Entries Tagged "theft"

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Aligning Interest with Capability

Have you ever been to a retail store and seen this sign on the register: “Your purchase free if you don’t get a receipt”? You almost certainly didn’t see it in an expensive or high-end store. You saw it in a convenience store, or a fast-food restaurant. Or maybe a liquor store. That sign is a security device, and a clever one at that. And it illustrates a very important rule about security: it works best when you align interests with capability.

If you’re a store owner, one of your security worries is employee theft. Your employees handle cash all day, and dishonest ones will pocket some of it for themselves. The history of the cash register is mostly a history of preventing this kind of theft. Early cash registers were just boxes with a bell attached. The bell rang when an employee opened the box, alerting the store owner—who was presumably elsewhere in the store—that an employee was handling money.

The register tape was an important development in security against employee theft. Every transaction is recorded in write-only media, in such a way that it’s impossible to insert or delete transactions. It’s an audit trail. Using that audit trail, the store owner can count the cash in the drawer, and compare the amount with what the register. Any discrepancies can be docked from the employee’s paycheck.

If you’re a dishonest employee, you have to keep transactions off the register. If someone hands you money for an item and walks out, you can pocket that money without anyone being the wiser. And, in fact, that’s how employees steal cash in retail stores.

What can the store owner do? He can stand there and watch the employee, of course. But that’s not very efficient; the whole point of having employees is so that the store owner can do other things. The customer is standing there anyway, but the customer doesn’t care one way or another about a receipt.

So here’s what the employer does: he hires the customer. By putting up a sign saying “Your purchase free if you don’t get a receipt,” the employer is getting the customer to guard the employee. The customer makes sure the employee gives him a receipt, and employee theft is reduced accordingly.

There is a general rule in security to align interest with capability. The customer has the capability of watching the employee; the sign gives him the interest.

In Beyond Fear I wrote about ATM fraud; you can see the same mechanism at work:

“When ATM cardholders in the US complained about phantom withdrawals from their accounts, the courts generally held that the banks had to prove fraud. Hence, the banks’ agenda was to improve security and keep fraud low, because they paid the costs of any fraud. In the UK, the reverse was true: The courts generally sided with the banks and assumed that any attempts to repudiate withdrawals were cardholder fraud, and the cardholder had to prove otherwise. This caused the banks to have the opposite agenda; they didn’t care about improving security, because they were content to blame the problems on the customers and send them to jail for complaining. The result was that in the US, the banks improved ATM security to forestall additional losses—most of the fraud actually was not the cardholder’s fault—while in the UK, the banks did nothing.”

The banks had the capability to improve security. In the US, they also had the interest. But in the UK, only the customer had the interest. It wasn’t until the UK courts reversed themselves and aligned interest with capability that ATM security improved.

Computer security is no different. For years I have argued in favor of software liabilities. Software vendors are in the best position to improve software security; they have the capability. But, unfortunately, they don’t have much interest. Features, schedule, and profitability are far more important. Software liabilities will change that. They’ll align interest with capability, and they’ll improve software security.

One last story… In Italy, tax fraud used to be a national hobby. (It may still be; I don’t know.) The government was tired of retail stores not reporting sales and paying taxes, so they passed a law regulating the customers. Any customer having just purchased an item and stopped within a certain distance of a retail store, has to produce a receipt or they would be fined. Just as in the “Your purchase free if you don’t get a receipt” story, the law turned the customers into tax inspectors. They demanded receipts from merchants, which in turn forced the merchants to create a paper audit trail for the purchase and pay the required tax.

This was a great idea, but it didn’t work very well. Customers, especially tourists, didn’t like to be stopped by police. People started demanding that the police prove they just purchased the item. Threatening people with fines if they didn’t guard merchants wasn’t as effective an enticement as offering people a reward if they didn’t get a receipt.

Interest must be aligned with capability, but you need to be careful how you generate interest.

This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.

