Blog: October 2023 Archives

The Future of Drone Warfare

Ukraine is using $400 drones to destroy tanks:

Facing an enemy with superior numbers of troops and armor, the Ukrainian defenders are holding on with the help of tiny drones flown by operators like Firsov that, for a few hundred dollars, can deliver an explosive charge capable of destroying a Russian tank worth more than $2 million.

[…]

A typical FPV weighs up to one kilogram, has four small engines, a battery, a frame and a camera connected wirelessly to goggles worn by a pilot operating it remotely. It can carry up to 2.5 kilograms of explosives and strike a target at a speed of up to 150 kilometers per hour, explains Pavlo Tsybenko, acting director of the Dronarium military academy outside Kyiv.

“This drone costs up to $400 and can be made anywhere. We made ours using microchips imported from China and details we bought on AliExpress. We made the carbon frame ourselves. And, yeah, the batteries are from Tesla. One car has like 1,100 batteries that can be used to power these little guys,” Tsybenko told POLITICO on a recent visit, showing the custom-made FPV drones used by the academy to train future drone pilots.

“It is almost impossible to shoot it down,” he said. “Only a net can help. And I predict that soon we will have to put up such nets above our cities, or at least government buildings, all over Europe.”

Science fiction authors have been writing about drone swarms for decades. Now they are reality. Tanks today. Soon it will be ships (probably with more expensive drones). Feels like this will be a major change in warfare.

Posted on October 31, 2023 at 7:03 AM37 Comments

Hacking Scandinavian Alcohol Tax

The islands of Åland are an important tax hack:

Although Åland is part of the Republic of Finland, it has its own autonomous parliament. In areas where Åland has its own legislation, the group of islands essentially operates as an independent nation.

This allows Scandinavians to avoid the notoriously high alcohol taxes:

Åland is a member of the EU and its currency is the euro, but Åland’s relationship with the EU is regulated by way of a special protocol. In order to maintain the important sale of duty-free goods on ferries operating between Finland and Sweden, Åland is not part of the EU’s VAT area.

Basically, ferries between the two countries stop at the island, and people stock up—I mean really stock up, hand trucks piled with boxes—on tax-free alcohol. Åland gets the revenue, and presumably docking fees.

The purpose of the special status of the Åland Islands was to maintain the right to tax free sales in the ship traffic. The ship traffic is of vital importance for the province’s communication, and the intention was to support the economy of the province this way.

Posted on October 30, 2023 at 7:10 AM24 Comments

Friday Squid Blogging: On the Ugliness of Squid Fishing

And seafood in general:

A squid ship is a bustling, bright, messy place. The scene on deck looks like a mechanic’s garage where an oil change has gone terribly wrong. Scores of fishing lines extend into the water, each bearing specialized hooks operated by automated reels. When they pull a squid on board, it squirts warm, viscous ink, which coats the walls and floors. Deep-sea squid have high levels of ammonia, which they use for buoyancy, and a smell hangs in the air. The hardest labor generally happens at night, from 5 P.M. until 7 A.M. Hundreds of bowling-ball-size light bulbs hang on racks on both sides of the vessel, enticing the squid up from the depths. The blinding glow of the bulbs, visible more than a hundred miles away, makes the surrounding blackness feel otherworldly.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.

Read my blog posting guidelines here.

Posted on October 27, 2023 at 5:13 PM71 Comments

Messaging Service Wiretap Discovered through Expired TLS Cert

Fascinating story of a covert wiretap that was discovered because of an expired TLS certificate:

The suspected man-in-the-middle attack was identified when the administrator of jabber.ru, the largest Russian XMPP service, received a notification that one of the servers’ certificates had expired.

However, jabber.ru found no expired certificates on the server, ­ as explained in a blog post by ValdikSS, a pseudonymous anti-censorship researcher based in Russia who collaborated on the investigation.

The expired certificate was instead discovered on a single port being used by the service to establish an encrypted Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection with users. Before it had expired, it would have allowed someone to decrypt the traffic being exchanged over the service.

Posted on October 27, 2023 at 7:01 AM20 Comments

New NSA Information from (and about) Snowden

Interesting article about the Snowden documents, including comments from former Guardian editor Ewen MacAskill.

MacAskill, who shared the Pulitzer Prize for Public Service with Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras for their journalistic work on the Snowden files, retired from The Guardian in 2018. He told Computer Weekly that:

  • As far as he knows, a copy of the documents is still locked in the New York Times office. Although the files are in the New York Times office, The Guardian retains responsibility for them.
  • As to why the New York Times has not published them in a decade, MacAskill maintains “this is a complicated issue.” “There is, at the very least, a case to be made for keeping them for future generations of historians,” he said.
  • Why was only 1% of the Snowden archive published by the journalists who had full access to it? Ewen MacAskill replied: “The main reason for only a small percentage—though, given the mass of documents, 1% is still a lot—was diminishing interest.”

[…]

The Guardian’s journalist did not recall seeing the three revelations published by Computer Weekly, summarized below:

  • The NSA listed Cavium, an American semiconductor company marketing Central Processing Units (CPUs)—the main processor in a computer which runs the operating system and applications—as a successful example of a “SIGINT-enabled” CPU supplier. Cavium, now owned by Marvell, said it does not implement back doors for any government.
  • The NSA compromised lawful Russian interception infrastructure, SORM. The NSA archive contains slides showing two Russian officers wearing jackets with a slogan written in Cyrillic: “You talk, we listen.” The NSA and/or GCHQ has also compromised key lawful interception systems.
  • Among example targets of its mass-surveillance programme, PRISM, the NSA listed the Tibetan government in exile.

