Schneier on Security

ab praeceptis • January 18, 2017 1:50 AM

R. Weber quite sometimes behaved like a clueless idiot here but he has a point there.

One core problem is that the whole thing is virtually always self-contained, i.e. keys are not exchanged out of band.
So: One does not even need a tainted client software. It would be sufficient if the MITM could play something like “While you were away Alice created a new pubkey. Here it is”. Actually one might even decorate that with some security theater like “So, Bobs system sends a test message to Alices system which then signs it using her private key and then Bob verifies it” – only that potentially even both, Alice and Bob got fcked by the MITM server who gave pubkeys under *his control to both.

If there is trustworthy 3rd party signing the keys and not out-of-band kex (oob meaning outside the whatsapp or whatever channels) one may well end up with the impression of lots of security while actually being cooked.

I think we should also concentrate more on another question: If you are a state agency and ever more people communicate encrypted (which state agencies, of course, dislike) then what can you do? One classical answer for that kind of problem is to offer and establish your own systems which, besides some security theater and big names actually is under your control.

Signal is clearly a candidate and shouldn’t be trusted.

ab praeceptis • January 18, 2017 2:08 PM

Dirk Praet (et al.)

Sure, thanks to [whoever looked closer at it or even disected it]-

But I was by far not the only one here expressing solid distrust. I’m too lazy to look it up but I mean to remember that Clive Robinson and others here shared their unfavourable views and their reasoning, too.
To be honest, the reason for me to not look any deeper, i.e. to not invest any time and work was that it seemed so obvious to be smelly that it simply wasn’t worth any more efforts.

I just had a closer look at the newest incarnation of the hyper-super-awfully-specially security crap pile above all crap piles: TLS 1.3

And I saw ome young exited italian pulling off yet another round of oh, we are so exited sales talk, not noticing that he basically said that all ssl/tls version before it were crappy with plenty of gaping holes – but, of course, this time with 1.3 everything is great! Just like it was with every version before …

I’m soooo pissed off by the neverending line of incapable “security experts” creating crap pile after crap pile, who blissfully ignore pretty every holy rule about security we know of – the first of those being “keep it simple and do 1 thing well”.

Which leads me back to signal and accomplices.

It’s not in any way new that PK crypto has some issues or critical points that must be properly considered and taken care off. One example is the mother of all security crap piles, PKI, which is rotten to the core for many reasons, a prominent one being making-loads-of-money was the priority (CAs).

To add insult to injury, we do have all the needed blocks. Mankind had ways to confirm identity since thousands of years; we just ignorantly chose to make that into a money making machine without even minimally performing the core job. We do have distribution mechanisms and the other building blocks needed but we chose to let greedy imbeciles design the “solution” we have and which is worthless crap.

Similarly, it just so happened that signal and accomplices were designed with major flaws (one of which you concentrated on).

I like the term “security theater” created (afaik) by our host Bruce Schneier. What I do not like is that major parts of today security community are actors in that theater. As far as I’m concerned moxie is one of them and in my view a grossly overrated one who doesn’t seem to have all the good intentions the theater makes people believe.

I do not trust signal. Not at all. Not even a bit.

ab praeceptis • January 18, 2017 4:36 PM

Czerno

Front up: I’m not particularly interested in messaging but I think that we could create something at least quite reasonable.

For a start, we do have the capability to encrypt (sym.). I think that we also have, at least indirectly or potentially, the rest of the needed building blocks.
Actually, thinking about your question I came to notice that oe god way to answer it is by approaching it from the “what we should not do” (or what’s wrong today) angle.

Most importantly, we should properly analyze the problem(s). Unfortunately, that is often not done but instead large PR blobs are chosen. PK/TLS is a particularly gross example. Why?
PK is basically about a certain, not necessarily common, scenario, namely about unknowns and untrusteds.
Moreover usually crypto is broken for one major reason: They mix up algorithm, implementation and diverse features. An example is the whole RTT early payload obsession of ssl/tls.

Funnily (?), PKI and signal share a common disease, albeit in different forms. PKI has been greedily perverted to the point of being useless or even dangerous, while signal simply ignored the problem.

Technically speaking messaging is just a buffered mechanism that exchanges data between 2 or more parties.
The problem doesn’t arise from that mechanism per se (not even from the need to buffer) but from other problems, in particular from the identification and authentification need, from the reasonably assumed to be hostile scenario, and the like.

