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The paperback version of A Hacker’s Mind has just been published. It’s the same book, only a cheaper format.
But—and this is the real reason I am posting this—Amazon has significantly discounted the hardcover to $15 to get rid of its stock. This is much cheaper than I am selling it for, and cheaper even than the paperback. So if you’ve been waiting for a price drop, this is your chance.
Molly White—of “Web3 is Going Just Great” fame—reviews Chris Dixon’s blockchain solutions book: Read Write Own:
In fact, throughout the entire book, Dixon fails to identify a single blockchain project that has successfully provided a non-speculative service at any kind of scale. The closest he ever comes is when he speaks of how “for decades, technologists have dreamed of building a grassroots internet access provider”. He describes one project that “got further than anyone else”: Helium. He’s right, as long as you ignore the fact that Helium was providing LoRaWAN, not Internet, that by the time he was writing his book Helium hotspots had long since passed the phase where they might generate even enough tokens for their operators to merely break even, and that the network was pulling in somewhere around $1,150 in usage fees a month despite the company being valued at $1.2 billion. Oh, and that the company had widely lied to the public about its supposed big-name clients, and that its executives have been accused of hoarding the project’s token to enrich themselves. But hey, a16z sunk millions into Helium (a fact Dixon never mentions), so might as well try to drum up some new interest!
Matt Burgess tries to only use passkeys. The results are mixed.
Amusing story about a penguin named “Squid.”
As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.
Read my blog posting guidelines here.
The widely reported story last week that 1.5 million smart toothbrushes were hacked and used in a DDoS attack is false.
Near as I can tell, a German reporter talking to someone at Fortinet got it wrong, and then everyone else ran with it without reading the German text. It was a hypothetical, which Fortinet eventually confirmed.
Or maybe it was a stock-price hack.
Over on Lawfare, Jim Dempsey published a really interesting proposal for software liability: “Standard for Software Liability: Focus on the Product for Liability, Focus on the Process for Safe Harbor.”
Section 1 of this paper sets the stage by briefly describing the problem to be solved. Section 2 canvasses the different fields of law (warranty, negligence, products liability, and certification) that could provide a starting point for what would have to be legislative action establishing a system of software liability. The conclusion is that all of these fields would face the same question: How buggy is too buggy? Section 3 explains why existing software development frameworks do not provide a sufficiently definitive basis for legal liability. They focus on process, while a liability regime should begin with a focus on the product—that is, on outcomes. Expanding on the idea of building codes for building code, Section 4 shows some examples of product-focused standards from other fields. Section 5 notes that already there have been definitive expressions of software defects that can be drawn together to form the minimum legal standard of security. It specifically calls out the list of common software weaknesses tracked by the MITRE Corporation under a government contract. Section 6 considers how to define flaws above the minimum floor and how to limit that liability with a safe harbor.
Full paper here.
Dempsey basically creates three buckets of software vulnerabilities: easy stuff that the vendor should have found and fixed, hard-to-find stuff that the vendor couldn’t be reasonably expected to find, and the stuff in the middle. He draws from other fields—consumer products, building codes, automobile design—to show that courts can deal with the stuff in the middle.
I have long been a fan of software liability as a policy mechanism for improving cybersecurity. And, yes, software is complicated, but we shouldn’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
In 2003, I wrote:
Clearly this isn’t all or nothing. There are many parties involved in a typical software attack. There’s the company who sold the software with the vulnerability in the first place. There’s the person who wrote the attack tool. There’s the attacker himself, who used the tool to break into a network. There’s the owner of the network, who was entrusted with defending that network. One hundred percent of the liability shouldn’t fall on the shoulders of the software vendor, just as one hundred percent shouldn’t fall on the attacker or the network owner. But today one hundred percent of the cost falls on the network owner, and that just has to stop.
Courts can adjudicate these complex liability issues, and have figured this thing out in other areas. Automobile accidents involve multiple drivers, multiple cars, road design, weather conditions, and so on. Accidental restaurant poisonings involve suppliers, cooks, refrigeration, sanitary conditions, and so on. We don’t let the fact that no restaurant can possibly fix all of the food-safety vulnerabilities lead us to the conclusion that restaurants shouldn’t be responsible for any food-safety vulnerabilities, yet I hear that line of reasoning regarding software vulnerabilities all of the time.
Interesting research: “Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training“:
Abstract: Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoor behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoor behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.
Especially note one of the sentences from the abstract: “For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024.”
And this deceptive behavior is hard to detect and remove.
Via a FOIA request, we have documents from the NSA about their banning of Furby toys. 404 Media has the story.
EDITED TO ADD: The documents are now on Archive.org.
A deepfake video conference call—with everyone else on the call a fake—fooled a finance worker into sending $25M to the criminals’ account.
Argentina is reporting that there is a good population of illex squid in its waters ready for fishing, and is working to ensure that Chinese fishing boats don’t take it all.
As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.
Read my blog posting guidelines here.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.