Entries Tagged "signatures"

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Detecting Forged Signatures Using Pen Pressure and Angle

Interesting:

Songhua Xu presented an interesting idea for measuring pen angle and pressure to present beautiful flower-like visual versions of a handwritten signature. You could argue that signatures are already a visual form, nicely identifiable and universal. However, with the added data about pen pressure and angle, the authors were able to create visual signatures that offer potentially greater security, assuming you can learn to read them.

A better image. The paper (abstract is free; paper is behind a paywall).

Posted on October 8, 2009 at 6:43 AMView Comments

Texas Instruments Signing Keys Broken

Texas Instruments’ calculators use RSA digital signatures to authenticate any updates to their operating system. Unfortunately, their signing keys are too short: 512-bits. Earlier this month, a collaborative effort factored the moduli and published the private keys. Texas Instruments responded by threatening websites that published the keys with the DMCA, but it’s too late.

So far, we have the operating-system signing keys for the TI-92+, TI-73, TI-89, TI-83+/TI-83+ Silver Edition, Voyage 200, TI-89 Titanium, and the TI-84+/TI-84 Silver Edition, and the date-stamp signing key for the TI-73, Explorer, TI-83 Plus, TI-83 Silver Edition, TI-84 Plus, TI-84 Silver Edition, TI-89, TI-89 Titanium, TI-92 Plus, and the Voyage 200.

Moral: Don’t assume that if your application is obscure, or if there’s no obvious financial incentive for doing so, that your cryptography won’t be broken if you use too-short keys.

Posted on September 25, 2009 at 6:17 AMView Comments

Forging SSL Certificates

We already knew that MD5 is a broken hash function. Now researchers have successfully forged MD5-signed certificates:

Molnar, Appelbaum, and Sotirov joined forces with the European MD5 research team in mid-2008, along with Swiss cryptographer Dag Arne Osvik. They realized that the co-construction technique could be used to simultaneously generate one normal SSL certificate and one forged certificate, which could be used to sign and vouch for any other. They purchased a signature for the legitimate certificate from an established company that was still using MD5 for signing, and then applied the legitimate signature to the forged certificate. Because the legitimate and forged certificates had the same MD5 value, the legitimate signature also marked the forged one as acceptable.

Lots and lots more articles, and the research.

This isn’t a big deal. The research is great; it’s good work, and I always like to see cryptanalytic attacks used to break real-world security systems. Making that jump is often much harder than cryptographers think.

But SSL doesn’t provide much in the way of security, so breaking it doesn’t harm security very much. Pretty much no one ever verifies SSL certificates, so there’s not much attack value in being able to forge them. And even more generally, the major risks to data on the Internet are at the endpoints—Trojans and rootkits on users’ computers, attacks against databases and servers, etc—and not in the network.

I’m not losing a whole lot of sleep because of these attacks. But—come on, people—no one should be using MD5 anymore.

EDITED TO ADD (12/31): While it is true that browsers do some SSL certificate verification, when they find an invalid certificate they display a warning dialog box which everyone—me included—ignores. There are simply too many valid sites out there with bad certificates for that warning to mean anything. This is far too true:

If you’re like me and every other user on the planet, you don’t give a shit when an SSL certificate doesn’t validate. Unfortunately, commons-httpclient was written by some pedantic fucknozzles who have never tried to fetch real-world webpages.

Posted on December 31, 2008 at 1:39 PMView Comments

Fax Signatures

Aren’t fax signatures the weirdest thing? It’s trivial to cut and paste—with real scissors and glue—anyone’s signature onto a document so that it’ll look real when faxed. There is so little security in fax signatures that it’s mind-boggling that anyone accepts them.

Yet people do, all the time. I’ve signed book contracts, credit card authorizations, nondisclosure agreements and all sorts of financial documents—all by fax. I even have a scanned file of my signature on my computer, so I can virtually cut and paste it into documents and fax them directly from my computer without ever having to print them out. What in the world is going on here?

