Essays in the Category "National Security Policy"

Page 2 of 14

Cyberweapons Have No Allegiance

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Motherboard
  • February 25, 2015

The thing about infrastructure is that everyone uses it. If it’s secure, it’s secure for everyone. And if it’s insecure, it’s insecure for everyone. This forces some hard policy choices.

When I was working with the Guardian on the Snowden documents, the one top-secret program the NSA desperately did not want us to expose was QUANTUM. This is the NSA’s program for what is called packet injection—basically, a technology that allows the agency to hack into computers.

Turns out, though, that the NSA was not alone in its use of this technology. The Chinese government uses packet injection to attack computers. The cyberweapons manufacturer Hacking Team sells packet injection technology to any government willing to pay for it. Criminals use it. And there are hacker tools that give the capability to individuals as well…

The Government Must Show Us the Evidence That North Korea Attacked Sony

American history is littered with examples of classified information pointing us towards aggression against other countries—think WMDs—only to later learn that the evidence was wrong

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Time
  • January 5, 2015

When you’re attacked by a missile, you can follow its trajectory back to where it was launched from. When you’re attacked in cyberspace, figuring out who did it is much harder. The reality of international aggression in cyberspace will change how we approach defense.

Many of us in the computer-security field are skeptical of the U.S. government’s claim that it has positively identified North Korea as the perpetrator of the massive Sony hack in November 2014. The FBI’s evidence is circumstantial and not very convincing. The attackers never mentioned the movie that became the centerpiece of the hack until the press did. More likely, the culprits are random hackers who have …

NSA Hacking of Cell Phone Networks

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Lawfare
  • December 8, 2014

The Intercept has published an article—based on the Snowden documents—about AURORAGOLD, an NSA surveillance operation against cell phone network operators and standards bodies worldwide. This is not a typical NSA surveillance operation where agents identify the bad guys and spy on them. This is an operation where the NSA spies on people designing and building a general communications infrastructure, looking for weaknesses and vulnerabilities that will allow it to spy on the bad guys at some later date.

In that way, AURORAGOLD is similar to the NSA’s …

The U.S.'s Hypocritical Stance Against Chinese Hackers

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Time
  • May 20, 2014

Chinese hacking of American computer networks is old news. For years we’ve known about their attacks against U.S. government and corporate targets. We’ve seen detailed reports of how they hacked The New York Times. Google has detected them going after Gmail accounts of dissidents. They’ve built sophisticated worldwide eavesdropping networks. These hacks target both military secrets and corporate intellectual property. They’re perpetrated by a combination of state, state-sponsored and state-tolerated hackers. It’s been going on for years.

On Monday, the Justice Department …

Should U.S. Hackers Fix Cybersecurity Holes or Exploit Them?

  • Bruce Schneier
  • The Atlantic
  • May 19, 2014

There’s a debate going on about whether the U.S. government—specifically, the NSA and United States Cyber Command—should stockpile Internet vulnerabilities or disclose and fix them. It’s a complicated problem, and one that starkly illustrates the difficulty of separating attack and defense in cyberspace.

A software vulnerability is a programming mistake that allows an adversary access into that system. Heartbleed is a recent example, but hundreds are discovered every year.

Unpublished vulnerabilities are called “zero-day” vulnerabilities, and they’re very valuable because no one is protected. Someone with one of those can attack systems world-wide with impunity…

Let the Spies Spy, Let the Cops Chase Terrorists

  • Bruce Schneier
  • CNN
  • May 15, 2014

According to NSA documents published in Glenn Greenwald’s new book “No Place to Hide,” we now know that the NSA spies on embassies and missions all over the world, including those of Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, the European Union, France, Georgia, Greece, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Slovakia, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Venezuela and Vietnam.

This will certainly strain international relations, as happened when it was revealed that the United States is eavesdropping on German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone—but is anyone really surprised? Spying on foreign governments is what the NSA is …

Internet Subversion

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Boston Review
  • May/June 2014

In addition to turning the Internet into a worldwide surveillance platform, the NSA has surreptitiously weakened the products, protocols, and standards we all use to protect ourselves. By doing so, it has destroyed the trust that underlies the Internet. We need that trust back.

Trust is inherently social. It is personal, relative, situational, and fluid. It is not uniquely human, but it is the underpinning of everything we have accomplished as a species. We trust other people, but we also trust organizations and processes. The psychology is complex, but when we trust a technology, we basically believe that it will work as intended…

There's No Real Difference Between Online Espionage and Online Attack

  • Bruce Schneier
  • The Atlantic
  • March 6, 2014

Back when we first started getting reports of the Chinese breaking into U.S. computer networks for espionage purposes, we described it in some very strong language. We called the Chinese actions cyberattacks. We sometimes even invoked the word cyberwar, and declared that a cyber-attack was an act of war.

When Edward Snowden revealed that the NSA has been doing exactly the same thing as the Chinese to computer networks around the world, we used much more moderate language to describe U.S. actions: words like espionage, or intelligence gathering, or spying. We stressed that it’s a peacetime activity, and that everyone does it…

Metadata = Surveillance

  • Bruce Schneier
  • IEEE Security & Privacy
  • March/April 2014

View or Download in PDF Format

Ever since reporters began publishing stories about NSA activities, based on documents provided by Edward Snowden, we’ve been repeatedly assured by government officials that it’s “only metadata.” This might fool the average person, but it shouldn’t fool those of us in the security field. Metadata equals surveillance data, and collecting metadata on people means putting them under surveillance.

An easy thought experiment demonstrates this. Imagine that you hired a private detective to eavesdrop on a subject. That detective would plant a bug in that subject’s home, office, and car. He would eavesdrop on his computer. He would listen in on that subject’s conversations, both face to face and remotely, and you would get a report on what was said in those conversations. (This is what President Obama repeatedly reassures us isn’t happening with our phone calls. But am I the only one who finds it suspicious that he always uses very specific words? “The NSA is not listening in on your phone calls.” This leaves open the possibility that the NSA is recording, transcribing, and analyzing your phone calls—and very occasionally reading them. This is far more likely to be true, and something a pedantically minded president could claim he wasn’t lying about.)…

NSA Robots are "Collecting" Your Data, Too, and They're Getting Away With It

  • Bruce Schneier
  • The Guardian
  • February 27, 2014

Increasingly, we are watched not by people but by algorithms. Amazon and Netflix track the books we buy and the movies we stream, and suggest other books and movies based on our habits. Google and Facebook watch what we do and what we say, and show us advertisements based on our behavior. Google even modifies our web search results based on our previous behavior. Smartphone navigation apps watch us as we drive, and update suggested route information based on traffic congestion. And the National Security Agency, of course, monitors our phone calls, emails and locations, then uses that information to try to identify terrorists…

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.