The Efficacy of Post-9/11 Counterterrorism
This is an interesting article. The authors argue that the whole war-on-terror nonsense is useless—that’s not new—but that the security establishment knows it doesn’t work and abandoned many of the draconian security measures years ago, long before Obama became president. All that’s left of the war on terror is political, as lawmakers fund unwanted projects in an effort to be tough on crime.
I wish it were true, but I don’t buy it. The war on terror is an enormous cash cow, and law enforcement is spending the money as fast as it can get it. It’s also a great stalking horse for increases in police powers, and I see no signs of agencies like the FBI or the TSA not grabbing all the power they can.
The second half of the article is better. The authors argue that openness, not secrecy, improves security:
The worst mistakes and abuses of the War on Terror were possible, in no small part, because national security is still practiced more as a craft than a science. Lacking rigorous evaluations of its practices, the national security establishment was particularly vulnerable to the panic, grandiosity, and overreach that colored policymaking in the wake of 9/11.
To avoid making those sorts of mistakes again, it is essential that we reimagine national security as an object of scientific inquiry. Over the last four centuries, virtually every other aspect of statecraft—from the economy to social policy to even domestic law enforcement—has been opened up to engagement with and evaluation by civil society. The practice of national security is long overdue for a similar transformation.
Maintaining the nation’s security of course will continue to require some degree of secrecy. But there is little reason to think that appropriate secrecy is inconsistent with a fact-based culture of robust and multiplicative inquiry. Indeed, to whatever partial extent that culture already exists within the national security establishment, it has led the move away from many of the counterproductive security measures established after 9/11.
Yet, in the ten years that Congress has been debating issues like coercive interrogation, ethnic profiling, and military tribunals, the House and Senate Intelligence committees, which have all the proper security clearances to evaluate such questions, have never established any formal process to consistently evaluate and improve the effectiveness of U.S. counterterrorism measures.
Establishing proper oversight and evaluation of the efficacy of our security practices will not come easily, for the security craft guards its claims to privileged knowledge jealously. But as long as the practice of security remains hidden behind a veil of classified documents and accepted wisdoms handed down from generation to generation of security agents, our national security apparatus will never become fully modern.
Here’s the report the article was based on.
Daniel • September 2, 2011 2:35 PM
I think identity, not openness, improves security. The fundamental issue is one of scale. There are simply too many people on the planet and we are still growing fast. You cannot have a society without order and order means the ability to control and manage and that means the ability to identify with precision. That will be something like RealID or something akin to Facebook/ Google+ as “GlobalID” which in going to forced upon humanity, most likely by DNA fingerprinting at birth. The openness that is so often lauded is really anarchy in disguise.
BTW, I don’t think that politicians are using the security cash cow to be tough on crime. The primary bugaboo in the US is not crime, it’s immigration. It’s the foreigners taking our jobs that’s the new excuse.
I see globalism as the real underlying impetus and 9/11, terrorism, immigration as just fear opportunities to condition people to embrace that direction. As much as it pains me to say it, I think in the long run the “letter soup” agencies are correct. I simply cannot imagine a future that is not dystopian so long as humanity continues to breed at such a rapid rate.