Entries Tagged "malware"

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Stealing Imaginary Things

There’s a new Trojan that tries to steal World of Warcraft passwords.

That reminded me about this article, about people paying programmers to find exploits to make virtual money in multiplayer online games, and then selling the proceeds for real money.

And here’s a page about ways people steal fake money in the online game Neopets, including cookie grabbers, fake login pages, fake contests, social engineering, and pyramid schemes.

I regularly say that every form of theft and fraud in the real world will eventually be duplicated in cyberspace. Perhaps every method of stealing real money will eventually be used to steal imaginary money, too.

Posted on August 10, 2005 at 7:36 AMView Comments

More Lynn/Cisco Information

There’s some new information on last week’s Lynn/Cisco/ISS story: Mike Lynn gave an interesting interview to Wired. Here’s some news about the FBI’s investigation. And here’s a video of Cisco/ISS ripping pages out of the BlackHat conference proceedings.

Someone is setting up a legal defense fund for Lynn. Send donations via PayPal to Abaddon@IO.com. (Does anyone know the URL?) According to BoingBoing, donations not used to defend Lynn will be donated to the EFF.

Copies of Lynn’s talk have popped up on the Internet, but some have been removed due to legal cease-and-desist letters from ISS attorneys, like this one. Currently, Lynn’s slides are here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here. (The list is from BoingBoing.) Note that the presentation above is not the same as the one Lynn gave at BlackHat. The presentation at BlackHat didn’t have the ISS logo at the bottom, as the one on the Internet does. Also, the critical code components were blacked out. (Photographs of Lynn’s actual presentation slides were available here, but have been removed due to legal threats from ISS.)

There have been a bunch of commentary and analyses on the whole story. Business Week completely missed the point. Larry Seltzer at eWeek is more balanced.

Hackers are working overtime to reconstruct Lynn’s attack and write an exploit. This, of course, means that we’re in much more danger of there being a worm that makes use of this vulnerability.

The sad thing is that we could have avoided this. If Cisco and ISS had simply let Lynn present his work, it would have been just another obscure presentation amongst the sea of obscure presentations that is BlackHat. By attempting to muzzle Lynn, the two companies ensured that 1) the vulnerability was the biggest story of the conference, and 2) some group of hackers would turn the vulnerability into exploit code just to get back at them.

EDITED TO ADD: Jennifer Granick is Lynn’s attorney, and she has blogged about what happened at BlackHat and DefCon. And photographs of the slides Lynn actually used for his talk are here (for now, at least). Is it just me, or does it seem like ISS is pursuing this out of malice? With Cisco I think it was simple stupidity, but I think it’s malice with ISS.

EDITED TO ADD: I don’t agree with Irs Winkler’s comments, either.

EDITED TO ADD: ISS defends itself.

EDITED TO ADD: More commentary.

EDITED TO ADD: Nice rebuttal to Winkler’s essay.

Posted on August 3, 2005 at 1:31 PMView Comments

Diebold Opti-Scan Voting Machine

An analysis of Diebold’s Opti-Scan (paper ballot) voting machine.

Computer expert Harri Hursti gained control over Leon County memory cards, which handle the vote-reporting from the precincts. Dr. Herbert Thompson, a security expert, took control of the Leon County central tabulator by implanting a trojan horse-like script.

Two programmers can become a lone programmer, says Hursti, who has figured out a way to control the entire central tabulator by way of a single memory card swap, and also how to make tampered polling place tapes match tampered central tabulator results. This more complex approach is untested, but based on testing performed May 26, Hursti says he has absolutely no reason to believe it wouldn’t work.

Three memory card tests demonstrated successful manipulation of election results, and showed that 1990 and 2002 FEC-required safeguards are being violated in the Diebold version 1.94 opti-scan system.

Posted on June 30, 2005 at 7:57 AMView Comments

Underhanded C Contest

As far as I know, this is the only security-related programming contest: the Underhanded C Contest. The object is to write clear, readable C code with hidden malicious behavior; in other words, to hide evil stuff in code that passes visual inspection of source by other programmers.

This year’s challenge: covert fingerprinting.

Posted on June 21, 2005 at 12:34 PMView Comments

Attack Trends: 2004 and 2005

Counterpane Internet Security, Inc., monitors more than 450 networks in 35 countries, in every time zone. In 2004 we saw 523 billion network events, and our analysts investigated 648,000 security “tickets.” What follows is an overview of what’s happening on the Internet right now, and what we expect to happen in the coming months.

In 2004, 41 percent of the attacks we saw were unauthorized activity of some kind, 21 percent were scanning, 26 percent were unauthorized access, 9 percent were DoS (denial of service), and 3 percent were misuse of applications.

Over the past few months, the two attack vectors that we saw in volume were against the Windows DCOM (Distributed Component Object Model) interface of the RPC (remote procedure call) service and against the Windows LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service). These seem to be the current favorites for virus and worm writers, and we expect this trend to continue.

The virus trend doesn’t look good. In the last six months of 2004, we saw a plethora of attacks based on browser vulnerabilities (such as GDI-JPEG image vulnerability and IFRAME) and an increase in sophisticated worm and virus attacks. More than 1,000 new worms and viruses were discovered in the last six months alone.

In 2005, we expect to see ever-more-complex worms and viruses in the wild, incorporating complex behavior: polymorphic worms, metamorphic worms, and worms that make use of entry-point obscuration. For example, SpyBot.KEG is a sophisticated vulnerability assessment worm that reports discovered vulnerabilities back to the author via IRC channels.

We expect to see more blended threats: exploit code that combines malicious code with vulnerabilities in order to launch an attack. We expect Microsoft’s IIS (Internet Information Services) Web server to continue to be an attractive target. As more and more companies migrate to Windows 2003 and IIS 6, however, we expect attacks against IIS to decrease.

