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Charles Mann made me the central focus of his article on airport security for Vanity Fair. (Mann also wrote about me in 2002 for The Atlantic.) The article was supposed to have been in the tenth-anniversary-of-9/11 issue, but got delayed.
Al Qaeda is sewing bombs into people. Actually, not really. This is an “aspirational” terrorist threat, which basically means that someone mentioned it while drunk in a bar somewhere. Of course, that won’t stop the DHS from trying to terrorize people with the idea and the security-industrial complex from selling us an expensive “solution” to reduce our fears.
Wired: “So: a disruptive, potentially expensive panic based on a wild aspirational scheme? Actually, that sounds a lot like al-Qaida. And the TSA.”
Me: “Refuse to be terrorized.”
This is a few years old, but I seem not to have blogged it before.
A great find:
In his 1956 short story, “Let’s Get Together,” Isaac Asimov describes security measures proposed to counter a terrorist threat:
“Consider further that this news will leak out as more and more people become involved in our countermeasures and more and more people begin to guess what we’re doing. Then what? The panic might do us more harm than any one TC bomb.”
The Presidential Assistant said irritably, “In Heaven’s name, man, what do you suggest we do, then?”
“Nothing,” said Lynn. “Call their bluff. Live as we have lived and gamble that They won’t dare break the stalemate for the sake of a one-bomb head start.”
“Impossible!” said Jeffreys. “Completely impossible. The welfare of all of Us is very largely in my hands, and doing nothing is the one thing I cannot do. I agree with you, perhaps, that X-ray machines at sports arenas are a kind of skin-deep measure that won’t be effective, but it has to be done so that people, in the aftermath, do not come to the bitter conclusion that we tossed our country away for the sake of a subtle line of reasoning that encouraged donothingism.”
This Jeffreys guy sounds as if he works for the TSA.
There’s a lot here that’s worth watching. He talks about expanding behavioral detection. He talks about less screening for “trusted travelers.”
So, what do the next 10 years hold for transportation security? I believe it begins with TSA’s continued movement toward developing and implementing a more risk-based security system, a phrase you may have heard the last few months. When I talk about risk-based, intelligence-driven security it’s important to note that this is not about a specific program per se, or a limited initiative being evaluated at a handful of airports.
On the contrary, risk-based security is much more comprehensive. It means moving further away from what may have seemed like a one-size-fits-all approach to security. It means focusing our agency’s resources on those we know the least about, and using intelligence in better ways to inform the screening process.
[…]
Another aspect of our risk-based, intelligence-driven security system is the trusted traveler proof-of-concept that will begin this fall. As part of this proof-of-concept, we are looking at how to expedite the screening process for travelers we know and trust the most, and travelers who are willing to voluntarily share more information with us before they travel. Doing so will then allow our officers to more effectively prioritize screening and focus our resources on those passengers we know the least about and those of course on watch lists.
[…]
We’re also working with airlines already testing a known-crewmember concept, and we are evaluating changes to the security screening process for children 12-and-under. Both of these concepts reflect the principles of risk-based security, considering that airline pilots are among our country’s most trusted travelers and the preponderance of intelligence indicates that children 12-and-under pose little risk to aviation security.
Finally, we are also evaluating the value of expanding TSA’s behavior detection program, to help our officers identify people exhibiting signs that may indicate a potential threat. This reflects an expansion of the agency’s existing SPOT program, which was developed by adapting global best practices. This effort also includes additional, specialized training for our organization’s Behavior Detection Officers and is currently being tested at Boston’s Logan International airport, where the SPOT program was first introduced.
I’ve written about this before: the human brain just isn’t suited to finding rare anomalies in a screening situation.
The Role of the Human Operator in Image-Based Airport Security Technologies
Abstract: Heightened international concerns relating to security and identity management have led to an increased interest in security applications, such as face recognition and baggage and passenger screening at airports. A common feature of many of these technologies is that a human operator is presented with an image and asked to decide whether the passenger or baggage corresponds to a person or item of interest. The human operator is a critical component in the performance of the system and it is of considerable interest to not only better understand the performance of human operators on such tasks, but to also design systems with a human operator in mind. This paper discusses a number of human factors issues which will have an impact on human operator performance in the operational environment, as well as highlighting the variables which must be considered when evaluating the performance of these technologies in scenario or operational trials based on Defence Science and Technology Organisation’s experience in such testing.
New research: Adrian J. Lee and Sheldon H. Jacobson (2011), “The Impact of Aviation Checkpoint Queues on Optimizing Security Screening Effectiveness,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 96 (August): 900–911.
Abstract: Passenger screening at aviation security checkpoints is a critical component in protecting airports and aircraft from terrorist threats. Recent developments in screening device technology have increased the ability to detect these threats; however, the average amount of time it takes to screen a passenger still remains a concern. This paper models the queueing process for a multi-level airport checkpoint security system, where multiple security classes are formed through subsets of specialized screening devices. An optimal static assignment policy is obtained which minimizes the steady-state expected amount of time a passenger spends in the securitysystem. Then, an optimal dynamic assignment policy is obtained through a transient analysis that balances the expected number of true alarms with the expected amount of time a passenger spends in the security system. Performance of a two-class system is compared to that of a selective security system containing primary and secondary levels of screening. The key contribution is that the resulting optimal assignment policies increase security and passenger throughput by efficiently and effectively utilizing available screening resources.
