Essays in the Category "Computer and Information Security"

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Backdoor in XZ Utils That Almost Happened

The recent cybersecurity catastrophe that wasn’t reveals an untenable situation, one being exploited by malicious actors.

  • Lawfare
  • April 9, 2024

Last week, the internet dodged a major nation-state attack that would have had catastrophic cybersecurity repercussions worldwide. It’s a catastrophe that didn’t happen, so it won’t get much attention—but it should. There’s an important moral to the story of the attack and its discovery: The security of the global internet depends on countless obscure pieces of software written and maintained by even more obscure unpaid, distractible, and sometimes vulnerable volunteers. It’s an untenable situation, and one that is being exploited by malicious actors. Yet precious little is being done to remedy it…

In Memoriam: Ross Anderson, 1956-2024

  • Communications of the ACM
  • April 9, 2024

Ross Anderson unexpectedly passed away in his sleep on March 28th in his home in Cambridge. He was 67.

I can’t remember when I first met Ross. It was well before 2008, when we created the Security and Human Behavior workshop. It was before 2001, when we created the Workshop on Economics and Information Security (okay, he created that one, I just helped). It was before 1998, when we first wrote about the insecurity of key escrow systems. In 1996, I was one of the people he brought to the Newton Institute at Cambridge University, for the six-month cryptography residency program he ran (I made a mistake not staying the whole time)—so it was before then as well…

Building a Cyber Insurance Backstop Is Harder Than It Sounds

Insurers argue that a government backstop would help them cover catastrophic cyberattacks, but it’s not so simple.

  • Bruce Schneier and Josephine Wolff
  • Lawfare
  • February 26, 2024

In the first week of January, the pharmaceutical giant Merck quietly settled its years-long lawsuit over whether or not its property and casualty insurers would cover a $700 million claim filed after the devastating NotPetya cyberattack in 2017. The malware ultimately infected more than 40,000 of Merck’s computers, which significantly disrupted the company’s drug and vaccine production. After Merck filed its $700 million claim, the pharmaceutical giant’s insurers argued that they were not required to cover the malware’s damage because the cyberattack was widely attributed to the Russian government and therefore was excluded from standard property and casualty insurance coverage as a “hostile or warlike act.”…

Centralized Vs. Decentralized Data Systems—Which Choice Is Best?

  • David Weldon
  • VentureBeat
  • September 12, 2022

Healthcare and insurance payers spend nearly $496 billion each year on billing and insurance-related costs, noted Bruce Schneier, chief of security architecture at Inrupt—a company created by the father of the modern web, Tim Berners-Lee. As the amount of data continues to grow, it is becoming more difficult for healthcare providers to access necessary information when treating patients.

Providers typically turn to centralized means such as healthcare information exchanges, but these present a laundry list of potential problems, Schneier argued…

Letter to the US Senate Judiciary Committee on App Stores

  • Bruce Schneier
  • January 31, 2022

View or Download in PDF Format

The Honorable Dick Durbin
Chair
Committee on Judiciary
711 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Amy Klobuchar
Chair
Subcommittee on Competition Policy,
Antitrust, and Consumer Rights
425 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Chuck Grassley
Ranking Member
Committee on Judiciary
135 Hart Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable Mike Lee
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Competition Policy,
Antitrust, and Consumer Rights
361A Russell Senate Office Building…

Robot Hacking Games

  • IEEE Security & Privacy
  • January/February 2022

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Hacker “Capture the Flag” has been a mainstay at hacker gatherings since the mid-1990s. It’s like the outdoor game, but played on computer networks. Teams of hackers defend their own computers while attacking other teams’. It’s a controlled setting for what computer hackers do in real life: finding and fixing vulnerabilities in their own systems and exploiting them in others’. It’s the software vulnerability lifecycle.

These days, dozens of teams from around the world compete in weekend-long marathon events held all over the world. People train for months. Winning is a big deal. If you’re into this sort of thing, it’s pretty much the most fun you can possibly have on the Internet without committing multiple felonies…

How to Cut Down on Ransomware Attacks Without Banning Bitcoin

  • Bruce Schneier and Nicholas Weaver
  • Slate
  • June 17, 2021

Ransomware isn’t new; the idea dates back to 1986 with the “Brain” computer virus. Now, it’s become the criminal business model of the internet for two reasons. The first is the realization that no one values data more than its original owner, and it makes more sense to ransom it back to them—sometimes with the added extortion of threatening to make it public—than it does to sell it to anyone else. The second is a safe way of collecting ransoms: Bitcoin.

This is where the suggestion to ban cryptocurrencies as a way to “solve” ransomware comes from. Lee Reiners, executive director of the Global Financial Markets Center at Duke Law, …

Russia’s Hacking Success Shows How Vulnerable the Cloud Is

The cloud is everywhere. It’s critical to computing. And it’s under attack.

  • Foreign Policy
  • May 24, 2021

Russia’s Sunburst cyberespionage campaign, discovered late last year, impacted more than 100 large companies and U.S. federal agencies, including the Treasury, Energy, Justice, and Homeland Security departments. A crucial part of the Russians’ success was their ability to move through these organizations by compromising cloud and local network identity systems to then access cloud accounts and pilfer emails and files.

Hackers said by the U.S. government to have been working for the Kremlin targeted a widely used Microsoft cloud service that synchronizes user identities. The hackers …

What Will It Take?

  • IEEE Security & Privacy
  • May-June 2021

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What will it take for policy makers to take cybersecurity seriously? Not minimal-change seriously. Not here-and-there seriously. But really seriously. What will it take for policy makers to take cybersecurity seriously enough to enact substantive legislative changes that would address the problems? It’s not enough for the average person to be afraid of cyberattacks. They need to know that there are engineering fixes—and that’s something we can provide.

For decades, I have been waiting for the “big enough” incident that would finally do it. In 2015, Chinese military hackers hacked the Office of Personal Management and made off with the highly personal information of about 22 million Americans who had security clearances. In 2016, the Mirai botnet leveraged millions of Internet-of-Things devices with default admin passwords to launch a denial-of-service attack that disabled major Internet platforms and services in both North America and Europe. In 2017, hackers—years later we learned that it was the Chinese military—hacked the credit bureau Equifax and stole the personal information of 147 million Americans. In recent years, ransomware attacks have knocked hospitals offline, and many articles have been written about Russia inside the U.S. power grid. And last year, the Russian SVR hacked thousands of sensitive networks inside civilian critical infrastructure worldwide in what we’re now calling Sunburst (and used to call SolarWinds)…

Bitcoin’s Greatest Feature Is Also Its Existential Threat

The cryptocurrency depends on the integrity of the blockchain. But China’s censors, the FBI, or powerful corporations could fragment it into oblivion.

  • Barath Raghavan and Bruce Schneier
  • Wired
  • March 9, 2021

Security researchers have recently discovered a botnet with a novel defense against takedowns. Normally, authorities can disable a botnet by taking over its command-and-control server. With nowhere to go for instructions, the botnet is rendered useless. But over the years, botnet designers have come up with ways to make this counterattack harder. Now the content-delivery network Akamai has reported on a new method: a botnet that uses the Bitcoin blockchain ledger. Since the blockchain is globally accessible and hard to take down, the botnet’s operators appear to be safe…

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Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.