Entries Tagged "national security policy"

Page 55 of 59

Last Week's Terrorism Arrests

Hours-long waits in the security line. Ridiculous prohibitions on what you can carry onboard. Last week’s foiling of a major terrorist plot and the subsequent airport security graphically illustrates the difference between effective security and security theater.

None of the airplane security measures implemented because of 9/11—no-fly lists, secondary screening, prohibitions against pocket knives and corkscrews—had anything to do with last week’s arrests. And they wouldn’t have prevented the planned attacks, had the terrorists not been arrested. A national ID card wouldn’t have made a difference, either.

Instead, the arrests are a victory for old-fashioned intelligence and investigation. Details are still secret, but police in at least two countries were watching the terrorists for a long time. They followed leads, figured out who was talking to whom, and slowly pieced together both the network and the plot.

The new airplane security measures focus on that plot, because authorities believe they have not captured everyone involved. It’s reasonable to assume that a few lone plotters, knowing their compatriots are in jail and fearing their own arrest, would try to finish the job on their own. The authorities are not being public with the details—much of the “explosive liquid” story doesn’t hang together—but the excessive security measures seem prudent.

But only temporarily. Banning box cutters since 9/11, or taking off our shoes since Richard Reid, has not made us any safer. And a long-term prohibition against liquid carry-ons won’t make us safer, either. It’s not just that there are ways around the rules, it’s that focusing on tactics is a losing proposition.

It’s easy to defend against what the terrorists planned last time, but it’s shortsighted. If we spend billions fielding liquid-analysis machines in airports and the terrorists use solid explosives, we’ve wasted our money. If they target shopping malls, we’ve wasted our money. Focusing on tactics simply forces the terrorists to make a minor modification in their plans. There are too many targets—stadiums, schools, theaters, churches, the long line of densely packed people before airport security—and too many ways to kill people.

Security measures that require us to guess correctly don’t work, because invariably we will guess wrong. It’s not security, it’s security theater: measures designed to make us feel safer but not actually safer.

Airport security is the last line of defense, and not a very good one at that. Sure, it’ll catch the sloppy and the stupid—and that’s a good enough reason not to do away with it entirely—but it won’t catch a well-planned plot. We can’t keep weapons out of prisons; we can’t possibly keep them off airplanes.

The goal of a terrorist is to cause terror. Last week’s arrests demonstrate how real security doesn’t focus on possible terrorist tactics, but on the terrorists themselves. It’s a victory for intelligence and investigation, and a dramatic demonstration of how investments in these areas pay off.

And if you want to know what you can do to help? Don’t be terrorized. They terrorize more of us if they kill some of us, but the dead are beside the point. If we give in to fear, the terrorists achieve their goal even if they were arrested. If we refuse to be terrorized, then they lose—even if their attacks succeed.

This op ed appeared today in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune.

EDITED TO ADD (8/13): The Department of Homeland Security declares an entire state of matter a security risk. And here’s a good commentary on being scared.

Posted on August 13, 2006 at 8:15 AMView Comments

Broadening CALEA

In 1994, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA). Basically, this is the law that forces the phone companies to make your telephone calls—including cell phone calls—available for government wiretapping.

But now the government wants access to VoIP calls, and SMS messages, and everything else. They’re doing their best to interpret CALEA as broadly as possible, but they’re also pursuing a legal angle. Ars Technica has the story:

The government hopes to shore up the legal basis for the program by passing amended legislation. The EFF took a look at the amendments and didn’t like what it found.

According to the Administration, the proposal would “confirm [CALEA’s] coverage of push-to-talk, short message service, voice mail service and other communications services offered on a commercial basis to the public,” along with “confirm[ing] CALEA’s application to providers of broadband Internet access, and certain types of ‘Voice-Over-Internet-Protocol’ (VOIP).” Many of CALEA’s express exceptions and limitations are also removed. Most importantly, while CALEA’s applicability currently depends on whether broadband and VOIP can be considered “substantial replacements” for existing telephone services, the new proposal would remove this limit.