Those three pieces of info come from Jake Appelbaum’s PhD thesis.

Posted on October 26, 2023 at 7:00 AM26 Comments

EPA Won’t Force Water Utilities to Audit Their Cybersecurity

The industry pushed back:

Despite the EPA’s willingness to provide training and technical support to help states and public water system organizations implement cybersecurity surveys, the move garnered opposition from both GOP state attorneys and trade groups.

Republican state attorneys that were against the new proposed policies said that the call for new inspections could overwhelm state regulators. The attorney generals of Arkansas, Iowa and Missouri all sued the EPA—claiming the agency had no authority to set these requirements. This led to the EPA’s proposal being temporarily blocked back in June.

So now we have a piece of our critical infrastructure with substandard cybersecurity. This seems like a really bad outcome.

Posted on October 24, 2023 at 7:02 AM34 Comments

Child Exploitation and the Crypto Wars

Susan Landau published an excellent essay on the current justification for the government breaking end-to-end-encryption: child sexual abuse and exploitation (CSAE). She puts the debate into historical context, discusses the problem of CSAE, and explains why breaking encryption isn’t the solution.

Posted on October 23, 2023 at 7:08 AM21 Comments

AI and US Election Rules

If an AI breaks the rules for you, does that count as breaking the rules? This is the essential question being taken up by the Federal Election Commission this month, and public input is needed to curtail the potential for AI to take US campaigns (even more) off the rails.

At issue is whether candidates using AI to create deepfaked media for political advertisements should be considered fraud or legitimate electioneering. That is, is it allowable to use AI image generators to create photorealistic images depicting Trump hugging Anthony Fauci? And is it allowable to use dystopic images generated by AI in political attack ads?

For now, the answer to these questions is probably “yes.” These are fairly innocuous uses of AI, not any different than the old-school approach of hiring actors and staging a photoshoot, or using video editing software. Even in cases where AI tools will be put to scurrilous purposes, that’s probably legal in the US system. Political ads are, after all, a medium in which you are explicitly permitted to lie.

The concern over AI is a distraction, but one that can help draw focus to the real issue. What matters isn’t how political content is generated; what matters is the content itself and how it is distributed.

Future uses of AI by campaigns go far beyond deepfaked images. Campaigns will also use AI to personalize communications. Whereas the previous generation of social media microtargeting was celebrated for helping campaigns reach a precision of thousands or hundreds of voters, the automation offered by AI will allow campaigns to tailor their advertisements and solicitations to the individual.

Most significantly, AI will allow digital campaigning to evolve from a broadcast medium to an interactive one. AI chatbots representing campaigns are capable of responding to questions instantly and at scale, like a town hall taking place in every voter’s living room, simultaneously. Ron DeSantis’ presidential campaign has reportedly already started using OpenAI’s technology to handle text message replies to voters.

At the same time, it’s not clear whose responsibility it is to keep US political advertisements grounded in reality—if it is anyone’s. The FEC’s role is campaign finance, and is further circumscribed by the Supreme Court’s repeated stripping of its authorities. The Federal Communications Commission has much more expansive responsibility for regulating political advertising in broadcast media, as well as political robocalls and text communications. However, the FCC hasn’t done much in recent years to curtail political spam. The Federal Trade Commission enforces truth in advertising standards, but political campaigns have been largely exempted from these requirements on First Amendment grounds.

To further muddy the waters, much of the online space remains loosely regulated, even as campaigns have fully embraced digital tactics. There are still insufficient disclosure requirements for digital ads. Campaigns pay influencers to post on their behalf to circumvent paid advertising rules. And there are essentially no rules beyond the simple use of disclaimers for videos that campaigns post organically on their own websites and social media accounts, even if they are shared millions of times by others.

Almost everyone has a role to play in improving this situation.

Let’s start with the platforms. Google announced earlier this month that it would require political advertisements on YouTube and the company’s other advertising platforms to disclose when they use AI images, audio, and video that appear in their ads. This is to be applauded, but we cannot rely on voluntary actions by private companies to protect our democracy. Such policies, even when well-meaning, will be inconsistently devised and enforced.

The FEC should use its limited authority to stem this coming tide. The FEC’s present consideration of rulemaking on this issue was prompted by Public Citizen, which petitioned the Commission to “clarify that the law against ‘fraudulent misrepresentation’ (52 U.S.C. §30124) applies to deliberately deceptive AI-produced content in campaign communications.” The FEC’s regulation against fraudulent misrepresentation (C.F.R. §110.16) is very narrow; it simply restricts candidates from pretending to be speaking on behalf of their opponents in a “damaging” way.

Extending this to explicitly cover deepfaked AI materials seems appropriate. We should broaden the standards to robustly regulate the activity of fraudulent misrepresentation, whether the entity performing that activity is AI or human—but this is only the first step. If the FEC takes up rulemaking on this issue, it could further clarify what constitutes “damage.” Is it damaging when a PAC promoting Ron DeSantis uses an AI voice synthesizer to generate a convincing facsimile of the voice of his opponent Donald Trump speaking his own Tweeted words? That seems like fair play. What if opponents find a way to manipulate the tone of the speech in a way that misrepresents its meaning? What if they make up words to put in Trump’s mouth? Those use cases seem to go too far, but drawing the boundaries between them will be challenging.

