There’s some excellent research (paper, news articles) surveying public keys in the wild. Basically, the researchers found that a small fraction of them (27,000 out of 7.1 million, or 0.38%) share a common factor and are inherently weak. The researchers can break those public keys, and anyone who duplicates their research can as well.
The cause of this is almost certainly a lousy random number generator used to create those public keys in the first place. This shouldn’t come as a surprise. One of the hardest parts of cryptography is random number generation. It’s really easy to write a lousy random number generator, and it’s not at all obvious that it is lousy. Randomness is a non-functional requirement, and unless you specifically test for it — and know how to test for it — you’re going to think your cryptosystem is working just fine. (One of the reporters who called me about this story said that the researchers told him about a real-world random number generator that produced just seven different random numbers.) So it’s likely these weak keys are accidental.
It’s certainly possible, though, that some random number generators have been deliberately weakened. The obvious culprits are national intelligence services like the NSA. I have no evidence that this happened, but if I were in charge of weakening cryptosystems in the real world, the first thing I would target is random number generators. They’re easy to weaken, and it’s hard to detect that you’ve done anything. Much safer than tweaking the algorithms, which can be tested against known test vectors and alternate implementations. But again, I’m just speculating here.
What is the security risk? There’s some, but it’s hard to know how much. We can assume that the bad guys can replicate this experiment and find the weak keys. But they’re random, so it’s hard to know how to monetize this attack. Maybe the bad guys will get lucky and one of the weak keys will lead to some obvious way to steal money, or trade secrets, or national intelligence. Maybe.
And what happens now? My hope is that the researchers know which implementations of public-key systems are susceptible to these bad random numbers — they didn’t name names in the paper — and alerted them, and that those companies will fix their systems. (I recommend my own Fortuna, from Cryptography Engineering.) I hope that everyone who implements a home-grown random number generator will rip it out and put in something better. But I don’t hold out much hope. Bad random numbers have broken a lot of cryptosystems in the past, and will continue to do so in the future.
From the introduction to the paper:
In this paper we complement previous studies by concentrating on computational and randomness properties of actual public keys, issues that are usually taken for granted. Compared to the collection of certificates considered in , where shared RSA moduli are “not very frequent”, we found a much higher fraction of duplicates. More worrisome is that among the 4.7 million distinct 1024-bit RSA moduli that we had originally collected, more than 12500 have a single prime factor in common. That this happens may be crypto-folklore, but it was new to us, and it does not seem to be a disappearing trend: in our current collection of 7.1 million 1024-bit RSA moduli, almost 27000 are vulnerable and 2048-bit RSA moduli are affected as well. When exploited, it could act the expectation of security that the public key infrastructure is intended to achieve.
And the conclusion:
We checked the computational properties of millions of public keys that we collected on the web. The majority does not seem to suffer from obvious weaknesses and can be expected to provide the expected level of security. We found that on the order of 0.003% of public keys is incorrect, which does not seem to be unacceptable. We were surprised, however, by the extent to which public keys are shared among unrelated parties. For ElGamal and DSA sharing is rare, but for RSA the frequency of sharing may be a cause for concern. What surprised us most is that many thousands of 1024-bit RSA moduli, including thousands that are contained in still valid X.509 certificates, offer no security at all. This may indicate that proper seeding of random number generators is still a problematic issue….
EDITED TO ADD (3/14): The title of the paper, “Ron was wrong, Whit is right” refers to the fact that RSA is inherently less secure because it needs two large random primes. Discrete log based algorithms, like DSA and ElGamal, are less susceptible to this vulnerability because they only need one random prime.
Posted on February 16, 2012 at 6:51 AM •