Posted on July 28, 2006 at 11:09 AMView Comments

Wiretappers' Conference

I can’t believe I forgot to blog this great article about the communications intercept trade show in DC earlier this month:

“You really need to educate yourself,” he insisted. “Do you think this stuff doesn’t happen in the West? Let me tell you something. I sell this equipment all over the world, especially in the Middle East. I deal with buyers from Qatar, and I get more concern about proper legal procedure from them than I get in the USA.”

Read the whole thing.

Posted on June 29, 2006 at 1:43 PMView Comments

Applying CALEA to VoIP

Security Implications of Applying the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act to Voice over IP,” paper by Steve Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Ernie Brickell, Clint Brooks, Vint Cerf, Whit Diffie, Susan Landau, Jon Peterson, and John Treichler.

Executive Summary

For many people, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) looks like a nimble way of using a computer to make phone calls. Download the software, pick an identifier and then wherever there is an Internet connection, you can make a phone call. From this perspective, it makes perfect sense that anything that can be done with a telephone, including the graceful accommodation of wiretapping, should be able to be done readily with VoIP as well.

The FCC has issued an order for all “interconnected” and all broadband access VoIP services to comply with Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)—without specific regulations on what compliance would mean. The FBI has suggested that CALEA should apply to all forms of VoIP, regardless of the technology involved in the VoIP implementation.

Intercept against a VoIP call made from a fixed location with a fixed IP address directly to a big internet provider’s access router is equivalent to wiretapping a normal phone call, and classical PSTN-style CALEA concepts can be applied directly. In fact, these intercept capabilities can be exactly the same in the VoIP case if the ISP properly secures its infrastructure and wiretap control process as the PSTN’s central offices are assumed to do.

However, the network architectures of the Internet and the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) are substantially different, and these differences lead to security risks in applying the CALEA to VoIP. VoIP, like most Internet communications, are communications for a mobile environment. The feasibility of applying CALEA to more decentralized VoIP services is quite problematic. Neither the manageability of such a wiretapping regime nor whether it can be made secure against subversion seem clear. The real danger is that a CALEA-type regimen is likely to introduce serious vulnerabilities through its “architected security breach.”

Potential problems include the difficulty of determining where the traffic is coming from (the VoIP provider enables the connection but may not provide the services for the actual conversation), the difficulty of ensuring safe transport of the signals to the law-enforcement facility, the risk of introducing new vulnerabilities into Internet communications, and the difficulty of ensuring proper minimization. VOIP implementations vary substantially across the Internet making it impossible to implement CALEA uniformly. Mobility and the ease of creating new identities on the Internet exacerbate the problem.

Building a comprehensive VoIP intercept capability into the Internet appears to require the cooperation of a very large portion of the routing infrastructure, and the fact that packets are carrying voice is largely irrelevant. Indeed, most of the provisions of the wiretap law do not distinguish among different types of electronic communications. Currently the FBI is focused on applying CALEA’s design mandates to VoIP, but there is nothing in wiretapping law that would argue against the extension of intercept design mandates to all types of Internet communications. Indeed, the changes necessary to meet CALEA requirements for VoIP would likely have to be implemented in a way that covered all forms of Internet communication.

In order to extend authorized interception much beyond the easy scenario, it is necessary either to eliminate the flexibility that Internet communications allow, or else introduce serious security risks to domestic VoIP implementations. The former would have significant negative effects on U.S. ability to innovate, while the latter is simply dangerous. The current FBI and FCC direction on CALEA applied to VoIP carries great risks.

Posted on June 28, 2006 at 12:01 PMView Comments

U.S. Government Sensitive but Unclassified Information

New report from the GAO: “GAO-06-385 – The Federal Government Needs to Establish Policies and Processes for Sharing Terrorism-Related and Sensitive but Unclassified Information,” March 2006:

Federal agencies report using 56 different sensitive but unclassified designations (16 of which belong to one agency) to protect sensitive information—from law or drug enforcement information to controlled nuclear information—and agencies that account for a large percentage of the homeland security budget reported using most of these designations. There are no governmentwide policies or procedures that describe the basis on which agencies should use most of these sensitive but unclassified designations, explain what the different designations mean across agencies, or ensure that they will be used consistently from one agency to another. In this absence, each agency determines what designations to apply to the sensitive but unclassified information it develops or shares. For example, one agency uses the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information designation, which has statutorily prescribed criteria for applying, sharing and protecting the information, whereas 13 agencies designate information For Official Use Only, which does not have similarly prescribed criteria. Sometimes agencies used different labels and handling requirements for similar information and, conversely, similar labels and requirements for very different kinds of information. More than half of the agencies reported encountering challenges in sharing such information. For example, DHS said that sensitive but unclassified information disseminated to its state and local partners had, on occasion, been posted to public Internet sites or otherwise compromised, potentially revealing possible vulnerabilities to business competitors.