Congress has a role to play as well. Senator Klobuchar and colleagues have been promoting both the existing Honest Ads Act and the proposed REAL Political Ads Act, which would expand the FEC’s disclosure requirements for content posted on the Internet and create a legal requirement for campaigns to disclose when they have used images or video generated by AI in political advertising. While that’s worthwhile, it focuses on the shiny object of AI and misses the opportunity to strengthen law around the underlying issues. The FEC needs more authority to regulate campaign spending on false or misleading media generated by any means and published to any outlet. Meanwhile, the FEC’s own Inspector General continues to warn Congress that the agency is stressed by flat budgets that don’t allow it to keep pace with ballooning campaign spending.

It is intolerable for such a patchwork of commissions to be left to wonder which, if any of them, has jurisdiction to act in the digital space. Congress should legislate to make clear that there are guardrails on political speech and to better draw the boundaries between the FCC, FEC, and FTC’s roles in governing political speech. While the Supreme Court cannot be relied upon to uphold common sense regulations on campaigning, there are strategies for strengthening regulation under the First Amendment. And Congress should allocate more funding for enforcement.

The FEC has asked Congress to expand its jurisdiction, but no action is forthcoming. The present Senate Republican leadership is seen as an ironclad barrier to expanding the Commission’s regulatory authority. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has a decades-long history of being at the forefront of the movement to deregulate American elections and constrain the FEC. In 2003, he brought the unsuccessful Supreme Court case against the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform act (the one that failed before the Citizens United case succeeded).

The most impactful regulatory requirement would be to require disclosure of interactive applications of AI for campaigns—and this should fall under the remit of the FCC. If a neighbor texts me and urges me to vote for a candidate, I might find that meaningful. If a bot does it under the instruction of a campaign, I definitely won’t. But I might find a conversation with the bot—knowing it is a bot—useful to learn about the candidate’s platform and positions, as long as I can be confident it is going to give me trustworthy information.

The FCC should enter rulemaking to expand its authority for regulating peer-to-peer (P2P) communications to explicitly encompass interactive AI systems. And Congress should pass enabling legislation to back it up, giving it authority to act not only on the SMS text messaging platform, but also over the wider Internet, where AI chatbots can be accessed over the web and through apps.

And the media has a role. We can still rely on the media to report out what videos, images, and audio recordings are real or fake. Perhaps deepfake technology makes it impossible to verify the truth of what is said in private conversations, but this was always unstable territory.

What is your role? Those who share these concerns could submit a comment to the FEC’s open public comment process before October 16, urging it to use its available authority. We all know government moves slowly, but a show of public interest is necessary to get the wheels moving.

Ultimately, all these policy changes serve the purpose of looking beyond the shiny distraction of AI to create the authority to counter bad behavior by humans. Remember: behind every AI is a human who should be held accountable.

This essay was written with Nathan Sanders, and was previously published on the Ash Center website.

Posted on October 20, 2023 at 7:10 AM26 Comments

Former Uber CISO Appealing His Conviction

Joe Sullivan, Uber’s CISO during their 2016 data breach, is appealing his conviction.

Prosecutors charged Sullivan, whom Uber hired as CISO after the 2014 breach, of withholding information about the 2016 incident from the FTC even as its investigators were scrutinizing the company’s data security and privacy practices. The government argued that Sullivan should have informed the FTC of the 2016 incident, but instead went out of his way to conceal it from them.

Prosecutors also accused Sullivan of attempting to conceal the breach itself by paying $100,000 to buy the silence of the two hackers behind the compromise. Sullivan had characterized the payment as a bug bounty similar to ones that other companies routinely make to researchers who report vulnerabilities and other security issues to them. His lawyers pointed out that Sullivan had made the payment with the full knowledge and blessing of Travis Kalanick, Uber’s CEO at the time, and other members of the ride-sharing giant’s legal team.

But prosecutors described the payment and an associated nondisclosure agreement that Sullivan’s team wanted the hackers to sign as an attempt to cover up what was in effect a felony breach of Uber’s network.

[…]

Sullivan’s fate struck a nerve with many peers and others in the industry who perceived CISOs as becoming scapegoats for broader security failures at their companies. Many argued ­ and continue to argue ­ that Sullivan acted with the full knowledge of his supervisors but in the end became the sole culprit for the breach and the associated failures for which he was charged. They believed that if Sullivan could be held culpable for his failure to report the 2016 breach to the FTC ­- and for the alleged hush payment—then so should Kalanick at the very least, and probably others as well.

It’s an argument that Sullivan’s lawyers once again raised in their appeal of the obstruction conviction this week. “Despite the fact that Mr. Sullivan was not responsible at Uber for the FTC’s investigation, including the drafting or signing any of the submissions to the FTC, the government singled him out among over 30 of his co-employees who all had information that Mr. Sullivan is alleged to have hidden from the FTC,” Swaminathan said.

I have some sympathy for that view. Sullivan was almost certainly scapegoated here. But I do want executives personally liable for what their company does. I don’t know enough about the details to have an opinion in this particular case.

Posted on October 19, 2023 at 7:08 AM16 Comments

Analysis of Intellexa’s Predator Spyware

Amnesty International has published a comprehensive analysis of the Predator government spyware products.

