Election Machine Insecurity Story
Interesting story of a flawed computer voting machine and a paper ballot available for recount. All ended well, but only because of that paper backup.
Vote totals in a Northampton County judge’s race showed one candidate, Abe Kassis, a Democrat, had just 164 votes out of 55,000 ballots across more than 100 precincts. Some machines reported zero votes for him. In a county with the ability to vote for a straight-party ticket, one candidate’s zero votes was a near statistical impossibility. Something had gone quite wrong.
Boing Boing post.
Pocono Chuck • December 5, 2019 6:53 AM
Many are advocating for a hard copy to be provided to each voter after they cast their ballot. This is not the paper roll inside the voting machine, but rather a receipt provided to the voter, presumably with a QR code (or other mechanism) that would shield their actual vote but allow verification for who/what they voted.
While I instantly understand the concept, what purpose does it serve if a substantial number of these paper ballot receipts are not produced in the event of a recount? In the particular case of the above story, one receipt could demonstrate the candidate with zero votes did, in fact, get 1 vote, but unless you collect nearly all the balots (or at least plurality), what good is it?
Consider: walk into any convenience store with an ATM, and you’ll find bank receipts in a trash can (or on the floor). If people are so careless with their financial papers, does anyone believe they’ll treat their voting records more securely?
I don’t see the push for these receipts to be much more than a feel good solution with little value in the event of a recount.