One might even go so far as to say that the typical PK approach does not solve but merely push the problem somewhere else (the communication between other parties such as CAs and clients suffers from the same problems).

Obviously we need some out of band or secondary channel.

Let’s look closer. Alice and Bob want to communicate. One question that comes to mind and might turn out to be quite helpful is “Why?”. Maybe they are colleagues or maybe they are customer and seller. In that very constellation there is already part of an answer to some questions. If they are colleagues they already know each other and almost certainly have out of band means to exchange e.g. preshared keys. Et voilà, what do we find looking at banks? Exactly that. They use 2nd channels or oob communication.

In other words: I would first and foremost address the id/auth problem. From there the rest is simple.

ab praeceptis • January 21, 2017 8:17 PM

Rolf Weber

Back then and today I argued that governments should introduce something like the Feinstein/Burr proposal, that they should demand from service providers that they are able to “break” their own encryption, and that the companies can do this without putting any regular customers at risk.

Please, elaborate.

ab praeceptis • January 22, 2017 11:51 PM

Rolf Weber

I agree with some of your observations and statements. My question, however, was of a technical nature.

I refer to what you said:

Back then and today I argued that governments should introduce something like the Feinstein/Burr proposal, that they should demand from service providers that they are able to “break” their own encryption, and that the companies can do this without putting any regular customers at risk.

How?

How would a system work in which per definitionem every customers data/communication can be decrypted and eavesdropped/mirrored/copied, whatever – while at the same time “regular customers” (presumably those whose data some agency does not desire) data/communiction can not be decrypted and eavesdropped/mirrored/copied, whatever?

Logically speaking, there is a set S of elements (customers) for whose data/communication the proposition “can not be stolen” holds true. At the same time you submit that there is a set I of elements for whose d/c the proposition “can not be stolen” is per definitonem false. Hence looking at the defining attribute of S and I I is the negation of S, which is commonly called a contradiction.

Now, one could, of course, introduce some mechanism to take elements out of S and put them into I. It should, however, be noted that the constituting attribute (proposition) of S necessitates to not at any point in time be in I.

In other words: your proposition is untenable. The result set is empty.

Reason: “Being secure” (to keep it in simple laymans terms) necessitates continuity, i.e. for any element of S to never be in I.

What you submit is “secure” to mean “secure for some time and under certain conditions” which boils down to “not secure”.

Moreover your position seem to be the one I call “mc cain’t rage”, i.e. one that only cares about access for lea and agencies and not at all for customers and security. What you propose is, in simple terms, a fake towards customers; something that by some definition can be vaguely called “secure” while it actually is intentionally insecure.

One strong indicator of that disease is that you do not even care about a mechanism that would allow customers to at least know whether they are currently in S or in I.

“Secure”, please finally note that is by definition “not insecure”. Even not sometimes or a bit or when the moon is full. It’s math and msath doesn’t care about politicians wet dreams.

Well noted, my point is not about politics, it is not about the question whether eavesdropping might sometimes be strongly desirable. It is only about your statement being provably wrong.

ab praeceptis • January 23, 2017 1:30 AM

Nope, that discussion is not even necessary. security that can be deactivated by any third party at their will is no security, period.

One could, however, discuss about “optional limited security priviledge”. Then, and only in that context, political aspects were to be discussed.

I’m insisting somewhat stubbornly because that whole pseudo-security thingy is worthless as exactly those agencies who would decide whether anyone can or can not enjoy the limited security priviledge are the ones against which we need to defend.

We don’t need secure communication because some evil mafiosi or terroristes want to listen in. We need it because the state agencies have turned against the very people whom to protect is their task.

It has been shown over and over again that the nsa, fbi, bnd, ghcq, etc. are the worst offenders and the most ignorant of constitutional rights.

For some states and large organizations (incl. corporations) that may be different; for us citizens however the enemy is clearly the state agencies (and not some evil chinese hackers).

ab praeceptis • January 24, 2017 12:43 AM

Ratio

So countries that don’t propagandize themselves as a democracy lighthouse do have proper and credible oversight?