And, more importantly, why are fax signatures still being used after years of experience? Why aren’t there many stories of signatures forged through the use of fax machines?

The answer comes from looking at fax signatures not as an isolated security measure, but in the context of the larger system. Fax signatures work because signed faxes exist within a broader communications context.

In a 2003 paper, “Economics, Psychology, and Sociology of Security,” Professor Andrew Odlyzko looks at fax signatures and concludes:

Although fax signatures have become widespread, their usage is restricted. They are not used for final contracts of substantial value, such as home purchases. That means that the insecurity of fax communications is not easy to exploit for large gain. Additional protection against abuse of fax insecurity is provided by the context in which faxes are used. There are records of phone calls that carry the faxes, paper trails inside enterprises and so on. Furthermore, unexpected large financial transfers trigger scrutiny. As a result, successful frauds are not easy to carry out by purely technical means.

He’s right. Thinking back, there really aren’t ways in which a criminal could use a forged document sent by fax to defraud me. I suppose an unscrupulous consulting client could forge my signature on an non-disclosure agreement and then sue me, but that hardly seems worth the effort. And if my broker received a fax document from me authorizing a money transfer to a Nigerian bank account, he would certainly call me before completing it.

Credit card signatures aren’t verified in person, either—and I can already buy things over the phone with a credit card—so there are no new risks there, and Visa knows how to monitor transactions for fraud. Lots of companies accept purchase orders via fax, even for large amounts of stuff, but there’s a physical audit trail, and the goods are shipped to a physical address—probably one the seller has shipped to before. Signatures are kind of a business lubricant: mostly, they help move things along smoothly.

Except when they don’t.

On October 30, 2004, Tristian Wilson was released from a Memphis jail on the authority of a forged fax message. It wasn’t even a particularly good forgery. It wasn’t on the standard letterhead of the West Memphis Police Department. The name of the policeman who signed the fax was misspelled. And the time stamp on the top of the fax clearly showed that it was sent from a local McDonald’s.

The success of this hack has nothing to do with the fact that it was sent over by fax. It worked because the jail had lousy verification procedures. They didn’t notice any discrepancies in the fax. They didn’t notice the phone number from which the fax was sent. They didn’t call and verify that it was official. The jail was accustomed to getting release orders via fax, and just acted on this one without thinking. Would it have been any different had the forged release form been sent by mail or courier?

Yes, fax signatures always exist in context, but sometimes they are the linchpin within that context. If you can mimic enough of the context, or if those on the receiving end become complacent, you can get away with mischief.

Arguably, this is part of the security process. Signatures themselves are poorly defined. Sometimes a document is valid even if not signed: A person with both hands in a cast can still buy a house. Sometimes a document is invalid even if signed: The signer might be drunk, or have a gun pointed at his head. Or he might be a minor. Sometimes a valid signature isn’t enough; in the United States there is an entire infrastructure of “notary publics” who officially witness signed documents. When I started filing my tax returns electronically, I had to sign a document stating that I wouldn’t be signing my income tax documents. And banks don’t even bother verifying signatures on checks less than $30,000; it’s cheaper to deal with fraud after the fact than prevent it.

Over the course of centuries, business and legal systems have slowly sorted out what types of additional controls are required around signatures, and in which circumstances.

Those same systems will be able to sort out fax signatures, too, but it’ll be slow. And that’s where there will be potential problems. Already fax is a declining technology. In a few years it’ll be largely obsolete, replaced by PDFs sent over e-mail and other forms of electronic documentation. In the past, we’ve had time to figure out how to deal with new technologies. Now, by the time we institutionalize these measures, the technologies are likely to be obsolete.

What that means is people are likely to treat fax signatures—or whatever replaces them—exactly the same way as paper signatures. And sometimes that assumption will get them into trouble.

