a large IT infrastructure company, I don’t care if it secures things by installing the hot new intrusion prevention systems, by configuring the routers and servers as to obviate the need for network-based security, or if it uses magic security dust given to it by elven kings. I just want a contract that specifies a level and quality of service, and my vendor can figure it out.
IT is infrastructure. Infrastructure is always outsourced. And the details of how the infrastructure works are left to the companies that provide it.
This is the future of IT, and when that happens we’re going to start to see a type of consolidation we haven’t seen before. Instead of large security companies gobbling up small security companies, both large and small security companies will be gobbled up by non-security companies. It’s already starting to happen. In 2006, IBM bought ISS. The same year BT bought my company, Counterpane, and last year it bought INS. These aren’t large security companies buying small security companies; these are non-security companies buying large and small security companies.
If I were Symantec and McAfee, I would be preparing myself for a buyer.
This is good consolidation. Instead of having to choose between a single product suite that isn’t very good or a best-of-breed set of products that don’t work well together, we can ignore the issue completely. We can just find an infrastructure provider that will figure it out and make it work—who cares how?
If you’ll forgive the possible comparison to hurricanes, Internet epidemics are much like severe weather: they happen randomly, they affect some segments of the population more than others, and your previous preparation determines how effective your defense is.
Zotob was the first major worm outbreak since MyDoom in January 2004. It happened quickly—less than five days after Microsoft published a critical security bulletin (its 39th of the year). Zotob’s effects varied greatly from organization to organization: some networks were brought to their knees, while others didn’t even notice.
The worm started spreading on Sunday, 14 August. Honestly, it wasn’t much of a big deal, but it got a lot of play in the press because it hit several major news outlets, most notably CNN. If a news organization is personally affected by something, it’s much more likely to report extensively on it. But my company, Counterpane Internet Security, monitors more than 500 networks worldwide, and we didn’t think it was worth all the press coverage.
By the 17th, there were at least a dozen other worms that exploited the same vulnerability, both Zotob variants and others that were completely different. Most of them tried to recruit computers for bot networks, and some of the different variants warred against each other—stealing “owned” computers back and forth. If your network was infected, it was a mess.
Two weeks later, the 18-year-old who wrote the original Zotob worm was arrested, along with the 21-year-old who paid him to write it. It seems likely the person who funded the worm’s creation was not a hacker, but rather a criminal looking to profit.
The nature of worms has changed in the past few years. Previously, hackers looking for prestige or just wanting to cause damage were responsible for most worms. Today, they’re increasingly written or commissioned by criminals. By taking over computers, worms can send spam, launch denial-of-service extortion attacks, or search for credit-card numbers and other personal information.
What could you have done beforehand to protect yourself against Zotob and its kin? “Install the patch” is the obvious answer, but it’s not really a satisfactory one. There are simply too many patches. Although a single computer user can easily set up patches to automatically download and install—at least Microsoft Windows system patches—large corporate networks can’t. Far too often, patches cause other things to break.
It would be great to know which patches are actually important and which ones just sound important. Before that weekend in August, the patch that would have protected against Zotob was just another patch; by Monday morning, it was the most important thing a sysadmin could do to secure the network.
Microsoft had six new patches available on 9 August, three designated as critical (including the one that Zotob used), one important, and two moderate. Could you have guessed beforehand which one would have actually been critical? With the next patch release, will you know which ones you can put off and for which ones you need to drop everything, test, and install across your network?
Given that it’s impossible to know what’s coming beforehand, how you respond to an actual worm largely determines your defense’s effectiveness. You might need to respond quickly, and you most certainly need to respond accurately. Because it’s impossible to know beforehand what the necessary response should be, you need a process for that response. Employees come and go, so the only thing that ensures a continuity of effective security is a process. You need accurate and timely information to fuel this process. And finally, you need experts to decipher the information, determine what to do, and implement a solution.
The Zotob storm was both typical and unique. It started soon after the vulnerability was published, but I don’t think that made a difference. Even worms that use six-month-old vulnerabilities find huge swaths of the Internet unpatched. It was a surprise, but they all are.
This essay will appear in the November/December 2005 issue of IEEE Security & Privacy.
Counterpane Internet Security, Inc., monitors more than 450 networks in 35 countries, in every time zone. In 2004 we saw 523 billion network events, and our analysts investigated 648,000 security “tickets.” What follows is an overview of what’s happening on the Internet right now, and what we expect to happen in the coming months.
In 2004, 41 percent of the attacks we saw were unauthorized activity of some kind, 21 percent were scanning, 26 percent were unauthorized access, 9 percent were DoS (denial of service), and 3 percent were misuse of applications.
