Essays in the Category "Business of Security"

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Security Orchestration for an Uncertain World

  • Bruce Schneier
  • SecurityIntelligence
  • March 21, 2017

Last month at the RSA Conference, I saw a lot of companies selling security incident response automation. Their promise was to replace people with computers—sometimes with the addition of machine learning or other artificial intelligence (AI) techniques—and to respond to attacks at computer speeds.

While this is a laudable goal, there’s a fundamental problem with doing this in the short term. You can only automate what you’re certain about, and there is still an enormous amount of uncertainty in cybersecurity. Automation has its place in incident response, but the focus needs to be on making the people effective, not on replacing them—security orchestration, not automation…

The Future of Incident Response

  • Bruce Schneier
  • IEEE Security & Privacy
  • September/October 2014

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Security is a combination of protection, detection, and response. It’s taken the industry a long time to get to this point, though. The 1990s was the era of protection. Our industry was full of products that would protect your computers and network. By 2000, we realized that detection needed to be formalized as well, and the industry was full of detection products and services.

This decade is one of response. Over the past few years, we’ve started seeing incident response (IR) products and services. Security teams are incorporating them into their arsenal because of three trends in computing. One, we’ve lost control of our computing environment. More of our data is held in the cloud by other companies, and more of our actual networks are outsourced. This makes response more complicated, because we might not have visibility into parts of our critical network infrastructures…

A Fraying of the Public/Private Surveillance Partnership

  • Bruce Schneier
  • The Atlantic
  • November 8, 2013

The public/private surveillance partnership between the NSA and corporate data collectors is starting to fray. The reason is sunlight. The publicity resulting from the Snowden documents has made companies think twice before allowing the NSA access to their users’ and customers’ data.

Pre-Snowden, there was no downside to cooperating with the NSA. If the NSA asked you for copies of all your Internet traffic, or to put backdoors into your security software, you could assume that your cooperation would forever remain secret. To be fair, not every corporation cooperated willingly. Some fought in court. But it seems that a lot of them, telcos and backbone providers especially, were happy to give the NSA unfettered access to everything. Post-Snowden, this is changing. Now that many companies’ cooperation has become public, they’re facing a PR backlash from customers and users who are upset that their data is flowing to the NSA. And this is costing those companies business…

How Companies Can Protect Against Leakers

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Bloomberg.com
  • August 21, 2013

Ever since Edward Snowden walked out of a National Security Agency facility in May with electronic copies of thousands of classified documents, the finger-pointing has concentrated on government’s security failures. Yet the debacle illustrates the challenge with trusting people in any organization.

The problem is easy to describe. Organizations require trusted people, but they don’t necessarily know whether those people are trustworthy. These individuals are essential, and can also betray organizations.

So how does an organization protect itself?…

The NSA Is Commandeering the Internet

Technology companies have to fight for their users, or they'll eventually lose them.

  • Bruce Schneier
  • The Atlantic
  • August 12, 2013

Danish translation

It turns out that the NSA’s domestic and world-wide surveillance apparatus is even more extensive than we thought. Bluntly: The government has commandeered the Internet. Most of the largest Internet companies provide information to the NSA, betraying their users. Some, as we’ve learned, fight and lose. Others cooperate, either out of patriotism or because they believe it’s easier that way.

I have one message to the executives of those companies: fight.

Do you remember those old spy movies, when the higher ups in government decide that the mission is more important than the spy’s life? It’s going to be the same way with you. You might think that your friendly relationship with the government means that they’re going to protect you, but they won’t. The NSA doesn’t care about you or your customers, and will burn you the moment it’s convenient to do so…

You Have No Control Over Security on the Feudal Internet

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Harvard Business Review
  • June 6, 2013

Facebook regularly abuses the privacy of its users. Google has stopped supporting its popular RSS feeder. Apple prohibits all iPhone apps that are political or sexual. Microsoft might be cooperating with some governments to spy on Skype calls, but we don’t know which ones. Both Twitter and LinkedIn have recently suffered security breaches that affected the data of hundreds of thousands of their users.

If you’ve started to think of yourself as a hapless peasant in a Game of Thrones power struggle, you’re more right than you may realize. These are not traditional companies, and we are not traditional customers. These are feudal lords, and we are their vassals, peasants, and serfs…

Take Stop-and-Scan with a Grain of Salt

Security Has Become a For-Profit Business

  • Bruce Schneier
  • New York Daily News
  • March 3, 2013

This is an edited version of a longer essay.

It’s a new day for the New York Police Department, with technology increasingly informing the way cops do their jobs. With innovation come new possibilities, but also new concerns.

For one, the NYPD is testing a security apparatus that uses terahertz radiation to detect guns under clothing from a distance. As Police Commissioner Ray Kelly explained back in January, “If something is obstructing the flow of that radiation, for example a weapon, the device will highlight that object.”

Ignore, for a moment, the glaring constitutional concerns, which make the stop-and-frisk debate pale in comparison: virtual strip-searching, evasion of probable cause, potential profiling. Organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union are all over those, even though their opposition probably won’t make a difference. We’re scared of terrorism and crime (even as the risks decrease), and when we’re scared, we’re willing to give up all sorts of freedoms to assuage our fears. Often, the courts go along…

Reputation is Everything in IT Security

  • Bruce Schneier
  • The Guardian
  • November 11, 2009

In the past, our relationship with our computers was technical. We cared what CPU they had and what software they ran. We understood our networks and how they worked. We were experts, or we depended on someone else for expertise. And security was part of that expertise.

This is changing. We access our email via the web, from any computer or from our phones. We use Facebook, Google Docs, even our corporate networks, regardless of hardware or network. We, especially the younger of us, no longer care about the technical details. Computing is infrastructure; it’s a commodity. It’s less about products and more about services; we simply expect it to work, like telephone service or electricity or a transportation network…

Is Perfect Access Control Possible?

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Information Security
  • September 2009

This essay appeared as the second half of a point/counterpoint with Marcus Ranum. Marcus’s half is here.

Access control is difficult in an organizational setting. On one hand, every employee needs enough access to do his job. On the other hand, every time you give an employee more access, there’s more risk: he could abuse that access, or lose information he has access to, or be socially engineered into giving that access to a malfeasant. So a smart, risk-conscious organization will give each employee the exact level of access he needs to do his job, and no more…

Be Careful When You Come to Put Your Trust in the Clouds

Cloud computing may represent the future of computing but users still need to be careful about who is looking after their data

  • Bruce Schneier
  • The Guardian
  • June 4, 2009

This year’s overhyped IT concept is cloud computing. Also called software as a service (Saas), cloud computing is when you run software over the internet and access it via a browser. The salesforce.com customer management software is an example of this. So is Google Docs. If you believe the hype, cloud computing is the future.

But, hype aside, cloud computing is nothing new. It’s the modern version of the timesharing model from the 1960s, which was eventually killed by the rise of the personal computer. It’s what Hotmail and Gmail have been doing all these years, and it’s social networking sites, remote backup companies, and remote email filtering companies such as MessageLabs. Any IT outsourcing – network infrastructure, security monitoring, remote hosting – is a form of cloud computing…

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Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.