A typical demonstration of a Ratio arbitrary “conclusion”. I told my reason for not mentioning Russia and now you arbitrarily invent a weird rule out of that and to put it in my mouth.
Obviously as so often you bend and pervert what you get when one is generous enough to answer your questions that were meant as but a trap.

That’s not how it works. Or do you think that Russia should prove it wasn’t behind the US election hacks? Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat.

For a start “The burden of proof is upon him who asserts and not upon the one negating” is – without context – but wanton blabla. Keep it for yourself.

Your attempt at logic is poor. Russia is a) another country and b) *accused”. What I was talking about was however a (western or other) countries duty towards its citizens or towards parties to whom an assertion about itself is made.

Accusing Russia (or anyone) of a crime needs prove or at least credible and strong evidence.

As it is the coutries I talked about who blabber all day long about being oh so legitimate, lawful, and democratic – and against whom there is plenty evidence of their assertion being untrue – it is upon them to show that their assertions are true.
Moreover I’m not talking of consequences. All I do is to say “you (western countries) are but a bunch of liars and banana republics”.

Concerning the “Russia disturbed or even bent our elections!” accusations, there are – and in fact have been and openly confessed – dire consequences.

Do you now finally understand the difference between an accusation and a “I do not believe your assertions” statement?

… banana republic according to you. (You said most are, so it would be interesting to know which countries aren’t.)

So? You are free to do research on that. You are also free to ask others to support you in that. You are, however, not free to impose that desire upon others by playing tricks, playing the judge of reason, etc.

One or more references would do.

How generous. But I wonder what for? To convince you? To see my statement accepted or at least tolerated by you? I couldn’t care less.

How is my (lack of) comments in other discussions of any relevance to my comments in this one?

That is easy to answer. In a restaurant I judge by the meal and the service. If the cook also happens to sing beautifully or to be an interesting partner for political discussions that’s plus. Of, however, they rarely serve meals I don’t care about the rest.

This is a blog about (hopefully mainly IT) security. I judge people by what they contribute in that field. Be it as a living lexikon like Nick P, be it like an experienced and much and smartly reflecting man like Clive Robinson, be it like an actual hands-on engineer like Thoth, to just name a few. Or be it even as a newbie with some serious interest trying hard to learn.

I don’t particularly like much politics here but I can understand that (particularly the us-americans) currently can hardly resist. Of course, I can also understand that IT and security have i.a. a political dimension, too. But as far as I’m concerned the main course here should be the technical aspects of security.

And then there is Ratio, who seems to mainly lurk and wait for .. oh well, I will politely stop this part.

In my minds eye you are mostly a nuisance and you contribute very very little in what I consider the “currency” here. Try your games with someone else.
If you want to really honestly discuss you’ll find me open. If however, like usually, you are merely waiting for your chance to make yourself look big and smart by trying to make others look small and stupid then you have to live with a reaction as far as I’m concerned.

And btw. I prefer a comment from Gerard van Vooren (whom you like to molest) every day and twice on sunday.

ab praeceptis • January 24, 2017 9:23 PM

Rolf Weber

It needs the service provider, who can check the request whether it is lawful and not too broad, and can challenge it.

For a start that is a problem that governments co-created. One could, for instance, have made laws requiring ISPs to check packets for faked headers (mainly a false source).
As for the “can check the request” you are, I’m feeling, entering the realm of fairy tales. Even without NSLs, the equivalent of nuclear bombs, your statement doesn’t hold. Trying that the gov goons would tell you “it already has been checked by a judge” and that by now, it’s not a proposition but an order the provider has to comply with, period.

the technician would commit a crime. I consider this risk very low, because the high likelihood it would be detected, at least if commited on big scale.

No, actually not. Just have a look at CAs. Many of them don’t meet even minimal requirements of OpSec. I do not see any reason to assume that just-any-provider would do better than CAs which are after all considered “high-sec”.

call it “secure”, after your definition.

I think this shows the problem quite well. It’s not my definition; it’s not that everybody can have its own definition. Your statement is about as reasonable as saying that 3+2=5 unless someone needs it to temporarily be 12.

Well noted, I do not discuss whether states or gov agencies should or even must have access to any and every communication or data they deem to be relevant e.g. for national security. That may or may not be the case but that’s an entirely different discussion.

I’m discussing about what security is. And anything that can be temporarily “unlocked” – usually without the target/victim even knowing to make it even worse – is NOT security.

