NSO Group Hacking WhatsApp Despite Court Order
WhatsApp has caught the NSO Group phishing its users, in violation of a court order.
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WhatsApp has caught the NSO Group phishing its users, in violation of a court order.
Attaullah Baig, WhatsApp’s former head of security, has filed a whistleblower lawsuit alleging that Facebook deliberately failed to fix a bunch of security flaws, in violation of its 2019 settlement agreement with the Federal Trade Commission.
The lawsuit, alleging violations of the whistleblower protection provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed in 2002, said that in 2022, roughly 100,000 WhatsApp users had their accounts hacked every day. By last year, the complaint alleged, as many as 400,000 WhatsApp users were getting locked out of their accounts each day as a result of such account takeovers.
Baig also allegedly notified superiors that data scraping on the platform was a problem because WhatsApp failed to implement protections that are standard on other messaging platforms, such as Signal and Apple Messages. As a result, the former WhatsApp head estimated that pictures and names of some 400 million user profiles were improperly copied every day, often for use in account impersonation scams.
Reuters is reporting that the US House of Representatives has banned WhatsApp on all employee devices:
The notice said the “Office of Cybersecurity has deemed WhatsApp a high risk to users due to the lack of transparency in how it protects user data, absence of stored data encryption, and potential security risks involved with its use.”
TechCrunch has more commentary, but no more information.
The case is over:
A jury has awarded WhatsApp $167 million in punitive damages in a case the company brought against Israel-based NSO Group for exploiting a software vulnerability that hijacked the phones of thousands of users.
I’m sure it’ll be appealed. Everything always is.
Meta is suing NSO Group, basically claiming that the latter hacks WhatsApp and not just WhatsApp users. We have a procedural ruling:
Under the order, NSO Group is prohibited from presenting evidence about its customers’ identities, implying the targeted WhatsApp users are suspected or actual criminals, or alleging that WhatsApp had insufficient security protections.
[…]
In making her ruling, Northern District of California Judge Phyllis Hamilton said NSO Group undercut its arguments to use evidence about its customers with contradictory statements.
“Defendants cannot claim, on the one hand, that its intent is to help its clients fight terrorism and child exploitation, and on the other hand say that it has nothing to do with what its client does with the technology, other than advice and support,” she wrote. “Additionally, there is no evidence as to the specific kinds of crimes or security threats that its clients actually investigate and none with respect to the attacks at issue.”
I have written about the issues at play in this case.
This is yet another story of commercial spyware being used against journalists and civil society members.
The journalists and other civil society members were being alerted of a possible breach of their devices, with WhatsApp telling the Guardian it had “high confidence” that the 90 users in question had been targeted and “possibly compromised.”
It is not clear who was behind the attack. Like other spyware makers, Paragon’s hacking software is used by government clients and WhatsApp said it had not been able to identify the clients who ordered the alleged attacks.
Experts said the targeting was a “zero-click” attack, which means targets would not have had to click on any malicious links to be infected.
A judge has found that NSO Group, maker of the Pegasus spyware, has violated the US Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by hacking WhatsApp in order to spy on people using it.
Jon Penney and I wrote a legal paper on the case.
Meta has threatened to pull WhatsApp out of India if the courts try to force it to break its end-to-end encryption.
In an open letter, seven secure messaging apps—including Signal and WhatsApp—point out that the UK’s Online Safety Bill could destroy end-to-end encryption:
As currently drafted, the Bill could break end-to-end encryption,opening the door to routine, general and indiscriminate surveillance of personal messages of friends, family members, employees, executives, journalists, human rights activists and even politicians themselves, which would fundamentally undermine everyone’s ability to communicate securely.
The Bill provides no explicit protection for encryption, and if implemented as written, could empower OFCOM to try to force the proactive scanning of private messages on end-to-end encrypted communication services—nullifying the purpose of end-to-end encryption as a result and compromising the privacy of all users.
In short, the Bill poses an unprecedented threat to the privacy, safety and security of every UK citizen and the people with whom they communicate around the world, while emboldening hostile governments who may seek to draft copy-cat laws.
Both Signal and WhatsApp have said that they will cease services in the UK rather than compromise the security of their users worldwide.
Long and interesting interview with Signal’s new president, Meredith Whittaker:
WhatsApp uses the Signal encryption protocol to provide encryption for its messages. That was absolutely a visionary choice that Brian and his team led back in the day - and big props to them for doing that. But you can’t just look at that and then stop at message protection. WhatsApp does not protect metadata the way that Signal does. Signal knows nothing about who you are. It doesn’t have your profile information and it has introduced group encryption protections. We don’t know who you are talking to or who is in the membership of a group. It has gone above and beyond to minimize the collection of metadata.
WhatsApp, on the other hand, collects the information about your profile, your profile photo, who is talking to whom, who is a group member. That is powerful metadata. It is particularly powerful—and this is where we have to back out into a structural argument for a company to collect the data that is also owned by Meta/Facebook. Facebook has a huge amount, just unspeakable volumes, of intimate information about billions of people across the globe.
It is not trivial to point out that WhatsApp metadata could easily be joined with Facebook data, and that it could easily reveal extremely intimate information about people. The choice to remove or enhance the encryption protocols is still in the hands of Facebook. We have to look structurally at what that organization is, who actually has control over these decisions, and at some of these details that often do not get discussed when we talk about message encryption overall.
I am a fan of Signal and I use it every day. The one feature I want, which WhatsApp has and Signal does not, is the ability to easily export a chat to a text file.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.