These technologies used to be the exclusive purview of organizations like the NSA. Now they’re available to every country on the planet—democratic, nondemocratic, authoritarian, whatever—for a price. This is the legacy of not securing the Internet when we could have.

Posted on October 18, 2023 at 7:06 AM15 Comments

Security Vulnerability of Switzerland’s E-Voting System

Online voting is insecure, period. This doesn’t stop organizations and governments from using it. (And for low-stakes elections, it’s probably fine.) Switzerland—not low stakes—uses online voting for national elections. Andrew Appel explains why it’s a bad idea:

Last year, I published a 5-part series about Switzerland’s e-voting system. Like any internet voting system, it has inherent security vulnerabilities: if there are malicious insiders, they can corrupt the vote count; and if thousands of voters’ computers are hacked by malware, the malware can change votes as they are transmitted. Switzerland “solves” the problem of malicious insiders in their printing office by officially declaring that they won’t consider that threat model in their cybersecurity assessment.

But it also has an interesting new vulnerability:

The Swiss Post e-voting system aims to protect your vote against vote manipulation and interference. The goal is to achieve this even if your own computer is infected by undetected malware that manipulates a user vote. This protection is implemented by special return codes (Prüfcode), printed on the sheet of paper you receive by physical mail. Your computer doesn’t know these codes, so even if it’s infected by malware, it can’t successfully cheat you as long as, you follow the protocol.

Unfortunately, the protocol isn’t explained to you on the piece of paper you get by mail. It’s only explained to you online, when you visit the e-voting website. And of course, that’s part of the problem! If your computer is infected by malware, then it can already present to you a bogus website that instructs you to follow a different protocol, one that is cheatable. To demonstrate this, I built a proof-of-concept demonstration.

Appel again:

Kuster’s fake protocol is not exactly what I imagined; it’s better. He explains it all in his blog post. Basically, in his malware-manipulated website, instead of displaying the verification codes for the voter to compare with what’s on the paper, the website asks the voter to enter the verification codes into a web form. Since the website doesn’t know what’s on the paper, that web-form entry is just for show. Of course, Kuster did not employ a botnet virus to distribute his malware to real voters! He keeps it contained on his own system and demonstrates it in a video.

Again, the solution is paper. (Here I am saying that in 2004.) And, no, blockchain does not help—it makes security worse.

Posted on October 17, 2023 at 7:11 AM26 Comments

Coin Flips Are Biased

Experimental result:

Many people have flipped coins but few have stopped to ponder the statistical and physical intricacies of the process. In a preregistered study we collected 350,757 coin flips to test the counterintuitive prediction from a physics model of human coin tossing developed by Persi Diaconis. The model asserts that when people flip an ordinary coin, it tends to land on the same side it started—Diaconis estimated the probability of a same-side outcome to be about 51%.

And the final paragraph:

Could future coin tossers use the same-side bias to their advantage? The magnitude of the observed bias can be illustrated using a betting scenario. If you bet a dollar on the outcome of a coin toss (i.e., paying 1 dollar to enter, and winning either 0 or 2 dollars depending on the outcome) and repeat the bet 1,000 times, knowing the starting position of the coin toss would earn you 19 dollars on average. This is more than the casino advantage for 6 deck blackjack against an optimal-strategy player, where the casino would make 5 dollars on a comparable bet, but less than the casino advantage for single-zero roulette, where the casino would make 27 dollars on average. These considerations lead us to suggest that when coin flips are used for high-stakes decision-making, the starting position of the coin is best concealed.

Boing Boing post.

Posted on October 16, 2023 at 7:06 AM17 Comments

Hacking the High School Grading System

Interesting New York Times article about high-school students hacking the grading system.

What’s not helping? The policies many school districts are adopting that make it nearly impossible for low-performing students to fail—they have a grading floor under them, they know it, and that allows them to game the system.

Several teachers whom I spoke with or who responded to my questionnaire mentioned policies stating that students cannot get lower than a 50 percent on any assignment, even if the work was never done, in some cases. A teacher from Chapel Hill, N.C., who filled in the questionnaire’s “name” field with “No, no, no,” said the 50 percent floor and “NO attendance enforcement” leads to a scenario where “we get students who skip over 100 days, have a 50 percent, complete a couple of assignments to tip over into 59.5 percent and then pass.”

It’s a basic math hack. If a student needs two-thirds of the points—over 65%—to pass, then they have to do two-thirds of the work. But if doing zero work results in a 50% grade, then they only have to do a little bit of work to get over the pass line.

I know this is a minor thing in the universe of problems with secondary education and grading, but I found the hack interesting. (And this is exactly the sort of thing I explore in my latest book: A Hacker’s Mind.

Posted on October 13, 2023 at 7:12 AM109 Comments

Bounty to Recover NIST’s Elliptic Curve Seeds

This is a fun challenge:

The NIST elliptic curves that power much of modern cryptography were generated in the late ’90s by hashing seeds provided by the NSA. How were the seeds generated? Rumor has it that they are in turn hashes of English sentences, but the person who picked them, Dr. Jerry Solinas, passed away in early 2023 leaving behind a cryptographic mystery, some conspiracy theories, and an historical password cracking challenge.

So there’s a $12K prize to recover the hash seeds.

