Gary McGraw on National Cybersecurity
Good essay, making the point that cyberattack and counterattack aren’t very useful—actual cyberdefense is what’s wanted.
Creating a cyber-rock is cheap. Buying a cyber-rock is even cheaper since zero-day attacks exist on the open market for sale to the highest bidder. In fact, if the bad guy is willing to invest time rather than dollars and become an insider, cyber-rocks may in fact be free of charge, but that is a topic for another time.
Given these price tags, it is safe to assume that some nations have already developed a collection of cyber-rocks, and that many other nations will develop a handful of specialized cyber-rocks (e.g., as an extension of many-year-old regional conflicts). If we follow the advice of Hayden and Chabinsky, we may even distribute cyber-rocks to private corporations.
Obviously, active defense is folly if all it means is unleashing the cyber-rocks from inside of our glass houses since everyone can or will have cyber-rocks. Even worse, unlike very high explosives, or nuclear materials, or other easily trackable munitions (part of whose deterrence value lies in others knowing about them), no one will ever know just how many or what kind of cyber-rocks a particular group actually has.
Now that we have established that cyber-offense is relatively easy and can be accomplished on the cheap, we can see why reliance on offense alone is inadvisable. What are we going to do to stop cyberwar from starting in the first place? The good news is that war has both defensive and offensive aspects, and understanding this fundamental dynamic is central to understanding cyberwar and deterrence.
The kind of defense I advocate (called “passive defense” or “protection” above) involves security engineering—building security in as we create our systems, knowing full well that they will be attacked in the future. One of the problems to overcome is that exploits are sexy and engineering is, well, not so sexy.
Geraldanthro • November 8, 2012 1:57 PM
More than Cyber ROCKS, STUXNET, et al,
5 or 6 yrs in Irans infrastructure & networks suggest everything mapped,
including counterstrike plans.
OTHER: CYBER WMD strike leaves enemy with very little left for any counterstrike.
http://warintel.blogspot.com/2010/10/stuxnet-30-most-powerful-weapon-ever.html
Gerald
War Anthropologist