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Back in November 2020, in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic, I gave a virtual talk at the International Symposium on Technology and Society: “The Story of the Internet and How it Broke Bad: A Call for Public-Interest Technologists.” It was something I was really proud of, and it’s finally up on the net.
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:
The list is maintained on this page.
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:
The list is maintained on this page.
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:
The list is maintained on this page.
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:
The list is maintained on this page.
For a limited time, I am selling signed copies of Click Here to Kill Everybody and Data and Goliath, both in paperback, for just $6 each plus shipping.
I have 500 copies of each book available. When they’re gone, the sale is over and the price will revert to normal.
Please be patient on delivery. It’s a lot of work to sign and mail hundreds of books. And the pandemic is causing mail slowdowns all over the world. I’ll send them out as quickly as I can, but I can’t guarantee any particular delivery date. Also, signed but not personalized books will arrive faster.
EDITED TO ADD (11/17): I am sold out. The sale is over.
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:
The list is maintained on this page.
Even before Apple made its announcement, law enforcement shifted their battle for backdoors to client-side scanning. The idea is that they wouldn’t touch the cryptography, but instead eavesdrop on communications and systems before encryption or after decryption. It’s not a cryptographic backdoor, but it’s still a backdoor—and brings with it all the insecurities of a backdoor.
I’m part of a group of cryptographers that has just published a paper discussing the security risks of such a system. (It’s substantially the same group that wrote a similar paper about key escrow in 1997, and other “exceptional access” proposals in 2015. We seem to have to do this every decade or so.) In our paper, we examine both the efficacy of such a system and its potential security failures, and conclude that it’s a really bad idea.
We had been working on the paper well before Apple’s announcement. And while we do talk about Apple’s system, our focus is really on the idea in general.
Ross Anderson wrote a blog post on the paper. (It’s always great when Ross writes something. It means I don’t have to.) So did Susan Landau. And there’s press coverage in the New York Times, the Guardian, Computer Weekly, the Financial Times, Forbes, El Pais (English translation), NRK (English translation), and—this is the best article of them all—the Register. See also this analysis of the law and politics of client-side scanning from last year.
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:
The list is maintained on this page.
This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:
The list is maintained on this page.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.