Over the past few months, the two attack vectors that we saw in volume were against the Windows DCOM (Distributed Component Object Model) interface of the RPC (remote procedure call) service and against the Windows LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service). These seem to be the current favorites for virus and worm writers, and we expect this trend to continue.
The virus trend doesn’t look good. In the last six months of 2004, we saw a plethora of attacks based on browser vulnerabilities (such as GDI-JPEG image vulnerability and IFRAME) and an increase in sophisticated worm and virus attacks. More than 1,000 new worms and viruses were discovered in the last six months alone.
In 2005, we expect to see ever-more-complex worms and viruses in the wild, incorporating complex behavior: polymorphic worms, metamorphic worms, and worms that make use of entry-point obscuration. For example, SpyBot.KEG is a sophisticated vulnerability assessment worm that reports discovered vulnerabilities back to the author via IRC channels.
We expect to see more blended threats: exploit code that combines malicious code with vulnerabilities in order to launch an attack. We expect Microsoft’s IIS (Internet Information Services) Web server to continue to be an attractive target. As more and more companies migrate to Windows 2003 and IIS 6, however, we expect attacks against IIS to decrease.
We also expect to see peer-to-peer networking as a vector to launch viruses.
Targeted worms are another trend we’re starting to see. Recently there have been worms that use third-party information-gathering techniques, such as Google, for advanced reconnaissance. This leads to a more intelligent propagation methodology; instead of propagating scattershot, these worms are focusing on specific targets. By identifying targets through third-party information gathering, the worms reduce the noise they would normally make when randomly selecting targets, thus increasing the window of opportunity between release and first detection.
Another 2004 trend that we expect to continue in 2005 is crime. Hacking has moved from a hobbyist pursuit with a goal of notoriety to a criminal pursuit with a goal of money. Hackers can sell unknown vulnerabilities—”zero-day exploits”—on the black market to criminals who use them to break into computers. Hackers with networks of hacked machines can make money by selling them to spammers or phishers. They can use them to attack networks. We have started seeing criminal extortion over the Internet: hackers with networks of hacked machines threatening to launch DoS attacks against companies. Most of these attacks are against fringe industries—online gambling, online computer gaming, online pornography—and against offshore networks. The more these extortions are successful, the more emboldened the criminals will become.
We expect to see more attacks against financial institutions, as criminals look for new ways to commit fraud. We also expect to see more insider attacks with a criminal profit motive. Already most of the targeted attacks—as opposed to attacks of opportunity—originate from inside the attacked organization’s network.
We also expect to see more politically motivated hacking, whether against countries, companies in “political” industries (petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, etc.), or political organizations. Although we don’t expect to see terrorism occur over the Internet, we do expect to see more nuisance attacks by hackers who have political motivations.
The Internet is still a dangerous place, but we don’t foresee people or companies abandoning it. The economic and social reasons for using the Internet are still far too compelling.
This essay originally appeared in the June 2005 issue of Queue.
The computer security industry is guilty of overhyping and underdelivering. Again and again, it tells customers that they must buy a certain product to be secure. Again and again, they buy the products—and are still insecure.
Firewalls didn’t keep out network attackers—in fact, the notion of “perimeter” is severely flawed. Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) didn’t keep networks safe, and worms and viruses do considerably damage despite the prevalence of antivirus products. It’s in this context that I want to evaluate Security Information Management Systems, or SIMS, which promise to solve a serious network problem: log analysis.
Computer logs are a goldmine of security information, containing not just IDS alerts, but messages from firewalls, servers, applications, and other network devices. Your network produces megabytes of these logs every day, and hidden in them are attack footprints. The trick is finding and reacting to them fast enough.
Analyzing log messages can determine how the attacker broke in, what he accessed, whether any backdoors were added, and so on. The idea behind log analysis is that if you can read the log messages in real time, you can figure out what the attacker is doing. And if you can respond fast enough, you can kick him out before he does damage. It’s security detection and response. Log analysis works, whether or not you use SIMS.
Even better, it works against a wide variety of risks. Unlike point solutions, security monitoring is general. Log analysis can detect attackers regardless of their tactics.
But SIMS don’t live up to the hype, because they’re missing the essential ingredient that so many other computer security products lack: human intelligence. Firewalls often fail because they’re configured and maintained improperly. IDSs are often useless because there’s no one to respond to their alerts—or to separate the real attacks from the false alarms. SIMS have the same problem: unless there’s a human expert monitoring them, they’re not defending anything. The tools are only as effective as the people using them.
