Subverting AIOps Systems Through Poisoned Input Data
In this input integrity attack against an AI system, researchers were able to fool AIOps tools:
AIOps refers to the use of LLM-based agents to gather and analyze application telemetry, including system logs, performance metrics, traces, and alerts, to detect problems and then suggest or carry out corrective actions. The likes of Cisco have deployed AIops in a conversational interface that admins can use to prompt for information about system performance. Some AIOps tools can respond to such queries by automatically implementing fixes, or suggesting scripts that can address issues.
These agents, however, can be tricked by bogus analytics data into taking harmful remedial actions, including downgrading an installed package to a vulnerable version.
The paper: “When AIOps Become “AI Oops”: Subverting LLM-driven IT Operations via Telemetry Manipulation“:
Abstract: AI for IT Operations (AIOps) is transforming how organizations manage complex software systems by automating anomaly detection, incident diagnosis, and remediation. Modern AIOps solutions increasingly rely on autonomous LLM-based agents to interpret telemetry data and take corrective actions with minimal human intervention, promising faster response times and operational cost savings.
In this work, we perform the first security analysis of AIOps solutions, showing that, once again, AI-driven automation comes with a profound security cost. We demonstrate that adversaries can manipulate system telemetry to mislead AIOps agents into taking actions that compromise the integrity of the infrastructure they manage. We introduce techniques to reliably inject telemetry data using error-inducing requests that influence agent behavior through a form of adversarial reward-hacking; plausible but incorrect system error interpretations that steer the agent’s decision-making. Our attack methodology, AIOpsDoom, is fully automated—combining reconnaissance, fuzzing, and LLM-driven adversarial input generation—and operates without any prior knowledge of the target system.
To counter this threat, we propose AIOpsShield, a defense mechanism that sanitizes telemetry data by exploiting its structured nature and the minimal role of user-generated content. Our experiments show that AIOpsShield reliably blocks telemetry-based attacks without affecting normal agent performance.
Ultimately, this work exposes AIOps as an emerging attack vector for system compromise and underscores the urgent need for security-aware AIOps design.
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Shashank • August 20, 2025 7:34 AM
This is an interesting lab POC but it would be more interesting to see how well this works against actual AIOps platforms (Datadog, Dynatrace, Elastic AIOps etc). The assumption that attackers can inject arbitrary telemetry into production pipelines can be faulty, telemetry generally goes through some normalization before coming of use.