On the NSA’s Supercomputer from the 1960s
Really interesting story about Harvest, a specialized code breaking computer built in the 1960s by IBM for the NSA.
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Really interesting story about Harvest, a specialized code breaking computer built in the 1960s by IBM for the NSA.
Wired writes (alternate source):
Security researchers at Google on Tuesday released a report describing what they’re calling “Coruna,” a highly sophisticated iPhone hacking toolkit that includes five complete hacking techniques capable of bypassing all the defenses of an iPhone to silently install malware on a device when it visits a website containing the exploitation code. In total, Coruna takes advantage of 23 distinct vulnerabilities in iOS, a rare collection of hacking components that suggests it was created by a well-resourced, likely state-sponsored group of hackers.
[…]
Coruna’s code also appears to have been originally written by English-speaking coders, notes iVerify’s cofounder Rocky Cole. “It’s highly sophisticated, took millions of dollars to develop, and it bears the hallmarks of other modules that have been publicly attributed to the US government,” Cole tells WIRED. “This is the first example we’ve seen of very likely US government toolsbased on what the code is telling usspinning out of control and being used by both our adversaries and cybercriminal groups.”
TechCrunch reports that Coruna is definitely of US origin:
Two former employees of government contractor L3Harris told TechCrunch that Coruna was, at least in part, developed by the company’s hacking and surveillance tech division, Trenchant. The two former employees both had knowledge of the company’s iPhone hacking tools. Both spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren’t authorized to talk about their work for the company.
It’s always super interesting to see what malware looks like when it’s created through a professional software development process. And the TechCrunch article has some speculation as to how the US lost control of it. It seems that an employee of L3Harris’s surviellance tech division, Trenchant, sold it to the Russian government.
Sen. Ron Wyden is warning us of an abuse of Section 702:
Wyden took to the Senate floor to deliver a lengthy speech, ostensibly about the since approved (with support of many Democrats) nomination of Joshua Rudd to lead the NSA. Wyden was protesting that nomination, but in the context of Rudd being unwilling to agree to basic constitutional limitations on NSA surveillance. But that’s just a jumping off point ahead of Section 702’s upcoming reauthorization deadline. Buried in the speech is a passage that should set off every alarm bell:
There’s another example of secret law related to Section 702, one that directly affects the privacy rights of Americans. For years, I have asked various administrations to declassify this matter. Thus far they have all refused, although I am still waiting for a response from DNI Gabbard. I strongly believe that this matter can and should be declassified and that Congress needs to debate it openly before Section 702 is reauthorized. In fact, when it is eventually declassified, the American people will be stunned that it took so long and that Congress has been debating this authority with insufficient information.
Over the decades, we have learned to take Wyden’s warnings seriously.
In the early 1960s, National Security Agency cryptanalyst and cryptanalysis instructor Lambros D. Callimahos coined the term “Stethoscope” to describe a diagnostic computer program used to unravel the internal structure of pre-computer ciphertexts. The term appears in the newly declassified September 1965 document Cryptanalytic Diagnosis with the Aid of a Computer, which compiled 147 listings from this tool for Callimahos’s course, CA-400: NSA Intensive Study Program in General Cryptanalysis.
The listings in the report are printouts from the Stethoscope program, run on the NSA’s Bogart computer, showing statistical and structural data extracted from encrypted messages, but the encrypted messages themselves are not included. They were used in NSA training programs to teach analysts how to interpret ciphertext behavior without seeing the original message.
The listings include elements such as frequency tables, index of coincidence, periodicity tests, bigram/trigram analysis, and columnar and transposition clues. The idea is to give the analyst some clues as to what language is being encoded, what type of cipher system is used, and potential ways to reconstruct plaintext within it.
Bogart was a special-purpose electronic computer tailored specifically for cryptanalytic tasks, such as statistical analysis of cipher texts, pattern recognition, and diagnostic testing, but not decryption per se.