Some backstory:

Some of the backstory here (it’s the funniest fucking backstory ever): it’s lately been circulating—though I think this may have been somewhat common knowledge among practitioners, though definitely not to me—that the “random” seeds for the NIST P-curves, generated in the 1990s by Jerry Solinas at NSA, were simply SHA1 hashes of some variation of the string “Give Jerry a raise”.

At the time, the “pass a string through SHA1” thing was meant to increase confidence in the curve seeds; the idea was that SHA1 would destroy any possible structure in the seed, so NSA couldn’t have selected a deliberately weak seed. Of course, NIST/NSA then set about destroying its reputation in the 2000’s, and this explanation wasn’t nearly enough to quell conspiracy theories.

But when Jerry Solinas went back to reconstruct the seeds, so NIST could demonstrate that the seeds really were benign, he found that he’d forgotten the string he used!

If you’re a true conspiracist, you’re certain nobody is going to find a string that generates any of these seeds. On the flip side, if anyone does find them, that’ll be a pretty devastating blow to the theory that the NIST P-curves were maliciously generated—even for people totally unfamiliar with basic curve math.

Note that this is not the constants used in the Dual_EC_PRNG random-number generator that the NSA backdoored. This is something different.

Posted on October 12, 2023 at 7:09 AM26 Comments

Cisco Can’t Stop Using Hard-Coded Passwords

There’s a new Cisco vulnerability in its Emergency Responder product:

This vulnerability is due to the presence of static user credentials for the root account that are typically reserved for use during development. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by using the account to log in to an affected system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to log in to the affected system and execute arbitrary commands as the root user.

This is not the first time Cisco products have had hard-coded passwords made public. You’d think it would learn.

Posted on October 11, 2023 at 7:04 AM19 Comments

Model Extraction Attack on Neural Networks

Adi Shamir et al. have a new model extraction attack on neural networks:

Polynomial Time Cryptanalytic Extraction of Neural Network Models

Abstract: Billions of dollars and countless GPU hours are currently spent on training Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) for a variety of tasks. Thus, it is essential to determine the difficulty of extracting all the parameters of such neural networks when given access to their black-box implementations. Many versions of this problem have been studied over the last 30 years, and the best current attack on ReLU-based deep neural networks was presented at Crypto’20 by Carlini, Jagielski, and Mironov. It resembles a differential chosen plaintext attack on a cryptosystem, which has a secret key embedded in its black-box implementation and requires a polynomial number of queries but an exponential amount of time (as a function of the number of neurons).

In this paper, we improve this attack by developing several new techniques that enable us to extract with arbitrarily high precision all the real-valued parameters of a ReLU-based DNN using a polynomial number of queries and a polynomial amount of time. We demonstrate its practical efficiency by applying it to a full-sized neural network for classifying the CIFAR10 dataset, which has 3072 inputs, 8 hidden layers with 256 neurons each, and about 1.2 million neuronal parameters. An attack following the approach by Carlini et al. requires an exhaustive search over 2256 possibilities. Our attack replaces this with our new techniques, which require only 30 minutes on a 256-core computer.

Posted on October 10, 2023 at 7:09 AM18 Comments

AI Risks

There is no shortage of researchers and industry titans willing to warn us about the potential destructive power of artificial intelligence. Reading the headlines, one would hope that the rapid gains in AI technology have also brought forth a unifying realization of the risks—and the steps we need to take to mitigate them.

The reality, unfortunately, is quite different. Beneath almost all of the testimony, the manifestoes, the blog posts, and the public declarations issued about AI are battles among deeply divided factions. Some are concerned about far-future risks that sound like science fiction. Some are genuinely alarmed by the practical problems that chatbots and deepfake video generators are creating right now. Some are motivated by potential business revenue, others by national security concerns.

The result is a cacophony of coded language, contradictory views, and provocative policy demands that are undermining our ability to grapple with a technology destined to drive the future of politics, our economy, and even our daily lives.

These factions are in dialogue not only with the public but also with one another. Sometimes, they trade letters, opinion essays, or social threads outlining their positions and attacking others’ in public view. More often, they tout their viewpoints without acknowledging alternatives, leaving the impression that their enlightened perspective is the inevitable lens through which to view AI But if lawmakers and the public fail to recognize the subtext of their arguments, they risk missing the real consequences of our possible regulatory and cultural paths forward.

To understand the fight and the impact it may have on our shared future, look past the immediate claims and actions of the players to the greater implications of their points of view. When you do, you’ll realize this isn’t really a debate only about AI. It’s also a contest about control and power, about how resources should be distributed and who should be held accountable.

Beneath this roiling discord is a true fight over the future of society. Should we focus on avoiding the dystopia of mass unemployment, a world where China is the dominant superpower or a society where the worst prejudices of humanity are embodied in opaque algorithms that control our lives? Should we listen to wealthy futurists who discount the importance of climate change because they’re already thinking ahead to colonies on Mars? It is critical that we begin to recognize the ideologies driving what we are being told. Resolving the fracas requires us to see through the specter of AI to stay true to the humanity of our values.

One way to decode the motives behind the various declarations is through their language. Because language itself is part of their battleground, the different AI camps tend not to use the same words to describe their positions. One faction describes the dangers posed by AI through the framework of safety, another through ethics or integrity, yet another through security, and others through economics. By decoding who is speaking and how AI is being described, we can explore where these groups differ and what drives their views.

