Entries Tagged "Schneier news"

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New Feature: 100 Latest Comments

If you look to the right, under the “Recent Entries,” you’ll see a link to the “100 Latest Comments.” This link takes you to a single page with the 100 most recent comments to this blog, in reverse chronological order.

It’s a quick and easy way to stay abreast of the various conversations going on here at Schneier on Security. I wish other blogs would do this.

Posted on May 18, 2005 at 12:36 PM • View Comments

Crypto-Gram

Seven years ago I started writing a monthly newsletter on security. Today, Crypto-Gram has over 120,000 readers, and is still growing.

If you read this blog every day, you don’t need to subscribe to Crypto-Gram. Everything in Crypto-Gram appears first in this blog. But I often update the longer essays, based on new information and reader comments, before including them in Crypto-Gram. The blog is more timely, but Crypto-Gram is more polished.

Some of you might prefer to read my writing in a monthly digest rather than in bits and pieces. Some of you might prefer an email that comes to you, rather than having to remember to check this blog. If so, try Crypto-Gram.

Crypto-Gram comes out on the 15th of every month. You can read the current issue (it came out today) here. You can read back issues here.

And if you want to subscribe to the monthly email—I promise no marketing e-mail ever—here.

Posted on May 15, 2005 at 3:01 PM • View Comments

Blowfish on "24"

Two nights ago, my encryption algorithm Blowfish was mentioned on the Fox show “24.” An alleged computer expert from the fictional anti-terror agency CTU was trying to retrieve some files from a terrorist’s laptop. This is the exchange between the agent and the terrorist’s girlfriend:

They used Blowfish algorithm.

How can you tell?

By the tab on the file headers.

Can you decrypt it?

CTU has a proprietary algorithm. It shouldn’t take that long. We’ll start by trying to hack the password. Let’s start with the basics. Write down nicknames, birthdays, pets—anything you think he might have used.

Posted on April 27, 2005 at 12:26 PM • View Comments

Regulation, Liability, and Computer Security

For a couple of years I have been arguing that liability is a way to solve the economic problems underlying our computer security problems. At the RSA conference this year, I was on a panel on that very topic.

This essay argues that regulation, not liability, is the correct way to solve the underlying economic problems, using the analogy of high-pressure steam engines in the 1800s.

Definitely worth thinking about some more.

Posted on February 25, 2005 at 8:00 AM • View Comments

TSA's Secure Flight

As I wrote previously, I am participating in a working group to study the security and privacy of Secure Flight, the U.S. government’s program to match airline passengers with a terrorist watch list. In the end, I signed the NDA allowing me access to SSI (Sensitive Security Information) documents, but managed to avoid filling out the paperwork for a SECRET security clearance.

Last week the group had its second meeting.

So far, I have four general conclusions. One, assuming that we need to implement a program of matching airline passengers with names on terrorism watch lists, Secure Flight is a major improvement—in almost every way—over what is currently in place. (And by this I mean the matching program, not any potential uses of commercial or other third-party data.)

Two, the security system surrounding Secure Flight is riddled with security holes. There are security problems with false IDs, ID verification, the ability to fly on someone else’s ticket, airline procedures, etc.

Three, the urge to use this system for other things will be irresistible. It’s just too easy to say: “As long as you’ve got this system that watches out for terrorists, how about also looking for this list of drug dealers…and by the way, we’ve got the Super Bowl to worry about too.” Once Secure Flight gets built, all it’ll take is a new law and we’ll have a nationwide security checkpoint system.

And four, a program of matching airline passengers with names on terrorism watch lists is not making us appreciably safer, and is a lousy way to spend our security dollars.

Unfortunately, Congress has mandated that Secure Flight be implemented, so it is unlikely that the program will be killed. And analyzing the effectiveness of the program in general, potential mission creep, and whether the general idea is a worthwhile one, is beyond the scope of our little group. In other words, my first conclusion is basically all that they’re interested in hearing.

But that means I can write about everything else.

To speak to my fourth conclusion: Imagine for a minute that Secure Flight is perfect. That is, we can ensure that no one can fly under a false identity, that the watch lists have perfect identity information, and that Secure Flight can perfectly determine if a passenger is on the watch list: no false positives and no false negatives. Even if we could do all that, Secure Flight wouldn’t be worth it.

Secure Flight is a passive system. It waits for the bad guys to buy an airplane ticket and try to board. If the bad guys don’t fly, it’s a waste of money. If the bad guys try to blow up shopping malls instead of airplanes, it’s a waste of money.

If I had some millions of dollars to spend on terrorism security, and I had a watch list of potential terrorists, I would spend that money investigating those people. I would try to determine whether or not they were a terrorism threat before they got to the airport, or even if they had no intention of visiting an airport. I would try to prevent their plot regardless of whether it involved airplanes. I would clear the innocent people, and I would go after the guilty. I wouldn’t build a complex computerized infrastructure and wait until one of them happened to wander into an airport. It just doesn’t make security sense.

That’s my usual metric when I think about a terrorism security measure: Would it be more effective than taking that money and funding intelligence, investigation, or emergency response—things that protect us regardless of what the terrorists are planning next. Money spent on security measures that only work against a particular terrorist tactic, forgetting that terrorists are adaptable, is largely wasted.

Posted on January 31, 2005 at 9:26 AM • View Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.