Listings like these were revolutionary. Before computers, cryptanalysts did this type of work manually, painstakingly counting letters and testing hypotheses. Stethoscope automated the grunt work, allowing analysts to focus on interpretation, and cryptanalytical strategy.
These listings were part of the Intensive Study Program in General Cryptanalysis at NSA. Students were trained to interpret listings without seeing the original ciphertext, a method that sharpened their analytical intuitive skills.
Also mentioned in the report is Rob Roy, another NSA diagnostic tool focused on different cryptanalytic tasks, but also producing frequency counts, coincidence indices, and periodicity tests. NSA had a tradition of giving codebreaking tools colorful names—for example, DUENNA, SUPERSCRITCHER, MADAME X, HARVEST, and COPPERHEAD.
The NSA and GCHQ have jointly published a history of World War II SIGINT: “Secret Messengers: Disseminating SIGINT in the Second World War.” This is the story of the British SLUs (Special Liaison Units) and the American SSOs (Special Security Officers).
Bluesky thread. Here’s the paper, from 1957. Note reference 3.
Law journal article that looks at the Dual_EC_PRNG backdoor from a US constitutional perspective:
Abstract: The National Security Agency (NSA) reportedly paid and pressured technology companies to trick their customers into using vulnerable encryption products. This Article examines whether any of three theories removed the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that this be reasonable. The first is that a challenge to the encryption backdoor might fail for want of a search or seizure. The Article rejects this both because the Amendment reaches some vulnerabilities apart from the searches and seizures they enable and because the creation of this vulnerability was itself a search or seizure. The second is that the role of the technology companies might have brought this backdoor within the private-search doctrine. The Article criticizes the doctrine particularly its origins in Burdeau v. McDowelland argues that if it ever should apply, it should not here. The last is that the customers might have waived their Fourth Amendment rights under the third-party doctrine. The Article rejects this both because the customers were not on notice of the backdoor and because historical understandings of the Amendment would not have tolerated it. The Article concludes that none of these theories removed the Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.
In response to a FOIA request, the NSA released “Fifty Years of Mathematical Cryptanalysis (1937-1987),” by Glenn F. Stahly, with a lot of redactions.
Weirdly, this is the second time the NSA has declassified the document. John Young got a copy in 2019. This one has a few less redactions. And nothing that was provided in 2019 was redacted here.
If you find anything interesting in the document, please tell us about it in the comments.
In “Secrets and Lies” (2000), I wrote:
It is poor civic hygiene to install technologies that could someday facilitate a police state.
It’s something a bunch of us were saying at the time, in reference to the vast NSA’s surveillance capabilities.
I have been thinking of that quote a lot as I read news stories of President Trump firing the Director of the National Security Agency. General Timothy Haugh.
A couple of weeks ago, I wrote:
We don’t know what pressure the Trump administration is using to make intelligence services fall into line, but it isn’t crazy to worry that the NSA might again start monitoring domestic communications.
The NSA already spies on Americans in a variety of ways. But that’s always been a sideline to its main mission: spying on the rest of the world. Once Trump replaces Haugh with a loyalist, the NSA’s vast surveillance apparatus can be refocused domestically.
Giving that agency all those powers in the 1990s, in the 2000s after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, and in the 2010s was always a mistake. I fear that we are about to learn how big a mistake it was.
Here’s PGP creator Phil Zimmerman in 1996, spelling it out even more clearly:
The Clinton Administration seems to be attempting to deploy and entrench a communications infrastructure that would deny the citizenry the ability to protect its privacy. This is unsettling because in a democracy, it is possible for bad people to occasionally get elected—sometimes very bad people. Normally, a well-functioning democracy has ways to remove these people from power. But the wrong technology infrastructure could allow such a future government to watch every move anyone makes to oppose it. It could very well be the last government we ever elect.
When making public policy decisions about new technologies for the government, I think one should ask oneself which technologies would best strengthen the hand of a police state. Then, do not allow the government to deploy those technologies. This is simply a matter of good civic hygiene.
2006 AT&T whistleblower Mark Klein has died.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.