SIMS require vigilance: attacks can happen at any time of the day and any day of the year. Consequently, staffing requires five fulltime employees; more, if you include supervisors and backup personnel with more specialized skills. Even if an organization could find the budget for all of these people, it would be very difficult to hire them in today’s job market. And attacks against a single organization don’t happen often enough to keep a team of this caliber engaged and interested.
Back in 1999, I founded Counterpane Internet Security; we sell an outsourced service called Managed Security Monitory, in which trained security analysts monitor IDS alerts and log messages. Because of the information our analysts received from the network—in real time—as well as their training and expertise, the analysts could detect attacks in progress and provide customers with a level of security they were incapable of achieving otherwise.
When building the Counterpane monitoring service in 1999, we examined log-monitoring appliances from companies like Intellitactics and e-Security. Back then, they weren’t anywhere near good enough for us to use, so we developed our own proprietary system. Today, because of the caliber of the human analysts who use the Counterpane system, it’s much better than any commercial SIMS. We were able to design it with our expert detection-and-response analysts in mind, and not the general sysadmin market.
The key to network security is people, not products. Piling more security products, such as SIMS, only our network won’t help. This is why I believe that network security will eventually be outsourced. There’s no other cost-effective way to reliably get the experts you need, and therefore no other cost-effective way to reliably get security.
This originally appeared in the September/October 2004 issue of IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine.
Bruce Schneier is founder and chief technology officer of Mountain View, Calif.-based MSSP Counterpane Internet Security Inc. and author of Applied Cryptography, Secrets and Lies, and Beyond Fear. He also publishes Crypto-Gram, a free monthly newsletter, and writes op-ed pieces for various publications. Schneier spoke to SearchSecurity.com about the latest threats, Microsoft’s ongoing security struggles and other topics in a two-part interview that took place by e-mail and phone last week. In this installment, he talks about the safety of open source vs. closed source, the future of security management and spread of blogs.
Are open source products more secure than closed source?
Schneier: It’s more complicated than that. To analyze the security of a software product you need to have software security experts analyze the code. You can do that in the closed-source model by hiring them, or you can do that in the open-source model by making the code public and hoping that they do so for free. Both work, but obviously the latter is cheaper. It’s also not guaranteed. There’s lots of open-source software out there that no one has analyzed and is no more secure than all the closed-source products that no one has analyzed. But then there are things like Linux, Apache or OpenBSD that get a lot of analysis. When open-source code is properly analyzed, there’s nothing better. But just putting the code out in public is no guarantee.
A recent Yankee Group report said enterprises will outsource 90% of their security management by 2010; that more businesses have made security a priority to meet growing threats and comply with laws like HIPAA and Sarbanes-Oxley. Do you agree?
Schneier: I think that network security will largely be outsourced by 2010 regardless of compliance issues. It’s infrastructure, and infrastructure is always outsourced … eventually. I say eventually because it often takes years for companies to come to terms with it. But Internet security is no different than tax preparation, legal services, food services, cleaning services or phone service. It will be outsourced. I do believe that the various compliance issues, like the laws you mention, are causing companies to increase their security budgets. It’s the same economic driver that I talked about in your question about Microsoft. By increasing the penalties to companies if they don’t have adequate security, the laws induce companies to spend more on security. That’s good for everyone.
How is Crypto-Gram doing?
Schneier: Crypto-Gram currently has about 100,000 readers; 75,000 get it in e-mail every month and another 25,000 read it on the Web. When I started it in 1998, I had no idea it would get this big. I actually thought about charging for it, which would have been a colossal mistake. I think the key to Crypto-Gram’s success is that it’s both interesting and honest. Security is an amazingly rich topic, and there are always things in the news to talk about. Last month I talked about airline security, the Olympics and cellphones. This month I’m going to talk about academic freedom, the security of elections, and RFID chips in passports.
Some people compare Crypto-Gram to a blog. Is that a reasonable comparison?
Schneier: It’s reasonable in the sense that it’s one person writing on topics that interests him. But the form-factor is different. Blogs are Web-based journals, updated regularly. Crypto-Gram is a monthly e-mail newsletter. Sometimes I wish I had the immediacy of a blog, but I like the discipline of a regular publishing schedule. And I think I have more readers because I push the content to my readers’ e-mail boxes.
Do you think blogs have become more useful than traditional media as a way to get the latest security news to IT managers?
Schneier: Blogs are faster, but they’re unfiltered. They’re definitely the fastest way to get the latest news—on security or any other topic—as long as you’re not too concerned about accuracy. Traditional news sources are slower, but there’s higher quality. So they’re both useful, as long as you understand their relative strengths and weaknesses.
By Bill Brenner, News Writer
05 Oct 2004 | SearchSecurity.com
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.