New Attack on AES
"Biclique Cryptanalysis of the Full AES," by Andrey Bogdanov, Dmitry Khovratovich, and Christian Rechberger.
Abstract. Since Rijndael was chosen as the Advanced Encryption Standard, improving upon 7-round attacks on the 128-bit key variant or upon 8-round attacks on the 192/256-bit key variants has been one of the most difficult challenges in the cryptanalysis of block ciphers for more than a decade. In this paper we present a novel technique of block cipher cryptanalysis with bicliques, which leads to the following results:
- The first key recovery attack on the full AES-128 with computational complexity 2126.1.
- The first key recovery attack on the full AES-192 with computational complexity 2189.7.
- The first key recovery attack on the full AES-256 with computational complexity 2254.4.
- Attacks with lower complexity on the reduced-round versions of AES not considered before, including an attack on 8-round AES-128 with complexity 2124.9.
- Preimage attacks on compression functions based on the full AES versions.
In contrast to most shortcut attacks on AES variants, we do not need to assume related-keys. Most of our attacks only need a very small part of the codebook and have small memory requirements, and are practically verified to a large extent. As our attacks are of high computational complexity, they do not threaten the practical use of AES in any way.
This is what I wrote about AES in 2009. I still agree with my advice:
Cryptography is all about safety margins. If you can break n round of a cipher, you design it with 2n or 3n rounds. What we're learning is that the safety margin of AES is much less than previously believed. And while there is no reason to scrap AES in favor of another algorithm, NST should increase the number of rounds of all three AES variants. At this point, I suggest AES-128 at 16 rounds, AES-192 at 20 rounds, and AES-256 at 28 rounds. Or maybe even more; we don't want to be revising the standard again and again.
And for new applications I suggest that people don't use AES-256. AES-128 provides more than enough security margin for the forseeable future. But if you're already using AES-256, there's no reason to change.
The advice about AES-256 was because of a 2009 attack, not this result.
Again, I repeat the saying I've heard came from inside the NSA: "Attacks always get better; they never get worse."
Posted on August 18, 2011 at 6:12 AM • 73 Comments