Essays in the Category "Computer and Information Security"

Page 25 of 33

Information Security: How Liable Should Vendors Be?

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Computerworld
  • October 28, 2004

An update to this essay was published in ENISA Quarterly in January 2007.

Information insecurity is costing us billions. We pay for it in theft: information theft, financial theft. We pay for it in productivity loss, both when networks stop working and in the dozens of minor security inconveniences we all have to endure. We pay for it when we have to buy security products and services to reduce those other two losses. We pay for security, year after year.

The problem is that all the money we spend isn’t fixing the problem. We’re paying, but we still end up with insecurities…

The Non-Security of Secrecy

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Communications of the ACM
  • October 2004

Considerable confusion exists between the different concepts of secrecy and security, which often causes bad security and surprising political arguments. Secrecy usually contributes only to a false sense of security.

In June 2004, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security urged regulators to keep network outage information secret. The Federal Communications Commission requires telephone companies to report large disruptions of telephone service, and wants to extend that to high-speed data lines and wireless networks. DHS fears that such information would give cyberterrorists a “virtual road map” to target critical infrastructures…

Saluting the data encryption legacy

  • Bruce Schneier
  • CNET News.com
  • September 27, 2004

The Data Encryption Standard, or DES, was a mid-’70s brainchild of the National Bureau of Standards: the first modern, public, freely available encryption algorithm. For over two decades, DES was the workhorse of commercial cryptography.

Over the decades, DES has been used to protect everything from databases in mainframe computers, to the communications links between ATMs and banks, to data transmissions between police cars and police stations. Whoever you are, I can guarantee that many times in your life, the security of your data was protected by DES…

Academics locked out by tight visa controls

  • Bruce Schneier
  • San Jose Mercury News
  • September 20, 2004

U.S. Security Blocks Free Exchange of Ideas

Cryptography is the science of secret codes, and it is a primary Internet security tool to fight hackers, cyber crime, and cyber terrorism. CRYPTO is the world’s premier cryptography conference. It’s held every August in Santa Barbara.

This year, 400 people from 30 countries came to listen to dozens of talks. Lu Yi was not one of them. Her paper was accepted at the conference. But because she is a Chinese Ph.D. student in Switzerland, she was not able to get a visa in time to attend the conference…

Security Information Management Systems: Solution, or Part of the Problem?

  • Bruce Schneier
  • IEEE Security & Privacy
  • September/October 2004

View or Download in PDF Format

We in the computer security industry are guilty of over-hyping and under-delivering. Again and again, we tell customers that they need to buy this or that product in order to be secure. Again and again, customers buy the products and are still not secure.

Firewalls didn’t keep out network attackers, and ignored the fact that the notion of “perimeter” is severely flawed. Intrusion detection systems didn’t keep networks safe, and worms and viruses do considerable damage despite the prevalence of anti-virus products. Intrusion prevention systems are being hyped as the new solution, but we all know that they won’t prevent intrusions…

We Owe Much to DES

  • Bruce Schneier
  • eWeek
  • August 30, 2004

It was a historic moment when, last month, the National Institute of Standards and Technology proposed withdrawing the Data Encryption Standard as an encryption standard.

DES has been the most popular encryption algorithm for 25 years. Developed at IBM, it was chosen by the National Bureau of Standards (now NIST) as the government-standard encryption algorithm in 1976. Since then, it has become an international encryption standard and has been used in thousands of applications, despite concerns about its short key length.

In 1972, the NBS initiated a program to protect computer and communications data that included a standard encryption algorithm. IBM submitted an algorithm that used simple logical operations on small groups of bits and could be implemented efficiently in mid-1970s hardware. The algorithm’s key strength comes from an S-box, a nonlinear table-lookup specified by strings of constants…

Cryptanalysis of MD5 and SHA: Time for a New Standard

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Computerworld
  • August 19, 2004

At the Crypto 2004 conference in Santa Barbara, Calif., this week, researchers announced several weaknesses in common hash functions. These results, while mathematically significant, aren’t cause for alarm. But even so, it’s probably time for the cryptography community to get together and create a new hash standard.

One-way hash functions are a cryptographic construct used in many applications. They are used with public-key algorithms for both encryption and digital signatures. They are used in integrity checking. They are used in authentication. They have all sorts of applications in a great many different protocols. Much more than encryption algorithms, one-way hash functions are the workhorses of modern cryptography…

Customers, Passwords, and Web Sites

  • Bruce Schneier
  • IEEE Security & Privacy
  • July/August 2004

View or Download in PDF Format

Criminals follow money. Today, more and more money is on the Internet: millions of people manage their bank, PayPal, or other accounts—and even their stock portfolios—online. It’s a tempting target—if criminals can access one of these accounts, they can steal a lot of money.

And almost all these accounts are protected only by passwords.

You already know that passwords are insecure. In my book Secrets and Lies (published way back in 2000), I wrote: “…password crackers can now break anything that you can reasonably expect a user to memorize.”…

The Witty Worm: A New Chapter in Malware

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Computerworld
  • June 2, 2004

If press coverage is any guide, then the Witty worm wasn’t all that successful. Blaster, SQL Slammer, Nimda, even Sasser made bigger headlines. Witty infected only about 12,000 machines, almost none of them home users. It didn’t seem like a big deal.

But Witty was a big deal (see story). It represented some scary malware firsts and is likely a harbinger of worms to come. IT professionals need to understand Witty and what it did.

Witty was the first worm to target a particular set of security products—in this case Internet Security System’s BlackICE and RealSecure. It infected and destroyed only computers that had particular versions of this software running…

Microsoft's Actions Speak Louder Than Words

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Network World
  • May 31, 2004

The security of your computer and network depends on two things: what you do to secure your computer and network, and what everyone else does to secure their computers and networks. It’s not enough for you to maintain a secure network. If other people don’t maintain their security, we’re all more vulnerable to attack. When many unsecure computers are connected to the Internet, worms spread faster and more extensively, distributed denial-of-service attacks are easier to launch, and spammers have more platforms from which to send e-mail. The more unsecure the average computer on the Internet is, the more unsecure your computer is…

1 … 23 24 25 26 27 … 33

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.