The Doomsayers

The loudest perspective is a frightening, dystopian vision in which AI poses an existential risk to humankind, capable of wiping out all life on Earth. AI, in this vision, emerges as a godlike, superintelligent, ungovernable entity capable of controlling everything. AI could destroy humanity or pose a risk on par with nukes. If we’re not careful, it could kill everyone or enslave humanity. It’s likened to monsters like the Lovecraftian shoggoths, artificial servants that rebelled against their creators, or paper clip maximizers that consume all of Earth’s resources in a single-minded pursuit of their programmed goal. It sounds like science fiction, but these people are serious, and they mean the words they use.

These are the AI safety people, and their ranks include the “Godfathers of AI,” Geoff Hinton and Yoshua Bengio. For many years, these leading lights battled critics who doubted that a computer could ever mimic capabilities of the human mind. Having steamrollered the public conversation by creating large language models like ChatGPT and other AI tools capable of increasingly impressive feats, they appear deeply invested in the idea that there is no limit to what their creations will be able to accomplish.

This doomsaying is boosted by a class of tech elite that has enormous power to shape the conversation. And some in this group are animated by the radical effective altruism movement and the associated cause of long-term-ism, which tend to focus on the most extreme catastrophic risks and emphasize the far-future consequences of our actions. These philosophies are hot among the cryptocurrency crowd, like the disgraced former billionaire Sam Bankman-Fried, who at one time possessed sudden wealth in search of a cause.

Reasonable sounding on their face, these ideas can become dangerous if stretched to their logical extremes. A dogmatic long-termer would willingly sacrifice the well-being of people today to stave off a prophesied extinction event like AI enslavement.

Many doomsayers say they are acting rationally, but their hype about hypothetical existential risks amounts to making a misguided bet with our future. In the name of long-term-ism, Elon Musk reportedly believes that our society needs to encourage reproduction among those with the greatest culture and intelligence (namely, his ultrarich buddies). And he wants to go further, such as limiting the right to vote to parents and even populating Mars. It’s widely believed that Jaan Tallinn, the wealthy long-termer who co-founded the most prominent centers for the study of AI safety, has made dismissive noises about climate change because he thinks that it pales in comparison with far-future unknown unknowns like risks from AI. The technology historian David C. Brock calls these fears “wishful worries”—that is, “problems that it would be nice to have, in contrast to the actual agonies of the present.”

More practically, many of the researchers in this group are proceeding full steam ahead in developing AI, demonstrating how unrealistic it is to simply hit pause on technological development. But the roboticist Rodney Brooks has pointed out that we will see the existential risks coming—the dangers will not be sudden and we will have time to change course. While we shouldn’t dismiss the Hollywood nightmare scenarios out of hand, we must balance them with the potential benefits of AI and, most important, not allow them to strategically distract from more immediate concerns. Let’s not let apocalyptic prognostications overwhelm us and smother the momentum we need to develop critical guardrails.

The Reformers

While the doomsayer faction focuses on the far-off future, its most prominent opponents are focused on the here and now. We agree with this group that there’s plenty already happening to cause concern: Racist policing and legal systems that disproportionately arrest and punish people of color. Sexist labor systems that rate feminine-coded résumés lower. Superpower nations automating military interventions as tools of imperialism and, someday, killer robots.

The alternative to the end-of-the-world, existential risk narrative is a distressingly familiar vision of dystopia: a society in which humanity’s worst instincts are encoded into and enforced by machines. The doomsayers think AI enslavement looks like the Matrix; the reformers point to modern-day contractors doing traumatic work at low pay for OpenAI in Kenya.

Propagators of these AI ethics concerns—like Meredith Broussard, Safiya Umoja Noble, Rumman Chowdhury, and Cathy O’Neil—have been raising the alarm on inequities coded into AI for years. Although we don’t have a census, it’s noticeable that many leaders in this cohort are people of color, women, and people who identify as LGBTQ. They are often motivated by insight into what it feels like to be on the wrong end of algorithmic oppression and by a connection to the communities most vulnerable to the misuse of new technology. Many in this group take an explicitly social perspective: When Joy Buolamwini founded an organization to fight for equitable AI, she called it the Algorithmic Justice League. Ruha Benjamin called her organization the Ida B. Wells Just Data Lab.

Others frame efforts to reform AI in terms of integrity, calling for Big Tech to adhere to an oath to consider the benefit of the broader public alongside—or even above—their self-interest. They point to social media companies’ failure to control hate speech or how online misinformation can undermine democratic elections. Adding urgency for this group is that the very companies driving the AI revolution have, at times, been eliminating safeguards. A signal moment came when Timnit Gebru, a co-leader of Google’s AI ethics team, was dismissed for pointing out the risks of developing ever-larger AI language models.

While doomsayers and reformers share the concern that AI must align with human interests, reformers tend to push back hard against the doomsayers’ focus on the distant future. They want to wrestle the attention of regulators and advocates back toward present-day harms that are exacerbated by AI misinformation, surveillance, and inequity. Integrity experts call for the development of responsible AI, for civic education to ensure AI literacy and for keeping humans front and center in AI systems.

This group’s concerns are well documented and urgent—and far older than modern AI technologies. Surely, we are a civilization big enough to tackle more than one problem at a time; even those worried that AI might kill us in the future should still demand that it not profile and exploit us in the present.

The Warriors

Other groups of prognosticators cast the rise of AI through the language of competitiveness and national security. One version has a post-9/11 ring to it—a world where terrorists, criminals, and psychopaths have unfettered access to technologies of mass destruction. Another version is a Cold War narrative of the United States losing an AI arms race with China and its surveillance-rich society.

