Entries Tagged "vulnerabilities"

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Is Penetration Testing Worth it?

There are security experts who insist penetration testing is essential for network security, and you have no hope of being secure unless you do it regularly. And there are contrarian security experts who tell you penetration testing is a waste of time; you might as well throw your money away. Both of these views are wrong. The reality of penetration testing is more complicated and nuanced.

Penetration testing is a broad term. It might mean breaking into a network to demonstrate you can. It might mean trying to break into a network to document vulnerabilities. It might involve a remote attack, physical penetration of a data center or social engineering attacks. It might use commercial or proprietary vulnerability scanning tools, or rely on skilled white-hat hackers. It might just evaluate software version numbers and patch levels, and make inferences about vulnerabilities.

It’s going to be expensive, and you’ll get a thick report when the testing is done.

And that’s the real problem. You really don’t want a thick report documenting all the ways your network is insecure. You don’t have the budget to fix them all, so the document will sit around waiting to make someone look bad. Or, even worse, it’ll be discovered in a breach lawsuit. Do you really want an opposing attorney to ask you to explain why you paid to document the security holes in your network, and then didn’t fix them? Probably the safest thing you can do with the report, after you read it, is shred it.

Given enough time and money, a pen test will find vulnerabilities; there’s no point in proving it. And if you’re not going to fix all the uncovered vulnerabilities, there’s no point uncovering them. But there is a way to do penetration testing usefully. For years I’ve been saying security consists of protection, detection and response—and you need all three to have good security. Before you can do a good job with any of these, you have to assess your security. And done right, penetration testing is a key component of a security assessment.

I like to restrict penetration testing to the most commonly exploited critical vulnerabilities, like those found on the SANS Top 20 list. If you have any of those vulnerabilities, you really need to fix them.

If you think about it, penetration testing is an odd business. Is there an analogue to it anywhere else in security? Sure, militaries run these exercises all the time, but how about in business? Do we hire burglars to try to break into our warehouses? Do we attempt to commit fraud against ourselves? No, we don’t.

Penetration testing has become big business because systems are so complicated and poorly understood. We know about burglars and kidnapping and fraud, but we don’t know about computer criminals. We don’t know what’s dangerous today, and what will be dangerous tomorrow. So we hire penetration testers in the belief they can explain it.

There are two reasons why you might want to conduct a penetration test. One, you want to know whether a certain vulnerability is present because you’re going to fix it if it is. And two, you need a big, scary report to persuade your boss to spend more money. If neither is true, I’m going to save you a lot of money by giving you this free penetration test: You’re vulnerable.

Now, go do something useful about it.

This essay appeared in the March issue of Information Security, as the first half of a point/counterpoint with Marcus Ranum. Here’s his half.

Posted on May 15, 2007 at 7:05 AMView Comments

Google Ad Hack

Clever:

…the bad guys behind the attack appeared to capitalize on an odd feature of Google’s sponsored links. Normally, when a viewer hovers over a hyperlink, the name of the site that the computer user is about to access appears in the bottom left corner of the browser window. But hovering over Google’s sponsored links shows nothing in that area. That blank space potentially gives bad guys another way to hide where visitors will be taken first.

Posted on May 1, 2007 at 7:25 AMView Comments

Dutch eVoting Scandal

Interesting:

His software is used with the Nedap voting machines currently used in 90 per cent of the electoral districts, and although it is not used in the actual vote count, it does tabulate the results on both a regional and national level.

According to the freedom of information disclosures, Groenendaal wrote to election officials in the lead up to the national elections in November 2006, threatening to cease “cooperating” if the government did not accede to his requests.

Posted on March 23, 2007 at 6:12 AMView Comments

Cloning RFID Chips Made by HID

Remember the Cisco fiasco from BlackHat 2005? Next in the stupid box is RFID-card manufacturer HID, who has prevented Chris Paget from presenting research on how to clone those cards.

Won’t these companies ever learn? HID won’t prevent the public from learning about the vulnerability, and they will end up looking like heavy handed goons. And it’s not even secret; Paget demonstrated the attack to me and others at the RSA Conference last month.

There’s a difference between a security flaw and information about a security flaw; HID needs to fix the first and not worry about the second. Full disclosure benefits us all.

EDITED TO ADD (2/28): The ACLU is presenting instead.

Posted on February 28, 2007 at 12:00 PMView Comments

Business Models for Discovering Security Vulnerabilities

One company sells them to the vendors:

The founder of a small Moscow security company, Gleg, Legerov scrutinizes computer code in commonly used software for programming bugs, which attackers can use to break into computer systems, and sends his findings to a few dozen corporate customers around the world. Each customer pays more than $10,000 for information it can use to plug the hidden holes in its computers and stay ahead of criminal hackers.

iDefensebuys them:

This month, iDefense, a Virginia- based subsidiary of the technology company VeriSign, began offering an $8,000 bounty to the first six researchers to find holes in Vista or the newest version of Internet Explorer, and up to $4,000 more for code that take can advantage of the weaknesses. Like Gleg, iDefense, will sell information about those vulnerabilities to companies and government agencies for an undisclosed amount, though iDefense makes it a practice to alert vendors like Microsoft first.

So do criminals:

But the iDefense rewards are low compared to bounties offered on the black market. In December, the Japanese antivirus company TrendMicro found a Vista vulnerability being offered by an anonymous hacker on a Romanian Web forum for $50,000.”

There’s a lot of FUD in this article, but also some good stuff.

Posted on February 5, 2007 at 12:44 PMView Comments

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Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.