Entries Tagged "locks"

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Vulnerabilities in Brink's Smart Safe

Brink’s sells an Internet-enabled smart safe called the CompuSafe Galileo. Despite being sold as a more secure safe, it’s wildly insecure:

Vulnerabilities found in CompuSafe Galileo safes, smart safes made by the ever-reliable Brinks company that are used by retailers, restaurants, and convenience stores, would allow a rogue employee or anyone else with physical access to them to command their doors to open and relinquish their cash….

The hack has the makings of the perfect crime, because a thief could also erase any evidence that the theft occurred simply by altering data in a back-end database where the smartsafe logs how much money is inside and who accessed it.

Nothing about these vulnerabilities is a surprise to anyone who works in computer security:

But the safes have an external USB port on the side of the touchscreens that allows service technicians to troubleshoot and obtain a backup of the database. This, unfortunately, creates an easy entrypoint for thieves to take complete, administrative control of the devices.

“Once you’re able to plug into that USB port, you’re able to access lots of things that you shouldn’t normally be able to access,” Petro told WIRED. “There is a full operating system…that you’re able to…fully take over…and make [the safe] do whatever you want it to do.”

The researchers created a malicious script that, once inserted into a safe on a USB stick, lets a thief automatically open the safe doors by emulating certain mouse and keyboard actions and bypassing standard application controls. “You plug in this little gizmo, wait about 60 seconds, and the door just pops open,” says Petro.

If it sounds like the people who designed this e-safe ignored all of the things we’ve learned about computer security in the last few decades, you’re right. And that’s the problem with Internet-of-Things security: it’s often designed by people who don’t know computer or Internet security.

They also haven’t learned the lessons of full disclosure or rapid patching:

They notified Brinks about the vulnerabilities more than a year ago, but say the company appears to have done nothing to resolve the issues. Although Brinks could disable driver software associated with the USB port to prevent someone from controlling the safes in this way, or lock down the system and database so it’s not running in administrative mode and the database can’t be changed, but so far the company appears to have done none of these.


Again, this all sounds familiar. The computer industry learned its lessons over a decade ago. Before then they ignored security vulnerabilities, threatened researchers, and generally behaved very badly. I expect the same things to happen with Internet-of-Things companies.

Posted on August 3, 2015 at 1:27 PMView Comments

Easily Cracking a Master Combination Lock


Kamkar told Ars his Master Lock exploit started with a well-known vulnerability that allows Master Lock combinations to be cracked in 100 or fewer tries. He then physically broke open a combination lock and noticed the resistance he observed was caused by two lock parts that touched in a way that revealed important clues about the combination. (He likened the Master Lock design to a side channel in cryptographic devices that can be exploited to obtain the secret key.) Kamkar then made a third observation that was instrumental to his Master Lock exploit: the first and third digit of the combination, when divided by four, always return the same remainder. By combining the insights from all three weaknesses he devised the attack laid out in the video.

Posted on May 5, 2015 at 6:59 AMView Comments

1971 Social Engineering Attack

From Betty Medsger’s book on the 1971 FBI burglary (page 22):

As burglars, they used some unusual techniques, ones Davidon enjoyed recalling years later, such as what some of them did in 1970 at a draft board office in Delaware. During their casing, they had noticed that the interior door that opened to the draft board office was always locked. There was no padlock to replace, as they had done at a draft board raid in Philadelphia a few months earlier, and no one in the group was able to pick the lock. The break-in technique they settled on at that office must be unique in the annals of burglary. Several hours before the burglary was to take place, one of them wrote a note and tacked it to the door they wanted to enter: “Please don’t lock this door tonight.” Sure enough, when the burglars arrived that night, someone had obediently left the door unlocked. The burglars entered the office with ease, stole the Selective Service records, and left. They were so pleased with themselves that one of them proposed leaving a thank-you note on the door. More cautious minds prevailed. Miss Manners be damned, they did not leave a note.

Posted on February 5, 2014 at 6:02 AMView Comments

Scientists Banned from Revealing Details of Car-Security Hack

The UK has banned researchers from revealing details of security vulnerabilities in car locks. In 2008, Phillips brought a similar suit against researchers who broke the Mifare chip. That time, they lost. This time, Volkswagen sued and won.

This is bad news for security researchers. (Remember back in 2001 when security researcher Ed Felten sued the RIAA in the US to be able to publish his research results?) We’re not going to improve security unless we’re allowed to publish our results. And we can’t start suppressing scientific results, just because a big corporation doesn’t like what it does to their reputation.

EDITED TO ADD (8/14): Here’s the ruling.

Posted on August 1, 2013 at 6:37 AMView Comments

Bluetooth-Controlled Door Lock

Here is a new lock that you can control via Bluetooth and an iPhone app.

That’s pretty cool, and I can imagine all sorts of reasons to get one of those. But I’m sure there are all sorts of unforeseen security vulnerabilities in this system. And even worse, a single vulnerability can affect all the locks. Remember that vulnerability found last year in hotel electronic locks?

Anyone care to guess how long before some researcher finds a way to hack this one? And how well the maker anticipated the need to update the firmware to fix the vulnerability once someone finds it?

I’m not saying that you shouldn’t use this lock, only that you understand that new technology brings new security risks, and electronic technology brings new kinds of security risks. Security is a trade-off, and the trade-off is particularly stark in this case.

Posted on May 16, 2013 at 8:45 AMView Comments

Shared Lock

A reader sent me this photo of a shared lock. It’s at the gate of a large ranch outside of Victoria, Texas. Multiple padlocks secure the device, but when a single padlock is removed, the center pin can be fully lifted and the gate can be opened. The point is to allow multiple entities (oil and gas, hunting parties, ranch supervisors, etc.) access without the issues of key distribution that would arise if it were just a single lock. On the other hand, the gate is only as secure as the weakest padlock.

EDITED TO ADD (9/14): A less elegant way to do the same thing.
A slightly different implementation of same idea: removal of any one lock allows locking bar to retract from pole and gate to open. And an interesting comment from someone who deals with this in his work.

Posted on August 29, 2012 at 6:37 AMView Comments

Unsafe Safes

In a long article about insecurities in gun safes, there’s this great paragraph:

Unfortunately, manufacturers and consumers are deceived and misled into a false sense of security by electronic credentials, codes, and biometrics. We have seen this often, even with high security locks. Our rule: electrons do not open doors; mechanical components do. If you can compromise the mechanisms then all the credentials, encryption, fingerprint readers, and other gizmos and gimmicks mean nothing.

In other words, security is only as strong as the weakest link.

EDITED TO ADD (8/13): DefCon 19 talk on the security of gun safes.

Posted on August 3, 2012 at 12:57 PMView Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.