Why Phishing Works
Abstract:
To build systems shielding users from fraudulent (or phishing) websites, designers need to know which attack strategies work and why. This paper provides the first empirical evidence about which malicious strategies are successful at deceiving general users. We first analyzed a large set of captured phishing attacks and developed a set of hypotheses about why these strategies might work. We then assessed these hypotheses with a usability study in which 22 participants were shown 20 web sites and asked to determine which ones were fraudulent. We found that 23% of the participants did not look at browser-based cues such as the address bar, status bar and the security indicators, leading to incorrect choices 40% of the time. We also found that some visual deception attacks can fool even the most sophisticated users. These results illustrate that standard security indicators are not effective for a substantial fraction of users, and suggest that alternative approaches are needed.
Here’s an article on the paper.
Zac Bedell • April 4, 2006 3:36 PM
The paper mentions that study participants were shown websites on a Mac using Firefox. I’m genuinely curious how much of an effect that had on the results. Granted, I’m a Mac user myself, but I have to wonder if the results might have been different on, say IE 6 on Windows.
Going purely on raw numbers, odds are most of the participants were out of their element in both OS and browser choice. I don’t doubt the results would have been depressing regardless of platform, though.