Posted on June 1, 2006 at 6:27 AMView Comments

Thief Disguises Himself as Security Guard

Another in our series on the security problems of trusting people in uniform:

A thief disguised as a security guard Tuesday duped the unsuspecting staff of a top Italian art gallery into giving him more than 200,000 euros ($253,100), local media reported.

The thief showed up Tuesday morning at the Pitti Palace, a grandiose renaissance construction in central Florence and one of Italy’s best known museums, wearing the same uniform used by employees of the security firm which every day collects the institution’s takings.

After the cashier staff gave him three bags full of money, he signed a receipt and calmly walked out.

Posted on May 12, 2006 at 6:10 AMView Comments

iJacking

The San Francisco Bay Guardian is reporting on a new crime: people who grab laptops out of their owners’ hands and then run away. It’s called “iJacking,” and there seems to be a wave of this type of crime at Internet cafes in San Francisco:

In 2004 the SFPD Robbery Division recorded 17 strong-arm laptop robberies citywide. This increased to 30 cases in 2005, a total that doesn’t even include thefts that fall under the category of “burglary,” when a victim isn’t present. (SFPD could not provide statistics on the number of laptop burglaries.)

In the past three months alone, Park Station, the police precinct that includes the Western Addition, has reported 11 strong-arm laptop robberies, a statistic that suggests this one district may exceed last year’s citywide total by the end of 2006.

Some stories:

Maloney was absorbed in his work when suddenly a hooded person yanked the laptop from Maloney’s hands and ran out the door. Maloney tried to grab his computer, but he stumbled across a few chairs and landed on the floor as the perpetrator dashed to a vehicle waiting a quarter block away.

[…]

Two weeks before Maloney’s robbery, on a Sunday afternoon, a man had been followed out of the Starbucks on the corner of Fulton Street and Masonic Avenue and was assaulted by two suspects in broad daylight. According to the police report, the suspects dragged the victim 15 feet along the pavement, kicking him in the face before stealing his computer.

In early February a women had her laptop snatched while sitting in Ali’s Café. She pursued the perpetrator out the door, only to be blindsided by a second accomplice. Ali described the assault as “a football tackle” so severe it left the victim’s eyeglasses in the branches of a nearby tree. In the most recent laptop robbery, on March 16 in a café on the 900 block of Valencia Street, police say the victim was actually stabbed.

It’s obvious why these thefts are occurring. Laptops are valuable, easy to steal, and easy to fence. If we want to “solve” this problem, we need to modify at least one of those characteristics. Some Internet cafes are providing locking cables for their patrons, in an attempt to make them harder to steal. But that will only mean that the muggers will follow their victims out of the cafes. Laptops will become less valuable over time, but that really isn’t a good solution. The only thing left is to make them harder to fence.

This isn’t an easy problem. There are a bunch of companies that make solutions that help people recover stolen laptops. There are programs that “phone home” if a laptop is stolen. There are programs that hide a serial number on the hard drive somewhere. There are non-removable tags users can affix to their computers with ID information. But until this kind of thing becomes common, the crimes will continue.

Reminds me of the problem of bicycle thefts.

Posted on March 31, 2006 at 1:06 PMView Comments

Blowing Up ATMs

In the Netherlands, criminals are stealing money from ATMs by blowing them up (article in Dutch). First, they drill a hole in an ATM and fill it with some sort of gas. Then, they ignite the gas—from a safe distance—and clean up the money that flies all over the place after the ATM explodes.

Sounds crazy, but apparently there has been an increase in this type of attack recently. The banks’ countermeasure is to install air vents so that gas can’t build up inside the ATMs.

Posted on March 10, 2006 at 12:26 PMView Comments

Kent Robbery

Something like 50 million pounds was stolen from a banknote storage depot in the UK. BBC has a good chronology of the theft.