This is an interesting article. The authors argue that the whole war-on-terror nonsense is useless—that’s not new—but that the security establishment knows it doesn’t work and abandoned many of the draconian security measures years ago, long before Obama became president. All that’s left of the war on terror is political, as lawmakers fund unwanted projects in an effort to be tough on crime.
I wish it were true, but I don’t buy it. The war on terror is an enormous cash cow, and law enforcement is spending the money as fast as it can get it. It’s also a great stalking horse for increases in police powers, and I see no signs of agencies like the FBI or the TSA not grabbing all the power they can.
The second half of the article is better. The authors argue that openness, not secrecy, improves security:
The worst mistakes and abuses of the War on Terror were possible, in no small part, because national security is still practiced more as a craft than a science. Lacking rigorous evaluations of its practices, the national security establishment was particularly vulnerable to the panic, grandiosity, and overreach that colored policymaking in the wake of 9/11.
To avoid making those sorts of mistakes again, it is essential that we reimagine national security as an object of scientific inquiry. Over the last four centuries, virtually every other aspect of statecraft—from the economy to social policy to even domestic law enforcement—has been opened up to engagement with and evaluation by civil society. The practice of national security is long overdue for a similar transformation.
Maintaining the nation’s security of course will continue to require some degree of secrecy. But there is little reason to think that appropriate secrecy is inconsistent with a fact-based culture of robust and multiplicative inquiry. Indeed, to whatever partial extent that culture already exists within the national security establishment, it has led the move away from many of the counterproductive security measures established after 9/11.
Yet, in the ten years that Congress has been debating issues like coercive interrogation, ethnic profiling, and military tribunals, the House and Senate Intelligence committees, which have all the proper security clearances to evaluate such questions, have never established any formal process to consistently evaluate and improve the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism measures.
Establishing proper oversight and evaluation of the efficacy of our security practices will not come easily, for the security craft guards its claims to privileged knowledge jealously. But as long as the practice of security remains hidden behind a veil of classified documents and accepted wisdoms handed down from generation to generation of security agents, our national security apparatus will never become fully modern.
Here’s the report the article was based on.
This job can’t be fun:
This Public Affairs Specialist position is located in the Office of Strategic Communications and Public Affairs (SCPA), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS). If selected for this position, you will serve as the Press Secretary and senior representative/liaison working with Federal and stakeholder partners. You will utilize your expert knowledge and mastery of advanced public affairs principles, concepts, regulations, practices, analytical methods, and techniques (internet, print, TV, and radio) on a variety of transportation security and TSA related issues.
Typical assignments include:
- Conducting on-camera and/or on the record interviews about sensitive, complex and potentially crisis situations, sometimes with no advance notice.
- Serving as a senior representative and liaison from the Office of Strategic Communications and Public Affairs working with Federal and stakeholder partners.
- Providing guidance on information to be released to the public, and approaches necessary to gain public understanding and acceptance of TSA policies and programs.
- Planning and conducting events to demonstrate agency initiatives to the news media.
- Responding to breaking news situations with an in-depth understanding of agency operations; willing to be available beyond normal business hours to respond to quickly evolving transportation security incidents and issues.
The posting expires today, so you don’t have much time. If you apply for and get the job, please continue to post here under a pseudonym. And if there’s a file on how to deal with me, I’d be really interested in seeing a copy.
Any institution delegated with the task of preventing terrorism has a dilemma: they can either do their best to prevent terrorism, or they can do their best to make sure they’re not blamed for any terrorist attacks. I’ve talked about this dilemma for a while now, and it’s nice to see some research results that demonstrate its effects.
A. Peter McGraw, Alexander Todorov, and Howard Kunreuther, “A Policy Maker’s Dilemma: Preventing Terrorism or Preventing Blame,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115 (May 2011): 25-34.
Abstract: Although anti-terrorism policy should be based on a normative treatment of risk that incorporates likelihoods of attack, policy makers’ anti-terror decisions may be influenced by the blame they expect from failing to prevent attacks. We show that people’s anti-terror budget priorities before a perceived attack and blame judgments after a perceived attack are associated with the attack’s severity and how upsetting it is but largely independent of its likelihood. We also show that anti-terror budget priorities are influenced by directly highlighting the likelihood of the attack, but because of outcome biases, highlighting the attack’s prior likelihood has no influence on judgments of blame, severity, or emotion after an attack is perceived to have occurred. Thus, because of accountability effects, we propose policy makers face a dilemma: prevent terrorism using normative methods that incorporate the likelihood of attack or prevent blame by preventing terrorist attacks the public find most blameworthy.
Think about this with respect to the TSA. Are they doing their best to mitigate terrorism, or are they doing their best to ensure that if there’s a terrorist attack the public doesn’t blame the TSA for missing it?
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.