And btw, if ever any spook in my country dared to do that with me I’d hunt him down like a wild dog. I’d start a private war.

Just look at those men who have spent decades in a prison because some cops played games or judges or prosecutors were crooked or lazy or incompetent.
How do you compensate for that? No amount of money will make 60-year old men a 30-year old again. No amount will give him children, a career, etc.
I’ve yet to see the guilty cop or judge being disposessed and put at the mercy of his victim. Usually they get away with a slap on their hand, if that.

Now, go the next step to see what you are asking for (state players rarely do). You demand that it shall be possible to eavesdrop, copy, whatever confidential data and communication from everyone at any time, period.
Sure you put nice garments on it, things like judges needing to sign and the companies being obliged to otherwise properly protect those data, communications or whatever. But what you demand, no matter how nicely dressed up, is to put any and every data and communication at the will of gov. people.

I find it very significant that you don’t spend so much as a single thought at protecting the citizens, not even about informing them post-facto (that would disturb your comfort). Nothing. All you’re interested in is “how can we get at those data/communications?”

THAT is criminal. There is no difference whatsoever between you/gov spooks and a plain bank robber. Both of you don’t care shit about the victim or its rights; both of you only care about what you want.

Next part: If data/communication is not secure – and that is what you want – then all flood doors are open.

You want to replace security by a fake at put the whole thing into the worst hands known, into gov. hands. And you want to lie about it; you want to tell the citizens a fairy tale about being secure while, in fact, in your system they would have no security at all.

In your system sensitive data of companies, of citizens, even of gov. could and would be stolen every day and nothing would be secure.
That just so happens to be quite exactly the current situation. The reason? In all those years clueless control-maniac freaks with gross disrespect for law and citizens had the saying.

Time to change that.

ab praeceptis • January 25, 2017 11:38 PM

Sancho_P

“The average German is far from being concerned re surveillance.”

Pardon me, but the average german is about as stupid as the Pizza he eats. Well noted, that is in no way a racial remark or about genetics or the like. It’s simply the result of decades of stupidization.

Formerly germany had a triple strided education system. First, the basis, was “Grundschule”, for everyone for 4 years beginning at age 6. After that there was either 4 years “Hauptschule” typically followed by an apprenticeship in some company. Or one went 5 years to “Realschule”, also typically followed by an apprenticeship. Those 2 were what produced the world renowned and quite capable workers and employees. The major difference being that Hauptschule was usually suggested at the end of Grundschule for those kids who either evidently had some artisanal or crafts talent or those who were considered not smart enough for the other 2 strides. Realschule was considered as something better and typically produced office and administration employeed or smarter craftsmen.
Finally, the third stride, “Gymnasium”, was for those who were either deemed intelligent enough by their teachers or by their rich parents (there was a joke along the line “dentists kids are always gifted!”); the goal was to go to university once was done with the 9 years Gymnasium and had his “Abitur” which was the needed ticket to enter university.
Depending on the state and other circumstances, one would typically need a teachers recommendation to enter the screening tests for Gymnasium, though legally everyone was entitled to try it. Mainly depending on the state about 20% to 50% passed that test and went to Gymnasium. Bavaria, for instance, was considered hardcore while some northern states were considered more lenient and some mainly city-“states” were considered a free trip – and worthless. Having a “good” Abitur in Bavaria was considered far better than a “very good” one in say, Hamburg.

Well, germans are germans and so they, of course, noted down and saved everything in their archives. Tests, test questions and tasks, results, average, just everything.

In the late 60ies the political “left” began to see election candy in that well proven system that had delivered excellent results. So they began to make a lot of noise about “social injustice” and that everything needed to become more “equal” and “fair”, insisting that the old system gave major advantages to the rich – which was utter bullshit.
In short, they began to dismantle the good school system and to create a worthless, purely politically driven one.

Remember me telling you that the germans kept records of everything? The reason is this: such we can – and some did – look at examination tasks then and now, and at different school types.
The results are shocking. Nowadays they have PhD’s who have difficulties writing and calculating. Even a “Dr.” doesn’t mean a lot. Then, say 40 years ago, in the “evil, injust” old system, the germans were known to be among the best engineers, doctors, craftsmen, welders, nurses, whatever, you name it.