The Times writes:

Large-scale cash robbery was once a technical challenge: drilling through walls, short-circuiting alarms, gagging guards and stationing the get-away car. Today, the weak points in the banks’ defences are not grilles and vaults, but human beings. Stealing money is now partly a matter of psychology. The success of the Tonbridge robbers depended on terrifying Mr Dixon into opening the doors. They had studied their victim. They knew the route he took home, and how he would respond when his wife and child were in mortal danger. It did not take gelignite to blow open the vaults; it took fear, in the hostage technique known as “tiger kidnapping”, so called because of the predatory stalking that precedes it. Tiger kidnapping is the point where old-fashioned crime meets modern terrorism.

Posted on February 27, 2006 at 12:26 PMView Comments

Identity Theft in the UK

Recently there was some serious tax credit fraud in the UK. Basically, there is a tax-credit system that allows taxpayers to get a refund for some of their taxes if they meet certain criteria. Politically, this was a major objective of the Labour Party. So the Inland Revenue (the UK version of the IRS) made it as easy as possible to apply for this refund. One of the ways taxpayers could apply was via a Web portal.

Unfortunately, the only details necessary when applying were the applicant’s National Insurance number (the UK version of the Social Security number) and mother’s maiden name. The refund was then paid directly into any bank account specified on the application form. Anyone who knows anything about security can guess what happened. Estimates are that fifteen millions pounds has been stolen by criminal syndicates.

The press has been treating this as an issue of identity theft, talking about how criminals went Dumpster diving to get National Insurance numbers and so forth. I have seen very little about how the authentication scheme failed. The system tried—using semi-secret information like NI number and mother’s maiden name—to authenticate the person. Instead, the system should have tried to authenticate the transaction. Even a simple verification step—does the name on the account match the name of the person who should receive the refund—would have gone a long way to preventing this type of fraud.

Posted on February 8, 2006 at 3:42 PMView Comments

RFID Zapper

This is an interesting demonstration project: a hand-held device that disables passive RFID tags.

There are several ways to deactivate RFID-Tags. One that might be offered by the industries are RFID-deactivators, which will send the RFID-Tag to sleep. A problem with this method is, that it is not permanent, the RFID-Tag can be reactivated (probably without your knowledge). Several ways of permanently deactivating RFID-Tags are know, e.g. cutting off the antenna from the actual microchip or overloading and literally frying the RFID-Tag by placing it in a common microwave-oven for even very short periods of time. Unfortunately both methods aren’t suitable for the destruction of RFID-Tags in clothes: cutting off the antenna would require to damage the piece of cloth, while frying the chips is likely to cause a short but potent flame, which would damage most textiles or even set them on fire.

The RFID-Zapper solves this dilemma. Basically it copies the mircowave-oven-method, but in a much smaller scale. It generates a strong electromagnetic field with a coil, which should be placed as near to the target-RFID-Tag as possible. The RFID-Tag then will recive a strong shock of energy comparable with an EMP and some part of it will blow, most likely the capacitator, thus deactivating the chip forever.

An obvious application would be to disable the RFID chip on your passport, but this kind of thing will probably be more popular with professional shoplifters.

Posted on January 4, 2006 at 6:35 AMView Comments

How Much High Explosive Does Any One Person Need?

Four hundred pounds:

The stolen goods include 150 pounds of C-4 plastic explosive and 250 pounds of thin sheets of explosives that could be used in letter bombs. Also, 2,500 detonators were missing from a storage explosive container, or magazine, in a bunker owned by Cherry Engineering.

The theft was professional:

Thieves apparently used blowtorches to cut through the storage trailers—suggesting they knew what they were after.

Most likely it’s a criminal who will resell the stuff, but it could be a terrorist organization. My guess is criminals, though.

By the way, this is in America…

The material was taken from Cherry Engineering, a company owned by Chris Cherry, a scientist at Sandia National Labs.

…where security is an afterthought:

The site, located outside Albuquerque, had no guards and no surveillance cameras.

Or maybe not even an afterthought:

It was the site’s second theft in the past two years.

If anyone is looking for something to spend national security money on that will actually make us safer, securing high-explosive-filled trailers would be high on my list.

EDITED TO ADD (12/29): The explosives were recovered.

Posted on December 20, 2005 at 2:20 PMView Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.