Another New AES Attack
A new and very impressive attack against AES has just been announced.
Over the past couple of months, there have been two (the second blogged about here) new cryptanalysis papers on AES. The attacks presented in the papers are not practical -- they're far too complex, they're related-key attacks, and they're against larger-key versions and not the 128-bit version that most implementations use -- but they are impressive pieces of work all the same.
This new attack, by Alex Biryukov, Orr Dunkelman, Nathan Keller, Dmitry Khovratovich, and Adi Shamir, is much more devastating. It is a completely practical attack against ten-round AES-256:
AES is the best known and most widely used block cipher. Its three versions (AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256) differ in their key sizes (128 bits, 192 bits and 256 bits) and in their number of rounds (10, 12, and 14, respectively). In the case of AES-128, there is no known attack which is faster than the 2128 complexity of exhaustive search. However, AES-192 and AES-256 were recently shown to be breakable by attacks which require 2176 and 2119 time, respectively. While these complexities are much faster than exhaustive search, they are completely non-practical, and do not seem to pose any real threat to the security of AES-based systems.
In this paper we describe several attacks which can break with practical complexity variants of AES-256 whose number of rounds are comparable to that of AES-128. One of our attacks uses only two related keys and 239 time to recover the complete 256-bit key of a 9-round version of AES-256 (the best previous attack on this variant required 4 related keys and 2120 time). Another attack can break a 10 round version of AES-256 in 245 time, but it uses a stronger type of related subkey attack (the best previous attack on this variant required 64 related keys and 2172 time).
They also describe an attack against 11-round AES-256 that requires 270 time -- almost practical.
These new results greatly improve on the Biryukov, Khovratovich, and Nikolic papers mentioned above, and a paper I wrote with six others in 2000, where we describe a related-key attack against 9-round AES-256 (then called Rijndael) in 2224 time. (This again proves the cryptographer's adage: attacks always get better, they never get worse.)
By any definition of the term, this is a huge result.
There are three reasons not to panic:
- The attack exploits the fact that the key schedule for 256-bit version is pretty lousy -- something we pointed out in our 2000 paper -- but doesn't extend to AES with a 128-bit key.
- It's a related-key attack, which requires the cryptanalyst to have access to plaintexts encrypted with multiple keys that are related in a specific way.
- The attack only breaks 11 rounds of AES-256. Full AES-256 has 14 rounds.
Not much comfort there, I agree. But it's what we have.
Cryptography is all about safety margins. If you can break n round of a cipher, you design it with 2n or 3n rounds. What we're learning is that the safety margin of AES is much less than previously believed. And while there is no reason to scrap AES in favor of another algorithm, NST should increase the number of rounds of all three AES variants. At this point, I suggest AES-128 at 16 rounds, AES-192 at 20 rounds, and AES-256 at 28 rounds. Or maybe even more; we don't want to be revising the standard again and again.
And for new applications I suggest that people don't use AES-256. AES-128 provides more than enough security margin for the forseeable future. But if you're already using AES-256, there's no reason to change.
The paper I have is still a draft. It is being circulated among cryptographers, and should be online in a couple of days. I will post the link as soon as I have it.
UPDATED TO ADD (8/3): The paper is public.
Posted on July 30, 2009 at 9:26 AM • 139 Comments