But it won’t cause social havoc. Wilson’s story is remarkable mostly because it’s so exceptional. And even he was rearrested at his home less than a week later. Fax signatures may be new, but fake signatures have always been a possibility. Our legal and business systems need to deal with the underlying problem—false authentication—rather than focus on the technology of the moment. Systems need to defend themselves against the possibility of fake signatures, regardless of how they arrive.

This essay previously appeared on Wired.com.

EDITED TO ADD (6/3): 2005 story, “Federal Jury Convicts N.Y. Attorney of Faking Judge’s Order.”

Posted on June 3, 2008 at 7:01 AMView Comments

Dept of Homeland Security Wants DNSSEC Keys

This is a big deal:

The shortcomings of the present DNS have been known for years but difficulties in devising a system that offers backward compatability while scaling to millions of nodes on the net have slowed down the implementation of its successor, Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC). DNSSEC ensures that domain name requests are digitally signed and authenticated, a defence against forged DNS data, a product of attacks such as DNS cache poisoning used to trick surfers into visiting bogus websites that pose as the real thing.

Obtaining the master key for the DNS root zone would give US authorities the ability to track DNS Security Extensions (DNSSec) “all the way back to the servers that represent the name system’s root zone on the internet”.

Access to the “key-signing key” would give US authorities a supervisory role over DNS lookups, vital for functions ranging from email delivery to surfing the net. At a recent ICANN meeting in Lisbon, Bernard Turcotte, president of the Canadian Internet Registration Authority, said managers of country registries were concerned about the proposal to allow the US to control the master keys, giving it privileged control of internet resources, Heise reports.

Another news report.

Posted on April 9, 2007 at 9:45 AMView Comments

VBootkit Bypasses Vista's Code Signing Mechanisms

Interesting work:

Experts say that the fundamental problem that this highlights is that every stage in Vista’s booting process works on blind faith that everything prior to it ran cleanly. The boot kit is therefore able to copy itself into the memory image even before Vista has booted and capture interrupt 13, which operating systems use for read access to sectors of hard drives, among other things.

This is not theoretical; VBootkit is actual code that demonstrates this.

Posted on April 3, 2007 at 12:51 PMView Comments

Notary Fraud

Many countries have the concept of a “notary public.” Their training and authority varies from country to country; in the United States, their primary role is to witness the signature of legal documents. Many important legal documents require notarization in addition to a signature, primarily as a security device.

When I get a document notarized, I present my photo ID to a notary public. Generally, I go to my local bank, where many of the employees are notary publics and I don’t have to pay a fee for the service. I sign the document while the notary watches, and he then signs an attestation to the fact that he saw me sign it. He doesn’t read the document; that’s not his job. And then I send my notarized document to whoever needed it: another bank, the patent office, my mortgage company, whatever.

It’s an eminently hackable system. Sure, you can always present a fake ID—I’ll bet my bank employee has never seen a West Virginia driver’s license, for example—but that takes work. The easiest way to hack the system is through social engineering.

Bring a small pile of documents to be notarized. In the middle of the pile, slip in a document with someone else’s signature. Since he’s busy with his own signing and stamping—and you’re engaging him in slightly distracting conversation—he’s probably not going to notice that he’s notarizing something “someone else” signed. If he does, apologize for your honest mistake and try again elsewhere.

Of course, you’re better off visiting a notary who charges by the document: he’ll be more likely to appreciate the stack of documents you’ve brought to him and less likely to ask questions. And pick a location—not like a bank—that isn’t filled with security cameras.

Of course, this won’t be enough if the final recipient of the document checks the signature; you’re on your own when it comes to forgery. And in my state the notary has to keep a record of the document he signs; this one won’t be in his records if he’s ever asked. But if you need to switch the deed on a piece of property, change ownership of a bank account, or give yourself power of attorney over someone else, hacking the notary system makes the job a lot easier.

Anyone know how often this kind of thing happens in real life?

Posted on November 29, 2006 at 7:19 AMView Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.