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Detecting Phishing Sites with Machine Learning

Really interesting article:

A trained eye (or even a not-so-trained one) can discern when something phishy is going on with a domain or subdomain name. There are search tools, such as Censys.io, that allow humans to specifically search through the massive pile of certificate log entries for sites that spoof certain brands or functions common to identity-processing sites. But it’s not something humans can do in real time very well—which is where machine learning steps in.

StreamingPhish and the other tools apply a set of rules against the names within certificate log entries. In StreamingPhish’s case, these rules are the result of guided learning—a corpus of known good and bad domain names is processed and turned into a “classifier,” which (based on my anecdotal experience) can then fairly reliably identify potentially evil websites.

Posted on August 9, 2018 at 6:17 AMView Comments

SpiderOak's Warrant Canary Died

BoingBoing has the story.

I have never quite trusted the idea of a warrant canary. But here it seems to have worked. (Presumably, if SpiderOak wanted to replace the warrant canary with a transparency report, they would have written something explaining their decision. To have it simply disappear is what we would expect if SpiderOak were being forced to comply with a US government request for personal data.)

EDITED TO ADD (8/9): SpiderOak has posted an explanation claiming that the warrant canary did not die—it just changed.

That’s obviously false, because it did die. And a change is the functional equivalent—that’s how they work. So either they have received a National Security Letter and now have to pretend they did not, or they completely misunderstood what a warrant canary is and how it works. No one knows.

I have never fully trusted warrant canaries—this EFF post explains why—and this is an illustration.

Posted on August 8, 2018 at 9:37 AMView Comments

Measuring the Rationality of Security Decisions

Interesting research: “Dancing Pigs or Externalities? Measuring the Rationality of
Security Decisions
“:

Abstract: Accurately modeling human decision-making in security is critical to thinking about when, why, and how to recommend that users adopt certain secure behaviors. In this work, we conduct behavioral economics experiments to model the rationality of end-user security decision-making in a realistic online experimental system simulating a bank account. We ask participants to make a financially impactful security choice, in the face of transparent risks of account compromise and benefits offered by an optional security behavior (two-factor authentication). We measure the cost and utility of adopting the security behavior via measurements of time spent executing the behavior and estimates of the participant’s wage. We find that more than 50% of our participants made rational (e.g., utility optimal) decisions, and we find that participants are more likely to behave rationally in the face of higher risk. Additionally, we find that users’ decisions can be modeled well as a function of past behavior (anchoring effects), knowledge of costs, and to a lesser extent, users’ awareness of risks and context (R2=0.61). We also find evidence of endowment effects, as seen in other areas of economic and psychological decision-science literature, in our digital-security setting. Finally, using our data, we show theoretically that a “one-size-fits-all” emphasis on security can lead to market losses, but that adoption by a subset of users with higher risks or lower costs can lead to market gains

Posted on August 7, 2018 at 6:40 AMView Comments

Three of My Books Are Available in DRM-Free E-Book Format

Humble Bundle sells groups of e-books at ridiculously low prices, DRM free. This month, the bundles are all Wiley titles, including three of my books: Applied Cryptography, Secrets and Lies, and Cryptography Engineering. $15 gets you everything, and they’re all DRM-free.

Even better, a portion of the proceeds goes to the EFF. As a board member, I’ve seen the other side of this. It’s significant money.

Posted on August 3, 2018 at 2:10 PMView Comments

How the US Military Can Better Keep Hackers

Interesting commentary:

The military is an impossible place for hackers thanks to antiquated career management, forced time away from technical positions, lack of mission, non-technical mid- and senior-level leadership, and staggering pay gaps, among other issues.

It is possible the military needs a cyber corps in the future, but by accelerating promotions, offering graduate school to newly commissioned officers, easing limited lateral entry for exceptional private-sector talent, and shortening the private/public pay gap, the military can better accommodate its most technical members now.

The model the author uses is military doctors.

Posted on August 3, 2018 at 6:21 AMView Comments

GCHQ on Quantum Key Distribution

The UK’s GCHQ delivers a brutally blunt assessment of quantum key distribution:

QKD protocols address only the problem of agreeing keys for encrypting data. Ubiquitous on-demand modern services (such as verifying identities and data integrity, establishing network sessions, providing access control, and automatic software updates) rely more on authentication and integrity mechanisms—such as digital signatures—than on encryption.

QKD technology cannot replace the flexible authentication mechanisms provided by contemporary public key signatures. QKD also seems unsuitable for some of the grand future challenges such as securing the Internet of Things (IoT), big data, social media, or cloud applications.

I agree with them. It’s a clever idea, but basically useless in practice. I don’t even think it’s anything more than a niche solution in a world where quantum computers have broken our traditional public-key algorithms.

Read the whole thing. It’s short.

Posted on August 1, 2018 at 2:07 PMView Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.