The Ramifications of Ukraine’s Drone Attack
You can read the details of Operation Spiderweb elsewhere. What interests me are the implications for future warfare:
If the Ukrainians could sneak drones so close to major air bases in a police state such as Russia, what is to prevent the Chinese from doing the same with U.S. air bases? Or the Pakistanis with Indian air bases? Or the North Koreans with South Korean air bases? Militaries that thought they had secured their air bases with electrified fences and guard posts will now have to reckon with the threat from the skies posed by cheap, ubiquitous drones that can be easily modified for military use. This will necessitate a massive investment in counter-drone systems. Money spent on conventional manned weapons systems increasingly looks to be as wasted as spending on the cavalry in the 1930s.
The Atlantic makes similar points.
There’s a balance between the cost of the thing, and the cost to destroy the thing, and that balance is changing dramatically. This isn’t new, of course. Here’s an article from last year about the cost of drones versus the cost of top-of-the-line fighter jets. If $35K in drones (117 drones times an estimated $300 per drone) can destroy $7B in Russian bombers and other long-range aircraft, why would anyone build more of those planes? And we can have this discussion about ships, or tanks, or pretty much every other military vehicle. And then we can add in drone-coordinating technologies like swarming.
Clearly we need more research on remotely and automatically disabling drones.
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Clive Robinson • June 4, 2025 7:36 AM
@ Bruce, ALL,
With regards the quote of,
This is nothing new.
It happened since before mankind could write, when he discovered that throwing a rock down on prey was effective as a first step in improving their chances of survival, either by putting food on the table as it were or eliminating a threat.
The military have always known,
“The advantage of the high ground.”
And as each technology advanced, they have exploited it.
You might as well look up the concept of the “Mass Driver” and similar Space Weapons. One is the notion of “rocks from space” where you simply take an asteroid or similar that’s outside of Earth’s gravity well and simply push it in on the right tragectory.
Currently we have no way to stop it, the only defence is the same as it is for drones,
1, Not have your position be identified.
2, Not be there when the weapons get there.”
This is in part what ICBMs IRBMs and now hypersonic cruise missiles are designed to built up areas and population centers.
It’s why I’ve mentioned in the past that the ten or so US carrier fleets are a waste of money militarily.
They can not hide nor are they comparatively mobile.
You can “invert the principle” with submersible weapons that can not be seen.
Think about a torpedo it’s a very basic submerged drone.
Now take it a step further, why bother sending nukes by express delivery ICBM at a great expense mark up, when you could build for a fraction of the price a bottom crawling nuclear mine…
It would just have to explode under water and as a result the ships could nolonger float. Or it could stand off outside a harbour that had appropriate land around it and the resulting explosion cause a tsunami type bore-race or tidelwave.
It’s why “infantry” are still current on battle fields they can hide and they can run.
As I’ve remarked in the past,
“There is no such thing as an accident, only lack of knowledge and the time to act on it.”
Which applies equally to offensive and defensive warfare regardless of the latest technology.
At the end of the day success depends on,
1, Denying your enemy knowledge.
2, Having time to react to your knowledge of the enemy.
That is the two essential fundamentals of warfare, and we’ve known it for at least four thousand years.