Essays in the Category "Computer and Information Security"

Page 24 of 33

Attack Trends: 2004 and 2005

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Queue
  • June 2, 2005

Counterpane Internet Security Inc. monitors more than 450 networks in 35 countries, in every time zone. In 2004 we saw 523 billion network events, and our analysts investigated 648,000 security “tickets.” What follows is an overview of what’s happening on the Internet right now, and what we expect to happen in the coming months.

In 2004, 41 percent of the attacks we saw were unauthorized activity of some kind, 21 percent were scanning, 26 percent were unauthorized access, 9 percent were DoS (denial of service), and 3 percent were misuse of applications…

Is Two-Factor Authentication Too Little, Too Late?

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Network World
  • April 4, 2005

Recently I published an essay arguing that two-factor authentication is an ineffective defense against identity theft (see www.schneier.com/essay-083.html). For example, issuing tokens to online banking customers won’t reduce fraud, because new attack techniques simply ignore the countermeasure. Unfortunately, some took my essay as a condemnation of two-factor authentication in general. This is not true. It’s simply a matter of understanding the threats and the attacks.

Passwords just don’t work anymore. As computers have gotten faster, password guessing has gotten easier. Ever-more-complicated passwords are required to evade password-guessing software. At the same time, there’s an upper limit to how complex a password users can be expected to remember. About five years ago, these two lines crossed: It is no longer reasonable to expect users to have passwords that can’t be guessed. For anything that requires reasonable security, the era of passwords is over…

The Curse of the Secret Question

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Computerworld
  • February 9, 2005

It’s happened to all of us: We sign up for some online account, choose a difficult-to-remember and hard-to-guess password, and are then presented with a “secret question” to answer. Twenty years ago, there was just one secret question: “What’s your mother’s maiden name?” Today, there are more: “What street did you grow up on?” “What’s the name of your first pet?” “What’s your favorite color?” And so on.

The point of all these questions is the same: a backup password. If you forget your password, the secret question can verify your identity so you can choose another password or have the site e-mail your current password to you. It’s a great idea from a customer service perspective—a user is less likely to forget his first pet’s name than some random password—but terrible for security. The answer to the secret question is much easier to guess than a good password, and the information is much more public. (I’ll bet the name of my family’s first pet is in some database somewhere.) And even worse, everybody seems to use the same series of secret questions…

Who says safe computing must remain a pipe dream?

  • Bruce Schneier
  • CNET News.com
  • December 9, 2004

Spanish translation

I am regularly asked what average Internet users can do to ensure their security. My first answer is usually, “Nothing—you’re screwed.”

But that’s not true, and the reality is more complicated. You’re screwed if you do nothing to protect yourself, but there are many things you can do to increase your security on the Internet.

Two years ago, I published a list of PC security recommendations. The idea was to give home users concrete actions they could take to improve security. This is an update of that list: a dozen things you can do to improve your security…

Desktop Google Finds Holes

  • Bruce Schneier
  • eWeek
  • November 29, 2004

Last month, Google released a beta version of its desktop search software: Google Desktop Search. Install it on your Windows machine, and it creates a searchable index of your data files, including word processing files, spreadsheets, presentations, e-mail messages, cached Web pages and chat sessions. It’s a great idea. Windows’ searching capability has always been mediocre, and Google fixes the problem nicely.

There are some security issues, though. The problem is that GDS indexes and finds documents that you may prefer not be found. For example, GDS searches your browser’s cache. This allows it to find old Web pages you’ve visited, including online banking summaries, personal messages sent from Web e-mail programs and password-protected personal Web pages…

Information Security: How Liable Should Vendors Be?

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Computerworld
  • October 28, 2004

An update to this essay was published in ENISA Quarterly in January 2007.

Information insecurity is costing us billions. We pay for it in theft: information theft, financial theft. We pay for it in productivity loss, both when networks stop working and in the dozens of minor security inconveniences we all have to endure. We pay for it when we have to buy security products and services to reduce those other two losses. We pay for security, year after year.

The problem is that all the money we spend isn’t fixing the problem. We’re paying, but we still end up with insecurities…

The Non-Security of Secrecy

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Communications of the ACM
  • October 2004

Considerable confusion exists between the different concepts of secrecy and security, which often causes bad security and surprising political arguments. Secrecy usually contributes only to a false sense of security.

In June 2004, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security urged regulators to keep network outage information secret. The Federal Communications Commission requires telephone companies to report large disruptions of telephone service, and wants to extend that to high-speed data lines and wireless networks. DHS fears that such information would give cyberterrorists a “virtual road map” to target critical infrastructures…

Saluting the data encryption legacy

  • Bruce Schneier
  • CNET News.com
  • September 27, 2004

The Data Encryption Standard, or DES, was a mid-’70s brainchild of the National Bureau of Standards: the first modern, public, freely available encryption algorithm. For over two decades, DES was the workhorse of commercial cryptography.

Over the decades, DES has been used to protect everything from databases in mainframe computers, to the communications links between ATMs and banks, to data transmissions between police cars and police stations. Whoever you are, I can guarantee that many times in your life, the security of your data was protected by DES…

Academics locked out by tight visa controls

  • Bruce Schneier
  • San Jose Mercury News
  • September 20, 2004

U.S. Security Blocks Free Exchange of Ideas

Cryptography is the science of secret codes, and it is a primary Internet security tool to fight hackers, cyber crime, and cyber terrorism. CRYPTO is the world’s premier cryptography conference. It’s held every August in Santa Barbara.

This year, 400 people from 30 countries came to listen to dozens of talks. Lu Yi was not one of them. Her paper was accepted at the conference. But because she is a Chinese Ph.D. student in Switzerland, she was not able to get a visa in time to attend the conference…

Security Information Management Systems: Solution, or Part of the Problem?

  • Bruce Schneier
  • IEEE Security & Privacy
  • September/October 2004

View or Download in PDF Format

We in the computer security industry are guilty of over-hyping and under-delivering. Again and again, we tell customers that they need to buy this or that product in order to be secure. Again and again, customers buy the products and are still not secure.

Firewalls didn’t keep out network attackers, and ignored the fact that the notion of “perimeter” is severely flawed. Intrusion detection systems didn’t keep networks safe, and worms and viruses do considerable damage despite the prevalence of anti-virus products. Intrusion prevention systems are being hyped as the new solution, but we all know that they won’t prevent intrusions…

1 22 23 24 25 26 33

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.