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AIs and Robots Should Sound Robotic

Most people know that robots no longer sound like tinny trash cans. They sound like Siri, Alexa, and Gemini. They sound like the voices in labyrinthine customer support phone trees. And even those robot voices are being made obsolete by new AI-generated voices that can mimic every vocal nuance and tic of human speech, down to specific regional accents. And with just a few seconds of audio, AI can now clone someone’s specific voice.

This technology will replace humans in many areas. Automated customer support will save money by cutting staffing at call centers. AI agents will make calls on our behalf, conversing with others in natural language. All of that is happening, and will be commonplace soon.

But there is something fundamentally different about talking with a bot as opposed to a person. A person can be a friend. An AI cannot be a friend, despite how people might treat it or react to it. AI is at best a tool, and at worst a means of manipulation. Humans need to know whether we’re talking with a living, breathing person or a robot with an agenda set by the person who controls it. That’s why robots should sound like robots.

You can’t just label AI-generated speech. It will come in many different forms. So we need a way to recognize AI that works no matter the modality. It needs to work for long or short snippets of audio, even just a second long. It needs to work for any language, and in any cultural context. At the same time, we shouldn’t constrain the underlying system’s sophistication or language complexity.

We have a simple proposal: all talking AIs and robots should use a ring modulator. In the mid-twentieth century, before it was easy to create actual robotic-sounding speech synthetically, ring modulators were used to make actors’ voices sound robotic. Over the last few decades, we have become accustomed to robotic voices, simply because text-to-speech systems were good enough to produce intelligible speech that was not human-like in its sound. Now we can use that same technology to make robotic speech that is indistinguishable from human sound robotic again.

A ring modulator has several advantages: It is computationally simple, can be applied in real-time, does not affect the intelligibility of the voice, and—most importantly—is universally “robotic sounding” because of its historical usage for depicting robots.

Responsible AI companies that provide voice synthesis or AI voice assistants in any form should add a ring modulator of some standard frequency (say, between 30-80 Hz) and of a minimum amplitude (say, 20 percent). That’s it. People will catch on quickly.

Here are a couple of examples you can listen to for examples of what we’re suggesting. The first clip is an AI-generated “podcast” of this article made by Google’s NotebookLM featuring two AI “hosts.” Google’s NotebookLM created the podcast script and audio given only the text of this article. The next two clips feature that same podcast with the AIs’ voices modulated more and less subtly by a ring modulator:

Raw audio sample generated by Google’s NotebookLM

Audio sample with added ring modulator (30 Hz-25%)

Audio sample with added ring modulator (30 Hz-40%)

We were able to generate the audio effect with a 50-line Python script generated by Anthropic’s Claude. One of the most well-known robot voices were those of the Daleks from Doctor Who in the 1960s. Back then robot voices were difficult to synthesize, so the audio was actually an actor’s voice run through a ring modulator. It was set to around 30 Hz, as we did in our example, with different modulation depth (amplitude) depending on how strong the robotic effect is meant to be. Our expectation is that the AI industry will test and converge on a good balance of such parameters and settings, and will use better tools than a 50-line Python script, but this highlights how simple it is to achieve.

Of course there will also be nefarious uses of AI voices. Scams that use voice cloning have been getting easier every year, but they’ve been possible for many years with the right know-how. Just like we’re learning that we can no longer trust images and videos we see because they could easily have been AI-generated, we will all soon learn that someone who sounds like a family member urgently requesting money may just be a scammer using a voice-cloning tool.

We don’t expect scammers to follow our proposal: They’ll find a way no matter what. But that’s always true of security standards, and a rising tide lifts all boats. We think the bulk of the uses will be with popular voice APIs from major companies—and everyone should know that they’re talking with a robot.

This essay was written with Barath Raghavan, and originally appeared in IEEE Spectrum.

Posted on February 6, 2025 at 7:03 AMView Comments

On Generative AI Security

Microsoft’s AI Red Team just published “Lessons from Red Teaming 100 Generative AI Products.” Their blog post lists “three takeaways,” but the eight lessons in the report itself are more useful:

  1. Understand what the system can do and where it is applied.
  2. You don’t have to compute gradients to break an AI system.
  3. AI red teaming is not safety benchmarking.
  4. Automation can help cover more of the risk landscape.
  5. The human element of AI red teaming is crucial.
  6. Responsible AI harms are pervasive but difficult to measure.
  7. LLMs amplify existing security risks and introduce new ones.
  8. The work of securing AI systems will never be complete.

Posted on February 5, 2025 at 7:03 AMView Comments

Deepfakes and the 2024 US Election

Interesting analysis:

We analyzed every instance of AI use in elections collected by the WIRED AI Elections Project (source for our analysis), which tracked known uses of AI for creating political content during elections taking place in 2024 worldwide. In each case, we identified what AI was used for and estimated the cost of creating similar content without AI.

We find that (1) half of AI use isn’t deceptive, (2) deceptive content produced using AI is nevertheless cheap to replicate without AI, and (3) focusing on the demand for misinformation rather than the supply is a much more effective way to diagnose problems and identify interventions.