We also expect to see peer-to-peer networking as a vector to launch viruses.

Targeted worms are another trend we’re starting to see. Recently there have been worms that use third-party information-gathering techniques, such as Google, for advanced reconnaissance. This leads to a more intelligent propagation methodology; instead of propagating scattershot, these worms are focusing on specific targets. By identifying targets through third-party information gathering, the worms reduce the noise they would normally make when randomly selecting targets, thus increasing the window of opportunity between release and first detection.

Another 2004 trend that we expect to continue in 2005 is crime. Hacking has moved from a hobbyist pursuit with a goal of notoriety to a criminal pursuit with a goal of money. Hackers can sell unknown vulnerabilities—”zero-day exploits”—on the black market to criminals who use them to break into computers. Hackers with networks of hacked machines can make money by selling them to spammers or phishers. They can use them to attack networks. We have started seeing criminal extortion over the Internet: hackers with networks of hacked machines threatening to launch DoS attacks against companies. Most of these attacks are against fringe industries—online gambling, online computer gaming, online pornography—and against offshore networks. The more these extortions are successful, the more emboldened the criminals will become.

We expect to see more attacks against financial institutions, as criminals look for new ways to commit fraud. We also expect to see more insider attacks with a criminal profit motive. Already most of the targeted attacks—as opposed to attacks of opportunity—originate from inside the attacked organization’s network.

We also expect to see more politically motivated hacking, whether against countries, companies in “political” industries (petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, etc.), or political organizations. Although we don’t expect to see terrorism occur over the Internet, we do expect to see more nuisance attacks by hackers who have political motivations.

The Internet is still a dangerous place, but we don’t foresee people or companies abandoning it. The economic and social reasons for using the Internet are still far too compelling.

This essay originally appeared in the June 2005 issue of Queue.

Posted on June 6, 2005 at 1:02 PMView Comments

Major Israeli Computer Espionage Case

This is a fascinating story of computer espionage.

Dozens of leading companies and top private investigators were named yesterday as suspects in a massive industrial espionage investigation that local police have been conducting for the past six months.

The companies suspected of commissioning the espionage, which was carried out by planting Trojan horse software in their competitors’ computers, include the satellite television company Yes, which is suspected of spying on cable television company HOT; cell-phone companies Pelephone and Cellcom, suspected of spying on their mutual rival Partner; and Mayer, which imports Volvos and Hondas to Israel and is suspected of spying on Champion Motors, importer of Audis and Volkswagens. Spy programs were also located in the computers of major companies such as Strauss-Elite, Shekem Electric and the business daily Globes.

Read the whole story; it’s filled with interesting details. To me, the most interesting is that even though the Trojan was installed on computers at dozens of Israel’s top companies, it was discovered only because the Trojan writer also used it to spy after his ex-in-laws.

There’s a lesson here for all computer criminals.

Edited to add: Much more information here.

Posted on May 31, 2005 at 7:17 AMView Comments

Holding Computer Files Hostage

This one has been predicted for years. Someone breaks into your network, encrypts your data files, and then demands a ransom to hand over the key.

I don’t know how the attackers did it, but below is probably the best way. A worm could be programmed to do it.

1. Break into a computer.

2. Generate a random 256-bit file-encryption key.

3. Encrypt the file-encryption key with a common RSA public key.

4. Encrypt data files with the file-encryption key.

5. Wipe data files and file-encryption key.

6. Wipe all free space on the drive.

7. Output a file containing the RSA-encrypted, file encryption key.

8. Demand ransom.

9. Receive ransom.

10. Receive encrypted file-encryption key.

11. Decrypt it and send it back.

In any situation like this, step 9 is the hardest. It’s where you’re most likely to get caught. I don’t know much about anonymous money transfer, but I don’t think Swiss bank accounts have the anonymity they used to.

You also might have to prove that you can decrypt the data, so an easy modification is to encrypt a piece of the data with another file-encryption key so you can prove to the victim that you have the RSA private key.

Internet attacks have changed over the last couple of years. They’re no longer about hackers. They’re about criminals. And we should expect to see more of this sort of thing in the future.

Posted on May 30, 2005 at 8:18 AMView Comments

Fearmongering About Bot Networks

Bot networks are a serious security problem, but this is ridiculous. From the Independent:

The PC in your home could be part of a complex international terrorist network. Without you realising it, your computer could be helping to launder millions of pounds, attacking companies’ websites or cracking confidential government codes.

This is not the stuff of science fiction or a conspiracy theory from a paranoid mind, but a warning from one of the world’s most-respected experts on computer crime. Dr Peter Tippett is chief technology officer at Cybertrust, a US computer security company, and a senior adviser on the issue to President George Bush. His warning is stark: criminals and terrorists are hijacking home PCs over the internet, creating “bot” computers to carry out illegal activities.

Yes, bot networks are bad. They’re used to send spam (both commercial and phishing), launch denial-of-service attacks (sometimes involving extortion), and stage attacks on other systems. Most bot networks are controlled by kids, but more and more criminals are getting into the act.

But your computer a part of an international terrorist network? Get real.

Once a criminal has gathered together what is known as a “herd” of bots, the combined computing power can be dangerous. “If you want to break the nuclear launch code then set a million computers to work on it. There is now a danger of nation state attacks,” says Dr Tippett. “The vast majority of terrorist organisations will use bots.”

I keep reading that last sentence, and wonder if “bots” is just a typo for “bombs.” And the line about bot networks being used to crack nuclear launch codes is nothing more than fearmongering.

Clearly I need to write an essay on bot networks.

Posted on May 17, 2005 at 3:33 PMView Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.