Some arguing from this perspective are acting on genuine national security concerns, and others have a simple motivation: money. These perspectives serve the interests of American tech tycoons as well as the government agencies and defense contractors they are intertwined with.

OpenAI’s Sam Altman and Meta’s Mark Zuckerberg, both of whom lead dominant AI companies, are pushing for AI regulations that they say will protect us from criminals and terrorists. Such regulations would be expensive to comply with and are likely to preserve the market position of leading AI companies while restricting competition from start-ups. In the lobbying battles over Europe’s trailblazing AI regulatory framework, US megacompanies pleaded to exempt their general-purpose AI from the tightest regulations, and whether and how to apply high-risk compliance expectations on noncorporate open-source models emerged as a key point of debate. All the while, some of the moguls investing in upstart companies are fighting the regulatory tide. The Inflection AI co-founder Reid Hoffman argued, “The answer to our challenges is not to slow down technology but to accelerate it.”

Any technology critical to national defense usually has an easier time avoiding oversight, regulation, and limitations on profit. Any readiness gap in our military demands urgent budget increases and funds distributed to the military branches and their contractors, because we may soon be called upon to fight. Tech moguls like Google’s former chief executive Eric Schmidt, who has the ear of many lawmakers, signal to American policymakers about the Chinese threat even as they invest in US national security concerns.

The warriors’ narrative seems to misrepresent that science and engineering are different from what they were during the mid-twentieth century. AI research is fundamentally international; no one country will win a monopoly. And while national security is important to consider, we must also be mindful of self-interest of those positioned to benefit financially.


As the science-fiction author Ted Chiang has said, fears about the existential risks of AI are really fears about the threat of uncontrolled capitalism, and dystopias like the paper clip maximizer are just caricatures of every start-up’s business plan. Cosma Shalizi and Henry Farrell further argue that “we’ve lived among shoggoths for centuries, tending to them as though they were our masters” as monopolistic platforms devour and exploit the totality of humanity’s labor and ingenuity for their own interests. This dread applies as much to our future with AI as it does to our past and present with corporations.

Regulatory solutions do not need to reinvent the wheel. Instead, we need to double down on the rules that we know limit corporate power. We need to get more serious about establishing good and effective governance on all the issues we lost track of while we were becoming obsessed with AI, China, and the fights picked among robber barons.

By analogy to the healthcare sector, we need an AI public option to truly keep AI companies in check. A publicly directed AI development project would serve to counterbalance for-profit corporate AI and help ensure an even playing field for access to the twenty-first century’s key technology while offering a platform for the ethical development and use of AI.

Also, we should embrace the humanity behind AI. We can hold founders and corporations accountable by mandating greater AI transparency in the development stage, in addition to applying legal standards for actions associated with AI. Remarkably, this is something that both the left and the right can agree on.

Ultimately, we need to make sure the network of laws and regulations that govern our collective behavior is knit more strongly, with fewer gaps and greater ability to hold the powerful accountable, particularly in those areas most sensitive to our democracy and environment. As those with power and privilege seem poised to harness AI to accumulate much more or pursue extreme ideologies, let’s think about how we can constrain their influence in the public square rather than cede our attention to their most bombastic nightmare visions for the future.

This essay was written with Nathan Sanders, and previously appeared in the New York Times.

Posted on October 9, 2023 at 7:03 AM46 Comments

Deepfake Election Interference in Slovakia

Well designed and well timed deepfake or two Slovakian politicians discussing how to rig the election:

Šimečka and Denník N immediately denounced the audio as fake. The fact-checking department of news agency AFP said the audio showed signs of being manipulated using AI. But the recording was posted during a 48-hour moratorium ahead of the polls opening, during which media outlets and politicians are supposed to stay silent. That meant, under Slovakia’s election rules, the post was difficult to widely debunk. And, because the post was audio, it exploited a loophole in Meta’s manipulated-media policy, which dictates only faked videos—­where a person has been edited to say words they never said­—go against its rules.

I just wrote about this. Countries like Russia and China tend to test their attacks out on smaller countries before unleashing them on larger ones. Consider this a preview to their actions in the US next year.

Posted on October 6, 2023 at 3:04 AM21 Comments

Political Disinformation and AI

Elections around the world are facing an evolving threat from foreign actors, one that involves artificial intelligence.

Countries trying to influence each other’s elections entered a new era in 2016, when the Russians launched a series of social media disinformation campaigns targeting the US presidential election. Over the next seven years, a number of countries—most prominently China and Iran—used social media to influence foreign elections, both in the US and elsewhere in the world. There’s no reason to expect 2023 and 2024 to be any different.

But there is a new element: generative AI and large language models. These have the ability to quickly and easily produce endless reams of text on any topic in any tone from any perspective. As a security expert, I believe it’s a tool uniquely suited to Internet-era propaganda.

This is all very new. ChatGPT was introduced in November 2022. The more powerful GPT-4 was released in March 2023. Other language and image production AIs are around the same age. It’s not clear how these technologies will change disinformation, how effective they will be or what effects they will have. But we are about to find out.

Election season will soon be in full swing in much of the democratic world. Seventy-one percent of people living in democracies will vote in a national election between now and the end of next year. Among them: Argentina and Poland in October, Taiwan in January, Indonesia in February, India in April, the European Union and Mexico in June, and the US in November. Nine African democracies, including South Africa, will have elections in 2024. Australia and the UK don’t have fixed dates, but elections are likely to occur in 2024.

