Essays in the Category "Laws and Regulations"

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3 Reasons to Kill the Internet Kill Switch Idea

  • Bruce Schneier
  • AOL News
  • July 9, 2010

Last month, Sen. Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., introduced a bill that might—we’re not really sure—give the president the authority to shut down all or portions of the Internet in the event of an emergency. It’s not a new idea. Sens. Jay Rockefeller, D-W.Va., and Olympia Snowe, R-Maine, proposed the same thing last year, and some argue that the president can already do something like this. If this or a similar bill ever passes, the details will change considerably and repeatedly. So let’s talk about the idea of an Internet kill switch in general.

It’s a bad one…

"Zero Tolerance" Really Means Zero Discretion

  • Bruce Schneier
  • MPR NewsQ
  • November 4, 2009

Recent stories have documented the ridiculous effects of zero-tolerance weapons policies in a Delaware school district: a first-grader expelled for taking a camping utensil to school, a 13-year-old expelled after another student dropped a pocketknife in his lap, and a seventh-grader expelled for cutting paper with a utility knife for a class project. Where’s the common sense? the editorials cry.

These so-called zero-tolerance policies are actually zero-discretion policies. They’re policies that must be followed, no situational discretion allowed. We encounter them whenever we go through airport security: no liquids, gels or aerosols. Some workplaces have them for sexual harassment incidents; in some sports a banned substance found in a urine sample means suspension, even if it’s for a real medical condition. Judges have zero discretion when faced with mandatory sentencing laws: three strikes for drug offences and you go to jail, mandatory sentencing for statutory rape (underage sex), etc. A national restaurant chain won’t serve hamburgers rare, even if you offer to sign a waiver. Whenever you hear “that’s the rule, and I can’t do anything about it”—and they’re not lying to get rid of you—you’re butting against a zero discretion policy…

Technology Shouldn't Give Big Brother a Head Start

  • Bruce Schneier
  • MPR NewsQ
  • July 31, 2009

China is the world’s most successful Internet censor. While the Great Firewall of China isn’t perfect, it effectively limits information flowing in and out of the country. But now the Chinese government is taking things one step further.

Under a requirement taking effect soon, every computer sold in China will have to contain the Green Dam Youth Escort software package. Ostensibly a pornography filter, it is government spyware that will watch every citizen on the Internet.

Green Dam has many uses. It can police a list of forbidden Web sites. It can monitor a user’s reading habits. It can even enlist the computer in some massive botnet attack, as part of a hypothetical future cyberwar…

It’s Time to Drop the "Expectation of Privacy" Test

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Wired
  • March 26, 2009

In the United States, the concept of “expectation of privacy” matters because it’s the constitutional test, based on the Fourth Amendment, that governs when and how the government can invade your privacy.

Based on the 1967 Katz v. United States Supreme Court decision, this test actually has two parts. First, the government’s action can’t contravene an individual’s subjective expectation of privacy; and second, that expectation of privacy must be one that society in general recognizes as reasonable. That second part isn’t based on anything like polling data; it is more of a normative idea of what level of privacy people should be allowed to expect, given the competing importance of personal privacy on one hand and the government’s interest in public safety on the other…

State Data Breach Notification Laws: Have They Helped?

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Information Security
  • January 2009

This essay appeared as the second half of a point/counterpoint with Marcus Ranum. Marcus’s half is here.

THERE ARE THREE REASONS for breach notification laws. One, it’s common politeness that when you lose something of someone else’s, you tell him. The prevailing corporate attitude before the law—”They won’t notice, and if they do notice they won’t know it’s us, so we are better off keeping quiet about the whole thing”—is just wrong. Two, it provides statistics to security researchers as to how pervasive the problem really is. And three, it forces companies to improve their security…

The Problem Is Information Insecurity

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Security Watch
  • August 10, 2008

Information insecurity is costing us billions. We pay for it in theft: information theft, financial theft. We pay for it in productivity loss, both when networks stop working and in the dozens of minor security inconveniences we all have to endure. We pay for it when we have to buy security products and services to reduce those other two losses. We pay for security, year after year.

The problem is that all the money we spend isn’t fixing the problem. We’re paying, but we still end up with insecurities.

The problem is insecure software. It’s bad design, poorly implemented features, inadequate testing and security vulnerabilities from software bugs. The money we spend on security is to deal with the effects of insecure software…

Memo to Next President: How to Get Cybersecurity Right

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Wired
  • August 7, 2008

Obama has a cybersecurity plan.

It’s basically what you would expect: Appoint a national cybersecurity adviser, invest in math and science education, establish standards for critical infrastructure, spend money on enforcement, establish national standards for securing personal data and data-breach disclosure, and work with industry and academia to develop a bunch of needed technologies.

I could comment on the plan, but with security, the devil is always in the details—and, of course, at this point there are few details. But since he brought up the topic—McCain supposedly is “…

Software Makers Should Take Responsibility

  • Bruce Schneier
  • The Guardian
  • July 17, 2008

A recent study of Internet browsers worldwide discovered that over half – 52% – of Internet Explorer users weren’t using the current version of the software. For other browsers the numbers were better, but not much: 17% of Firefox users, 35% of Safari users, and 44% of Opera users were using an old version.

This is particularly important because browsers are an increasingly common vector for internet attacks, and old versions of browsers don’t have all their security patches up to date. They’re open to attack through vulnerabilities the vendors have already fixed…

Our Data, Ourselves

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Wired
  • May 15, 2008

Dutch version by Jeroen van der Ham

In the information age, we all have a data shadow.

We leave data everywhere we go. It’s not just our bank accounts and stock portfolios, or our itemized bills, listing every credit card purchase and telephone call we make. It’s automatic road-toll collection systems, supermarket affinity cards, ATMs and so on.

It’s also our lives. Our love letters and friendly chat. Our personal e-mails and SMS messages. Our business plans, strategies and offhand conversations. Our political leanings and positions. And this is just the data we interact with. We all have shadow selves living in the data banks of hundreds of corporations’ information brokers—information about us that is both surprisingly personal and uncannily complete—except for the errors that you can neither see nor correct…

Driver's Licenses for Immigrants: Denying Licenses Makes Us Less Safe

  • Bruce Schneier
  • Detroit Free Press
  • February 7, 2008

Many people say that allowing illegal aliens to obtain state driver’s licenses helps them and encourages them to remain illegally in this country. Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox late last year issued an opinion that licenses could be issued only to legal state residents, calling it “one more tool in our initiative to bolster Michigan’s border and document security.”

In reality, we are a much more secure nation if we do issue driver’s licenses and/or state IDs to every resident who applies, regardless of immigration status. Issuing them doesn’t make us any less secure, and refusing puts us at risk…

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Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.