Page 47

Perfectl Malware

Perfectl in an impressive piece of malware:

The malware has been circulating since at least 2021. It gets installed by exploiting more than 20,000 common misconfigurations, a capability that may make millions of machines connected to the Internet potential targets, researchers from Aqua Security said. It can also exploit CVE-2023-33246, a vulnerability with a severity rating of 10 out of 10 that was patched last year in Apache RocketMQ, a messaging and streaming platform that’s found on many Linux machines.

The researchers are calling the malware Perfctl, the name of a malicious component that surreptitiously mines cryptocurrency. The unknown developers of the malware gave the process a name that combines the perf Linux monitoring tool and ctl, an abbreviation commonly used with command line tools. A signature characteristic of Perfctl is its use of process and file names that are identical or similar to those commonly found in Linux environments. The naming convention is one of the many ways the malware attempts to escape notice of infected users.

Perfctl further cloaks itself using a host of other tricks. One is that it installs many of its components as rootkits, a special class of malware that hides its presence from the operating system and administrative tools. Other stealth mechanisms include:

  • Stopping activities that are easy to detect when a new user logs in
  • Using a Unix socket over TOR for external communications
  • Deleting its installation binary after execution and running as a background service thereafter
  • Manipulating the Linux process pcap_loop through a technique known as hooking to prevent admin tools from recording the malicious traffic
  • Suppressing mesg errors to avoid any visible warnings during execution.

The malware is designed to ensure persistence, meaning the ability to remain on the infected machine after reboots or attempts to delete core components. Two such techniques are (1) modifying the ~/.profile script, which sets up the environment during user login so the malware loads ahead of legitimate workloads expected to run on the server and (2) copying itself from memory to multiple disk locations. The hooking of pcap_loop can also provide persistence by allowing malicious activities to continue even after primary payloads are detected and removed.

Besides using the machine resources to mine cryptocurrency, Perfctl also turns the machine into a profit-making proxy that paying customers use to relay their Internet traffic. Aqua Security researchers have also observed the malware serving as a backdoor to install other families of malware.

Something this complex and impressive implies that a government is behind this. North Korea is the government we know that hacks cryptocurrency in order to fund its operations. But this feels too complex for that. I have no idea how to attribute this.

Posted on October 14, 2024 at 7:06 AMView Comments

More on My AI and Democracy Book

In July, I wrote about my new book project on AI and democracy, to be published by MIT Press in fall 2025. My co-author and collaborator Nathan Sanders and I are hard at work writing.

At this point, we would like feedback on titles. Here are four possibilities:

  1. Rewiring the Republic: How AI Will Transform our Politics, Government, and Citizenship
  2. The Thinking State: How AI Can Improve Democracy
  3. Better Run: How AI Can Make our Politics, Government, Citizenship More Efficient, Effective and Fair
  4. AI and the New Future of Democracy: Changes in Politics, Government, and Citizenship

What we want out of the title is that it convey (1) that it is a book about AI, (2) that it is a book about democracy writ large (and not just deepfakes), and (3) that it is largely optimistic.

What do you like? Feel free to do some mixing and matching: swapping “Will Transform” for “Will Improve” for “Can Transform” for “Can Improve,” for example. Or “Democracy” for “the Republic.” Remember, the goal here is for a title that will make a potential reader pick the book up off a shelf, or read the blurb text on a webpage. It needs to be something that will catch the reader’s attention. (Other title ideas are here).

Also, FYI, this is the current table of contents:

Introduction
1. Introduction: How AI will Change Democracy
2. Core AI Capabilities
3. Democracy as an Information System

Part I: AI-Assisted Politics
4. Background: Making Mistakes
5. Talking to Voters
6. Conducting Polls
7. Organizing a Political Campaign
8. Fundraising for Politics
9. Being a Politician

Part II: AI-Assisted Legislators
10. Background: Explaining Itself
11. Background: Who’s to Blame?
12. Listening to Constituents
13. Writing Laws
14. Writing More Complex Laws
15. Writing Laws that Empower Machines
16. Negotiating Legislation

Part III: The AI-Assisted Administration
17. Background: Exhibiting Values and Bias
18. Background: Augmenting Versus Replacing People
19. Serving People
20. Operating Government
21. Enforcing Regulations

Part IV: The AI-Assisted Court
22. Background: Being Fair
23. Background: Getting Hacked
24. Acting as a Lawyer
25. Arbitrating Disputes
26. Enforcing the Law
27. Reshaping Legislative Intent
28. Being a Judge

Part V: AI-Assisted Citizens
29. Background: AI and Power
30. Background: AI and Trust
31. Explaining the News
32. Watching the Government
33. Moderating, Facilitating, and Building Consensus
34. Acting as Your Personal Advocate
35. Acting as Your Personal Political Proxy

Part VI: Ensuring That AI Benefits Democracy
36. Why AI is Not Yet Good for Democracy
37. How to Ensure AI is Good for Democracy
38. What We Need to Do Now
39. Conclusion

Everything is subject to change, of course. The manuscript isn’t due to the publisher until the end of March, and who knows what AI developments will happen between now and then.

