Hacking Drug Pumps
When you connect hospital drug pumps to the Internet, they're hackable. This is only surprising to people who aren't paying attention.
Rios says when he first told Hospira a year ago that hackers could update the firmware on its pumps, the company "didn't believe it could be done." Hospira insisted there was "separation" between the communications module and the circuit board that would make this impossible. Rios says technically there is physical separation between the two. But the serial cable provides a bridge to jump from one to the other.
An attacker wouldn't need physical access to the pump because the communication modules are connected to hospital networks, which are in turn connected to the Internet.
"From an architecture standpoint, it looks like these two modules are separated," he says. "But when you open the device up, you can see they're actually connected with a serial cable, and they"re connected in a way that you can actually change the core software on the pump."
An attacker wouldn't need physical access to the pump. The communication modules are connected to hospital networks, which are in turn connected to the Internet. "You can talk to that communication module over the network or over a wireless network," Rios warns.
Hospira knows this, he says, because this is how it delivers firmware updates to its pumps. Yet despite this, he says, the company insists that "the separation makes it so you can't hurt someone. So we're going to develop a proof-of-concept that proves that's not true."
One of the biggest conceptual problems we have is that something is believed secure until demonstrated otherwise. We need to reverse that: everything should be believed insecure until demonstrated otherwise.
Posted on June 17, 2015 at 2:02 PM • 65 Comments