Here’s the list:

Table 2: Sensitive but Unclassified Designations in Use at Selected Federal Agencies

Designation Agencies using designation

1 Applied Technology *Department of Energy (DOE)
2 Attorney-Client Privilege Department of Commerce (Commerce), *DOE
3 Business Confidential *DOE
4 Budgetary Information Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
5 Census Confidential Commerce
6 Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act Information (CIPSEA) Social Security Administration (SSA)
7 Computer Security Act Sensitive Information (CSASI) Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
8 Confidential Department of Labor
9 Confidential Business Information (CBI) Commerce, EPA
10 Contractor Access Restricted Information (CARI) HHS
11 Copyrighted Information *DOE
12 Critical Energy Infrastructure Information (CEII) Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
13 Critical Infrastructure Information Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
14 DEA Sensitive Department of Justice (DOJ)
15 DOD Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information Department of Defense (DOD)
16 Draft EPA
17 Export Controlled Information *DOE
18 For Official Use Only (FOUO) Commerce, DOD, Department of Education, EPA, General Services Administration, HHS, DHS, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), DOJ, Labor, OPM, SSA, and the Department of Transportation (DOT)
19 For Official Use Only‹Law Enforcement Sensitive DOD
20 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) EPA
21 Government Confidential Commercial Information *DOE
22 High-Temperature Superconductivity Pilot Center Information *DOE
23 In Confidence *DOE
24 Intellectual Property *DOE
25 Law Enforcement Sensitive Commerce, EPA, DHS, DOJ, HHS, Labor, OPM
26 Law Enforcement Sensitive/Sensitive DOJ
27 Limited Distribution Information DOD
28 Limited Official Use (LOU) DHS, DOJ, Department of Treasury
29 Medical records EPA
30 Non-Public Information FERC
31 Not Available National Technical Information Service Commerce
32 Official Use Only (OUO) DOE, SSA, Treasury
33 Operations Security Protected Information (OSPI) HHS
34 Patent Sensitive Information *DOE
35 Predecisional Draft *DOE
36 Privacy Act Information *DOE, EPA
37 Privacy Act Protected Information (PAPI) HHS
38 Proprietary Information *DOE, DOJ
39 Protected Battery Information *DOE
40 Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) DHS
41 Safeguards Information Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
42 Select Agent Sensitive Information (SASI) HHS
43 Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) Commerce, HHS, NASA, National Science Foundation (NSF), Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
44 Sensitive Drinking Water Related Information (SDWRI) EPA
45 Sensitive Information DOD, U.S. Postal Service (USPS)
46 Sensitive Instruction SSA
47 Sensitive Internal Use *DOE
48 Sensitive Unclassified Non-Safeguards Information NRC
49 Sensitive Nuclear Technology *DOE
50 Sensitive Security Information (SSI) DHS, DOT, U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)
51 Sensitive Water Vulnerability Assessment Information EPA
52 Small Business Innovative Research Information *DOE
53 Technical Information DOD
54 Trade Sensitive Information Commerce
55 Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) DOE
56 Unclassified National Security-Related *DOE

I’ve already written about SSI (Sensitive Security Information).

Posted on May 19, 2006 at 7:52 AMView Comments

"The TSA's Constitution-Free Zone"

Interesting first-person account of someone on the U.S. Terrorist Watch List:

To sum up, if you run afoul of the nation’s “national security” apparatus, you’re completely on your own. There are no firm rules, no case law, no real appeals processes, no normal array of Constitutional rights, no lawyers to help, and generally none of the other things that we as American citizens expect to be able to fall back on when we’ve been (justly or unjustly) identified by the government as wrong-doers.

Posted on May 12, 2006 at 1:38 PMView Comments

1 53 54 55 56 57 59

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.