EDITED: The title under consideration is “Rewiring the Republic,” and not “Rewiring Democracy.” Although, I suppose, both are really under consideration.

Posted on October 11, 2024 at 3:00 PMView Comments

IronNet Has Shut Down

After retiring in 2014 from an uncharacteristically long tenure running the NSA (and US CyberCommand), Keith Alexander founded a cybersecurity company called IronNet. At the time, he claimed that it was based on IP he developed on his own time while still in the military. That always troubled me. Whatever ideas he had, they were developed on public time using public resources: he shouldn’t have been able to leave military service with them in his back pocket.

In any case, it was never clear what those ideas were. IronNet never seemed to have any special technology going for it. Near as I could tell, its success was entirely based on Alexander’s name.

Turns out there was nothing there. After some crazy VC investments and an IPO with a $3 billion “unicorn” valuation, the company has shut its doors. It went bankrupt a year ago—ceasing operations and firing everybody—and reemerged as a private company. It now seems to be gone for good, not having found anyone willing to buy it.

And—wow—the recriminations are just starting.

Last September the never-profitable company announced it was shutting down and firing its employees after running out of money, providing yet another example of a tech firm that faltered after failing to deliver on overhyped promises.

The firm’s crash has left behind a trail of bitter investors and former employees who remain angry at the company and believe it misled them about its financial health.

IronNet’s rise and fall also raises questions about the judgment of its well-credentialed leaders, a who’s who of the national security establishment. National security experts, former employees and analysts told The Associated Press that the firm collapsed, in part, because it engaged in questionable business practices, produced subpar products and services, and entered into associations that could have left the firm vulnerable to meddling by the Kremlin.

“I’m honestly ashamed that I was ever an executive at that company,” said Mark Berly, a former IronNet vice president. He said the company’s top leaders cultivated a culture of deceit “just like Theranos,” the once highly touted blood-testing firm that became a symbol of corporate fraud.

There has been one lawsuit. Presumably there will be more. I’m sure Alexander got plenty rich off his NSA career.

Posted on October 11, 2024 at 7:08 AMView Comments

Deebot Robot Vacuums Are Using Photos and Audio to Train Their AI

An Australian news agency is reporting that robot vacuum cleaners from the Chinese company Deebot are surreptitiously taking photos and recording audio, and sending that data back to the vendor to train their AIs.

Ecovacs’s privacy policy—available elsewhere in the app—allows for blanket collection of user data for research purposes, including:

  • The 2D or 3D map of the user’s house generated by the device
  • Voice recordings from the device’s microphone
  • Photos or videos recorded by the device’s camera

It also states that voice recordings, videos and photos that are deleted via the app may continue to be held and used by Ecovacs.

No word on whether the recorded audio is being used to train the vacuum in some way, or whether it is being used to train a LLM.

Slashdot thread.

Posted on October 10, 2024 at 7:00 AMView Comments

China Possibly Hacking US “Lawful Access” Backdoor

The Wall Street Journal is reporting that Chinese hackers (Salt Typhoon) penetrated the networks of US broadband providers, and might have accessed the backdoors that the federal government uses to execute court-authorized wiretap requests. Those backdoors have been mandated by law—CALEA—since 1994.

It’s a weird story. The first line of the article is: “A cyberattack tied to the Chinese government penetrated the networks of a swath of U.S. broadband providers.” This implies that the attack wasn’t against the broadband providers directly, but against one of the intermediary companies that sit between the government CALEA requests and the broadband providers.

For years, the security community has pushed back against these backdoors, pointing out that the technical capability cannot differentiate between good guys and bad guys. And here is one more example of a backdoor access mechanism being targeted by the “wrong” eavesdroppers.

Other news stories.

Posted on October 8, 2024 at 7:00 AMView Comments

Weird Zimbra Vulnerability

Hackers can execute commands on a remote computer by sending malformed emails to a Zimbra mail server. It’s critical, but difficult to exploit reliably.

In an email sent Wednesday afternoon, Proofpoint researcher Greg Lesnewich seemed to largely concur that the attacks weren’t likely to lead to mass infections that could install ransomware or espionage malware. The researcher provided the following details:

  • While the exploitation attempts we have observed were indiscriminate in targeting, we haven’t seen a large volume of exploitation attempts
  • Based on what we have researched and observed, exploitation of this vulnerability is very easy, but we do not have any information about how reliable the exploitation is
  • Exploitation has remained about the same since we first spotted it on Sept. 28th
  • There is a PoC available, and the exploit attempts appear opportunistic
  • Exploitation is geographically diverse and appears indiscriminate
  • The fact that the attacker is using the same server to send the exploit emails and host second-stage payloads indicates the actor does not have a distributed set of infrastructure to send exploit emails and handle infections after successful exploitation. We would expect the email server and payload servers to be different entities in a more mature operation.
  • Defenders protecting Zimbra appliances should look out for odd CC or To addresses that look malformed or contain suspicious strings, as well as logs from the Zimbra server indicating outbound connections to remote IP addresses.

Posted on October 3, 2024 at 7:04 AMView Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.