This tracks with my analysis. People share as a form of social signaling. I send you a meme/article/clipping/photo to show that we are on the same team. Whether it is true, or misinformation, or actual propaganda, is of secondary importance. Sometimes it’s completely irrelevant. This is why fact checking doesn’t work. This is why “cheap fakes”—obviously fake photos and videos—are effective. This is why, as the authors of that analysis said, the demand side is the real problem.

Posted on February 4, 2025 at 7:01 AMView Comments

Journalists and Civil Society Members Using WhatsApp Targeted by Paragon Spyware

This is yet another story of commercial spyware being used against journalists and civil society members.

The journalists and other civil society members were being alerted of a possible breach of their devices, with WhatsApp telling the Guardian it had “high confidence” that the 90 users in question had been targeted and “possibly compromised.”

It is not clear who was behind the attack. Like other spyware makers, Paragon’s hacking software is used by government clients and WhatsApp said it had not been able to identify the clients who ordered the alleged attacks.

Experts said the targeting was a “zero-click” attack, which means targets would not have had to click on any malicious links to be infected.

Posted on February 3, 2025 at 7:05 AMView Comments

Fake Reddit and WeTransfer Sites Are Pushing Malware

There are thousands of fake Reddit and WeTransfer webpages that are pushing malware. They exploit people who are using search engines to search sites like Reddit.

Unsuspecting victims clicking on the link are taken to a fake WeTransfer site that mimicks the interface of the popular file-sharing service. The ‘Download’ button leads to the Lumma Stealer payload hosted on “weighcobbweo[.]top.”

Boing Boing post.

Posted on January 30, 2025 at 7:44 AMView Comments

ExxonMobil Lobbyist Caught Hacking Climate Activists

The Department of Justice is investigating a lobbying firm representing ExxonMobil for hacking the phones of climate activists:

The hacking was allegedly commissioned by a Washington, D.C., lobbying firm, according to a lawyer representing the U.S. government. The firm, in turn, was allegedly working on behalf of one of the world’s largest oil and gas companies, based in Texas, that wanted to discredit groups and individuals involved in climate litigation, according to the lawyer for the U.S. government. In court documents, the Justice Department does not name either company.

As part of its probe, the U.S. is trying to extradite an Israeli private investigator named Amit Forlit from the United Kingdom for allegedly orchestrating the hacking campaign. A lawyer for Forlit claimed in a court filing that the hacking operation her client is accused of leading “is alleged to have been commissioned by DCI Group, a lobbying firm representing ExxonMobil, one of the world’s largest fossil fuel companies.”

Posted on January 29, 2025 at 7:04 AMView Comments

CISA Under Trump

Jen Easterly is out as the Director of CISA. Read her final interview:

There’s a lot of unfinished business. We have made an impact through our ransomware vulnerability warning pilot and our pre-ransomware notification initiative, and I’m really proud of that, because we work on preventing somebody from having their worst day. But ransomware is still a problem. We have been laser-focused on PRC cyber actors. That will continue to be a huge problem. I’m really proud of where we are, but there’s much, much more work to be done. There are things that I think we can continue driving, that the next administration, I hope, will look at, because, frankly, cybersecurity is a national security issue.

If Project 2025 is a guide, the agency will be gutted under Trump:

“Project 2025’s recommendations—essentially because this one thing caused anger—is to just strip the agency of all of its support altogether,” he said. “And CISA’s functions go so far beyond its role in the information space in a way that would do real harm to election officials and leave them less prepared to tackle future challenges.”

In the DHS chapter of Project 2025, Cucinelli suggests gutting CISA almost entirely, moving its core responsibilities on critical infrastructure to the Department of Transportation. It’s a suggestion that Adav Noti, the executive director of the nonpartisan voting rights advocacy organization Campaign Legal Center, previously described to Democracy Docket as “absolutely bonkers.”

“It’s located at Homeland Security because the whole premise of the Department of Homeland Security is that it’s supposed to be the central resource for the protection of the nation,” Noti said. “And that the important functions shouldn’t be living out in siloed agencies.”

Posted on January 28, 2025 at 7:09 AMView Comments

New VPN Backdoor

A newly discovered VPN backdoor uses some interesting tactics to avoid detection:

When threat actors use backdoor malware to gain access to a network, they want to make sure all their hard work can’t be leveraged by competing groups or detected by defenders. One countermeasure is to equip the backdoor with a passive agent that remains dormant until it receives what’s known in the business as a “magic packet.” On Thursday, researchers revealed that a never-before-seen backdoor that quietly took hold of dozens of enterprise VPNs running Juniper Network’s Junos OS has been doing just that.

J-Magic, the tracking name for the backdoor, goes one step further to prevent unauthorized access. After receiving a magic packet hidden in the normal flow of TCP traffic, it relays a challenge to the device that sent it. The challenge comes in the form of a string of text that’s encrypted using the public portion of an RSA key. The initiating party must then respond with the corresponding plaintext, proving it has access to the secret key.

The lightweight backdoor is also notable because it resided only in memory, a trait that makes detection harder for defenders. The combination prompted researchers at Lumin Technology’s Black Lotus Lab to sit up and take notice.

[…]

The researchers found J-Magic on VirusTotal and determined that it had run inside the networks of 36 organizations. They still don’t know how the backdoor got installed.

Slashdot thread.

EDITED TO ADD (2/1): Another article.

Posted on January 27, 2025 at 7:02 AMView Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.