Many of those elections matter a lot to the countries that have run social media influence operations in the past. China cares a great deal about Taiwan, Indonesia, India, and many African countries. Russia cares about the UK, Poland, Germany, and the EU in general. Everyone cares about the United States.

And that’s only considering the largest players. Every US national election from 2016 has brought with it an additional country attempting to influence the outcome. First it was just Russia, then Russia and China, and most recently those two plus Iran. As the financial cost of foreign influence decreases, more countries can get in on the action. Tools like ChatGPT significantly reduce the price of producing and distributing propaganda, bringing that capability within the budget of many more countries.

A couple of months ago, I attended a conference with representatives from all of the cybersecurity agencies in the US. They talked about their expectations regarding election interference in 2024. They expected the usual players—Russia, China, and Iran—and a significant new one: “domestic actors.” That is a direct result of this reduced cost.

Of course, there’s a lot more to running a disinformation campaign than generating content. The hard part is distribution. A propagandist needs a series of fake accounts on which to post, and others to boost it into the mainstream where it can go viral. Companies like Meta have gotten much better at identifying these accounts and taking them down. Just last month, Meta announced that it had removed 7,704 Facebook accounts, 954 Facebook pages, 15 Facebook groups, and 15 Instagram accounts associated with a Chinese influence campaign, and identified hundreds more accounts on TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), LiveJournal, and Blogspot. But that was a campaign that began four years ago, producing pre-AI disinformation.

Disinformation is an arms race. Both the attackers and defenders have improved, but also the world of social media is different. Four years ago, Twitter was a direct line to the media, and propaganda on that platform was a way to tilt the political narrative. A Columbia Journalism Review study found that most major news outlets used Russian tweets as sources for partisan opinion. That Twitter, with virtually every news editor reading it and everyone who was anyone posting there, is no more.

Many propaganda outlets moved from Facebook to messaging platforms such as Telegram and WhatsApp, which makes them harder to identify and remove. TikTok is a newer platform that is controlled by China and more suitable for short, provocative videos—ones that AI makes much easier to produce. And the current crop of generative AIs are being connected to tools that will make content distribution easier as well.

Generative AI tools also allow for new techniques of production and distribution, such as low-level propaganda at scale. Imagine a new AI-powered personal account on social media. For the most part, it behaves normally. It posts about its fake everyday life, joins interest groups and comments on others’ posts, and generally behaves like a normal user. And once in a while, not very often, it says—or amplifies—something political. These persona bots, as computer scientist Latanya Sweeney calls them, have negligible influence on their own. But replicated by the thousands or millions, they would have a lot more.

That’s just one scenario. The military officers in Russia, China, and elsewhere in charge of election interference are likely to have their best people thinking of others. And their tactics are likely to be much more sophisticated than they were in 2016.

Countries like Russia and China have a history of testing both cyberattacks and information operations on smaller countries before rolling them out at scale. When that happens, it’s important to be able to fingerprint these tactics. Countering new disinformation campaigns requires being able to recognize them, and recognizing them requires looking for and cataloging them now.

In the computer security world, researchers recognize that sharing methods of attack and their effectiveness is the only way to build strong defensive systems. The same kind of thinking also applies to these information campaigns: The more that researchers study what techniques are being employed in distant countries, the better they can defend their own countries.

Disinformation campaigns in the AI era are likely to be much more sophisticated than they were in 2016. I believe the US needs to have efforts in place to fingerprint and identify AI-produced propaganda in Taiwan, where a presidential candidate claims a deepfake audio recording has defamed him, and other places. Otherwise, we’re not going to see them when they arrive here. Unfortunately, researchers are instead being targeted and harassed.

Maybe this will all turn out okay. There have been some important democratic elections in the generative AI era with no significant disinformation issues: primaries in Argentina, first-round elections in Ecuador, and national elections in Thailand, Turkey, Spain, and Greece. But the sooner we know what to expect, the better we can deal with what comes.

This essay previously appeared in The Conversation.

Posted on October 5, 2023 at 7:12 AM40 Comments

Hacking Gas Pumps via Bluetooth

Turns out pumps at gas stations are controlled via Bluetooth, and that the connections are insecure. No details in the article, but it seems that it’s easy to take control of the pump and have it dispense gas without requiring payment.

It’s a complicated crime to monetize, though. You need to sell access to the gas pump to others.

EDITED TO ADD (10/13): Reader Jeff Hall says that story is not accurate, and that the gas pumps do not have a Bluetooth connection.

Posted on October 3, 2023 at 7:01 AM25 Comments

NSA AI Security Center

The NSA is starting a new artificial intelligence security center:

The AI security center’s establishment follows an NSA study that identified securing AI models from theft and sabotage as a major national security challenge, especially as generative AI technologies emerge with immense transformative potential for both good and evil.

Nakasone said it would become “NSA’s focal point for leveraging foreign intelligence insights, contributing to the development of best practices guidelines, principles, evaluation, methodology and risk frameworks” for both AI security and the goal of promoting the secure development and adoption of AI within “our national security systems and our defense industrial base.”

He said it would work closely with U.S. industry, national labs, academia and the Department of Defense as well as international partners.

Posted on October 2, 2023 at 12:40 PM13 Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.