In fact, recent research shows than a considerable parts of todays freshmen at university would utterly fail to pass the tests that one needed 40 years ago at the end of Hauptschule (the simplest and shortest stride for the “less gifted”).

Long story, apologies, but I felt some background was needed to support my entry statement. And indeed one can conclusively show that the germans have been willfully stupidized.
Such they are also in an “optimal” condition to soak up all the system propaganda.

It can actually be funny at times. Right now, for example. After being tought for decades that us-americans are basically the heroic Übermenschen who never do wrong and whatever they do is smart and for the better of the world, imagine the situation in german livingroom when merkel suddely declares Trumps usa less then perfect and when, in fact, the german mass media and politics try to change towards a usa critical position! Hilarious if one has some sense of humor.

But it gets even better. Trump says things that are quite similiar to what “evil ultra-rightist” have said for years. Formertimes, of course, it was very easy to just declare them “Nazis!” and stigmatize them into quietude and, more importantly, to keep citizens away from thinking or, god forbid, joining thise evil rightists!
While that may sound funny, it wasn’t at all. “Evil rightists” could even end up in justice farces and see their lives more or less destroyed.

Now, however, those “evil rightists” have a trump-card. All they need to do is to say that there position is very similar to the us-american presidents one and that they just repeat what Trump says – which, by definition is good in german thinking (after all the indoctrination).

Now, quite some germans are awakening and beginning to recognize that they have been duped, stupidized, and basically kept like cattle, albeit in a rather cozy looking barn.

ab praeceptis • January 26, 2017 10:50 AM

Rolf Weber

Actually I would even be OK with security agencies being able to crack all communications. I do see the necessity for them being able to do their job.

The problems in my minds eye are the following:

• Full information of the citizens immediately afterwards. Incl. detailled information of why he was eavesdropped and exactly and completely what has been eavesdropped.
• In case the citizen turns out to be innocent and wrongfully suspected, those in charge are to be punished – and in adequate ways, i.e. for example, nude photos of them and their wives and bank account information are handed to the victimized citizen. Is must be painful for two reasons: a) they must think twice before intruding into the private sphere of citizens and b) they must experience themselves what they do to others.
• Any and all information must be annihilated as soon as it becomes clear that the citizen was wrongfully suspected or after he has been in court and the case is closed.
• Any and all unrelated information must be deleted immediately; failing to do so will automatically and without any ifs and buts terminate the jobs of all involved.
• All persons victimized, e.g. any contacts, must be informed in full.
• Any order to eavesdrop must be signed not only by judges but also cleared by civil advocates (e.g. as not overly broad).
• any public servants knowing the victim even remotely must be excluded from the operation.
• all public servants operationally involved must go through tough checks, both psychological and background, once a year and must pass 100% clean.

Short version: I want them extensively examined and brutally punished for even the slightest abuse.

Looking at the reality we find that complete assholes who just happen to have a badge and judges one can’t trust at all and who are more then willing to bend over are grossly abusing their power and ignorantly victimizing citizens who then are quite helpless.

THAT is the problem. And the fact that “but we must be able to trace baby killing brutal terrorists!” is consistently abused by lea people who often enough are worse than the hunted civilians.

I have reasons for my position. When I was a very young man I once was woken up by loud knocking. Opening still sleepy I looked at 4 or 5 cops and right into 2 barrels. They temporarily arrested me, turned my appartment into a trash bin, refused to tell me anything and then left just saying “It’s OK. You are free again” without any explanation whatsoever.
When I called the police headquarters they laughed at me and told me to shut up.

Happily enough I had certain means and contacts. Some days later my lawyer told me the reason for that horror event: some elderly neighbour who saw me frequently coming home in the morning had “informed” the cops that I might be a terrorist because I slept during the day. Seriously. Btw. I was working at night then, simple as that.

From then on I spent some years to hunt down those cop animals as well as the rubber-stamping judge. The cops I got; they were graded down and punished. The judge I didn’t get; the system protected him too well, he basically had carte blanche because one judge doesn’t go against another judge. We had to arrange something different to have him punished adequately (read: very hard). Later it turned out that that “judge” pig was the man to go to for corrupt cops as he would stamp just about everything.

And you are asking me to give those animals the power to break encryption (or demand it be broken)? Think again.