Blog: 2006 Archives

Rudyard Kipling As a Security Author

A review of Kim:

Kipling packed a great deal of information and concept into his stories, and in “Kim” we find The Great Game: espionage and spying. Within the first twenty pages we have authentication by something you have, denial of service, impersonation, stealth, masquerade, role- based authorization (with ad hoc authentication by something you know), eavesdropping, and trust based on data integrity. Later on we get contingency planning against theft and cryptography with key changes.

The book is out of copyright, so you can read it online.

Posted on December 29, 2006 at 2:11 PM10 Comments

AACS Cracked?

This is a big deal. AACS (Advanced Access Content System), the copy protection is used in both Blu Ray and HD DVD, might have been cracked—but it’s still a rumor.

If it’s true, what will be interesting is the system’s in-the-field recovery system. Will it work?

Hypothetical fallout could be something like this: if PowerDVD is the source of the keys, an AACS initiative will be launched to revoke the player’s keys to render it inoperable and in need of an update. There is some confusion regarding this process, however. It is not the case that you can protect a cracked player by hiding it offline (the idea being that the player will never “update” with new code that way). Instead, the player’s existing keys will be revoked at the disc level, meaning that new pressings of discs won’t play on the cracked player. In this way, hiding a player from updates will not result in having a cracked player that will work throughout the years. It could mean that all bets are off for discs that are currently playable on the cracked player, however (provided it is not updated). Again, this is all hypothetical at this time.

Copy protection is inherently futile. The best it can be is a neverending arms race, which is why Big Media is increasingly relying on legal and social barriers.

EDITED TO ADD (12/30): An update.

EDITED TO ADD (1/3): More info from the author of the tool.

EDITED TO ADD (1/12): Excellent multi-part analysis here.

EDITED TO ADD (1/16): Part five of the above series of essays. And keys for different movies are starting to appear.

Posted on December 29, 2006 at 6:02 AM25 Comments

Wal-Mart Stays Open During Bomb Scare

This is interesting: A Wal-Mart store in Mitchell, South Dakota receives a bomb threat. The store managers decide not to evacuate while the police search for the bomb. Presumably, they decided that the loss of revenue due to an evacuation was not worth the additional security of an evacuation:

During the nearly two-hour search Wal-Mart officials opted not to evacuated the busy discount store even though police recomended [sic] they do so. Wal-Mart officials said the call was a hoax and not a threat.

I think this is a good sign. It shows that people are thinking rationally about security trade-offs, and not thoughtlessly being terrorized.

Remember, though: security trade-offs are based on agenda. From the perspective of the Wal-Mart managers, the store’s revenues are the most important; most of the risks of the bomb threat are externalities.

Of course, the store employees have a different agenda—there is no upside to staying open, and only a downside due to the additional risk—and they didn’t like the decision:

The incident has family members of Wal-Mart employees criticizing store officials for failing to take police’s recommendation to evacuate.

Voorhees has worked at the Mitchell discount chain since Wal-Mart Supercenter opened in 2001. Her daughter, Charlotte Goode, 36, said Voorhees called her Sunday, crying and upset as she relayed the story.

“It’s right before Christmas. They were swamped with people,” she said. “To me, they endangerd [sic] the community, customers and associates. They put making a buck ahead of public safety.”

Posted on December 28, 2006 at 1:32 PM102 Comments

The Problem with "Hiring Hackers"

The Communications Director for Montana’s Congressman Denny Rehberg solicited “hackers” to break into the computer system at Texas Christian University and change his grades (so they would look better when he eventually ran for office, I presume). The hackers posted the email exchange instead. Very funny:

First, let’s be clear. You are soliciting me to break the law and hack into a computer across state lines. That is a federal offense and multiple felonies. Obviously I can’t trust anyone and everyone that mails such a request, you might be an FBI agent, right?

So, I need three things to make this happen:

1. A picture of a squirrel or pigeon on your campus. One close-up, one with background that shows buildings, a sign, or something to indicate you are standing on the campus.

2. The information I mentioned so I can find the records once I get into the database.

3. Some idea of what I get for all my trouble.

Posted on December 27, 2006 at 1:40 PM30 Comments

Tracking Automobiles Through their Tires

Automobile tires are now being outfitted with RFID transmitters:

Schrader Bridgeport is the market leader in direct Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems. Direct TPMS use pressure sensors inside each tire to transmit data to a dashboard display alerting drivers to tire pressure problems.

I’ll bet anything you can track cars with them, just as you can track some joggers by their sneakers.

As I said before, the people who are designing these systems are putting “zero thought into security and privacy issues. Unless we enact some sort of broad law requiring companies to add security into these sorts of systems, companies will continue to produce devices that erode our privacy through new technologies. Not on purpose, not because they’re evil—just because it’s easier to ignore the externality than to worry about it.”

Posted on December 27, 2006 at 7:44 AM58 Comments

A Cost Analysis of Windows Vista Content Protection

Peter Gutman’s “A Cost Analysis of Windows Vista Content Protection” is fascinating reading:

Executive Summary

Windows Vista includes an extensive reworking of core OS elements in order to provide content protection for so-called “premium content”, typically HD data from Blu-Ray and HD-DVD sources. Providing this protection incurs considerable costs in terms of system performance, system stability, technical support overhead, and hardware and software cost. These issues affect not only users of Vista but the entire PC industry, since the effects of the protection measures extend to cover all hardware and software that will ever come into contact with Vista, even if it’s not used directly with Vista (for example hardware in a Macintosh computer or on a Linux server). This document analyses the cost involved in Vista’s content protection, and the collateral damage that this incurs throughout the computer industry.

Executive Executive Summary

The Vista Content Protection specification could very well constitute the longest suicide note in history.

It contains stuff like:

Denial-of-Service via Driver Revocation

Once a weakness is found in a particular driver or device, that driver will have its signature revoked by Microsoft, which means that it will cease to function (details on this are a bit vague here, presumably some minimum functionality like generic 640×480 VGA support will still be available in order for the system to boot). This means that a report of a compromise of a particular driver or device will cause all support for that device worldwide to be turned off until a fix can be found. Again, details are sketchy, but if it’s a device problem then presumably the device turns into a paperweight once it’s revoked. If it’s an older device for which the vendor isn’t interested in rewriting their drivers (and in the fast-moving hardware market most devices enter “legacy” status within a year of two of their replacement models becoming available), all devices of that type worldwide become permanently unusable.

Read the whole thing.

And here’s commentary on the paper.

Posted on December 26, 2006 at 1:56 PM67 Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.