Friday Squid Blogging: Live Video of Promachoteuthis Squid
The first live video of the Promachoteuthis squid, filmed at a newly discovered seamount off the coast of Chile.
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The first live video of the Promachoteuthis squid, filmed at a newly discovered seamount off the coast of Chile.
There is a side-channel attack against YubiKey access tokens that allows someone to clone a device. It’s a complicated attack, requiring the victim’s username and password, and physical access to their YubiKey—as well as some technical expertise and equipment.
Still, nice piece of security analysis.
Really interesting analysis of the American M-209 encryption device and its security.
This story seems straightforward. A city is the victim of a ransomware attack. They repeatedly lie to the media about the severity of the breach. A security researcher repeatedly proves their statements to be lies. The city gets mad and sues the researcher.
Let’s hope the judge throws the case out, but—still—it will serve as a warning to others.
The NSA’s “National Cryptologic School Television Catalogue” from 1991 lists about 600 COMSEC and SIGINT training videos.
There are a bunch explaining the operations of various cryptographic equipment, and a few code words I have never heard of before.
Interesting vulnerability:
…a special lane at airport security called Known Crewmember (KCM). KCM is a TSA program that allows pilots and flight attendants to bypass security screening, even when flying on domestic personal trips.
The KCM process is fairly simple: the employee uses the dedicated lane and presents their KCM barcode or provides the TSA agent their employee number and airline. Various forms of ID need to be presented while the TSA agent’s laptop verifies the employment status with the airline. If successful, the employee can access the sterile area without any screening at all.
A similar system also exists for cockpit access, called the Cockpit Access Security System (CASS). Most aircraft have at least one jumpseat inside the cockpit sitting behind the flying pilots. When pilots need to commute or travel, it is not always possible for them to occupy a revenue seat, so a jumpseat can be used instead. CASS allows the gate agent of a flight to verify that the jumpseater is an authorized pilot. The gate agent can then inform the crew of the flight that the jumpseater was authenticated by CASS.
[attack details omitted]
At this point, we realized we had discovered a very serious problem. Anyone with basic knowledge of SQL injection could login to this site and add anyone they wanted to KCM and CASS, allowing themselves to both skip security screening and then access the cockpits of commercial airliners.
We ended up finding several more serious issues but began the disclosure process immediately after finding the first issue.
The “long lost lecture” by Adm. Grace Hopper has been published by the NSA. (Note that there are two parts.)
It’s a wonderful talk: funny, engaging, wise, prescient. Remember that talk was given in 1982, less than a year before the ARPANET switched to TCP/IP and the internet went operational. She was a remarkable person.
Listening to it, and thinking about the audience of NSA engineers, I wonder how much of what she’s talking about as the future of computing—miniaturization, parallelization—was being done in the present and in secret.
Matthew Green wrote a really good blog post on what Telegram’s encryption is and is not.
EDITED TO ADD (8/28): Another good explainer from Kaspersky.
Ars Technica has a good article on what’s happening in the world of television surveillance. More than even I realized.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.