Entries Tagged "democracy"

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How Cybersecurity Fears Affect Confidence in Voting Systems

American democracy runs on trust, and that trust is cracking.

Nearly half of Americans, both Democrats and Republicans, question whether elections are conducted fairly. Some voters accept election results only when their side wins. The problem isn’t just political polarization—it’s a creeping erosion of trust in the machinery of democracy itself.

Commentators blame ideological tribalism, misinformation campaigns and partisan echo chambers for this crisis of trust. But these explanations miss a critical piece of the puzzle: a growing unease with the digital infrastructure that now underpins nearly every aspect of how Americans vote.

The digital transformation of American elections has been swift and sweeping. Just two decades ago, most people voted using mechanical levers or punch cards. Today, over 95% of ballots are counted electronically. Digital systems have replaced poll books, taken over voter identity verification processes and are integrated into registration, counting, auditing and voting systems.

This technological leap has made voting more accessible and efficient, and sometimes more secure. But these new systems are also more complex. And that complexity plays into the hands of those looking to undermine democracy.

In recent years, authoritarian regimes have refined a chillingly effective strategy to chip away at Americans’ faith in democracy by relentlessly sowing doubt about the tools U.S. states use to conduct elections. It’s a sustained campaign to fracture civic faith and make Americans believe that democracy is rigged, especially when their side loses.

This is not cyberwar in the traditional sense. There’s no evidence that anyone has managed to break into voting machines and alter votes. But cyberattacks on election systems don’t need to succeed to have an effect. Even a single failed intrusion, magnified by sensational headlines and political echo chambers, is enough to shake public trust. By feeding into existing anxiety about the complexity and opacity of digital systems, adversaries create fertile ground for disinformation and conspiracy theories.

Testing cyber fears

To test this dynamic, we launched a study to uncover precisely how cyberattacks corroded trust in the vote during the 2024 U.S. presidential race. We surveyed more than 3,000 voters before and after election day, testing them using a series of fictional but highly realistic breaking news reports depicting cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. We randomly assigned participants to watch different types of news reports: some depicting cyberattacks on election systems, others on unrelated infrastructure such as the power grid, and a third, neutral control group.

The results, which are under peer review, were both striking and sobering. Mere exposure to reports of cyberattacks undermined trust in the electoral process—regardless of partisanship. Voters who supported the losing candidate experienced the greatest drop in trust, with two-thirds of Democratic voters showing heightened skepticism toward the election results.

But winners too showed diminished confidence. Even though most Republican voters, buoyed by their victory, accepted the overall security of the election, the majority of those who viewed news reports about cyberattacks remained suspicious.

The attacks didn’t even have to be related to the election. Even cyberattacks against critical infrastructure such as utilities had spillover effects. Voters seemed to extrapolate: “If the power grid can be hacked, why should I believe that voting machines are secure?”

Strikingly, voters who used digital machines to cast their ballots were the most rattled. For this group of people, belief in the accuracy of the vote count fell by nearly twice as much as that of voters who cast their ballots by mail and who didn’t use any technology. Their firsthand experience with the sorts of systems being portrayed as vulnerable personalized the threat.

It’s not hard to see why. When you’ve just used a touchscreen to vote, and then you see a news report about a digital system being breached, the leap in logic isn’t far.

Our data suggests that in a digital society, perceptions of trust—and distrust—are fluid, contagious and easily activated. The cyber domain isn’t just about networks and code. It’s also about emotions: fear, vulnerability and uncertainty.

Firewall of trust

Does this mean we should scrap electronic voting machines? Not necessarily.

Every election system, digital or analog, has flaws. And in many respects, today’s high-tech systems have solved the problems of the past with voter-verifiable paper ballots. Modern voting machines reduce human error, increase accessibility and speed up the vote count. No one misses the hanging chads of 2000.

But technology, no matter how advanced, cannot instill legitimacy on its own. It must be paired with something harder to code: public trust. In an environment where foreign adversaries amplify every flaw, cyberattacks can trigger spirals of suspicion. It is no longer enough for elections to be secure – voters must also perceive them to be secure.

That’s why public education surrounding elections is now as vital to election security as firewalls and encrypted networks. It’s vital that voters understand how elections are run, how they’re protected and how failures are caught and corrected. Election officials, civil society groups and researchers can teach how audits work, host open-source verification demonstrations and ensure that high-tech electoral processes are comprehensible to voters.

We believe this is an essential investment in democratic resilience. But it needs to be proactive, not reactive. By the time the doubt takes hold, it’s already too late.

Just as crucially, we are convinced that it’s time to rethink the very nature of cyber threats. People often imagine them in military terms. But that framework misses the true power of these threats. The danger of cyberattacks is not only that they can destroy infrastructure or steal classified secrets, but that they chip away at societal cohesion, sow anxiety and fray citizens’ confidence in democratic institutions. These attacks erode the very idea of truth itself by making people doubt that anything can be trusted.

If trust is the target, then we believe that elected officials should start to treat trust as a national asset: something to be built, renewed and defended. Because in the end, elections aren’t just about votes being counted—they’re about people believing that those votes count.

And in that belief lies the true firewall of democracy.

This essay was written with Ryan Shandler and Anthony J. DeMattee, and originally appeared in The Conversation.

Posted on June 30, 2025 at 7:05 AM • View Comments

The Voter Experience

Technology and innovation have transformed every part of society, including our electoral experiences. Campaigns are spending and doing more than at any other time in history. Ever-growing war chests fuel billions of voter contacts every cycle. Campaigns now have better ways of scaling outreach methods and offer volunteers and donors more efficient ways to contribute time and money. Campaign staff have adapted to vast changes in media and social media landscapes, and use data analytics to forecast voter turnout and behavior.

Yet despite these unprecedented investments in mobilizing voters, overall trust in electoral health, democratic institutions, voter satisfaction, and electoral engagement has significantly declined. What might we be missing?

In software development, the concept of user experience (UX) is fundamental to the design of any product or service. It’s a way to think holistically about how a user interacts with technology. It ensures that products and services are built with the users’ actual needs, behaviors, and expectations in mind, as opposed to what developers think users want. UX enables informed decisions based on how the user will interact with the system, leading to improved design, more effective solutions, and increased user satisfaction. Good UX design results in easy, relevant, useful, positive experiences. Bad UX design leads to unhappy users.

This is not how we normally think of elections. Campaigns measure success through short-term outputs—voter contacts, fundraising totals, issue polls, ad impressions—and, ultimately, election results. Rarely do they evaluate how individuals experience this as a singular, messy, democratic process. Each campaign, PAC, nonprofit, and volunteer group may be focused on their own goal, but the voter experiences it all at once. By the time they’re in line to vote, they’ve been hit with a flood of outreach—spammy texts from unfamiliar candidates, organizers with no local ties, clunky voter registration sites, conflicting information, and confusing messages, even from campaigns they support. Political teams can point to data that justifies this barrage, but the effectiveness of voter contact has been steadily declining since 2008. Intuitively, we know this approach has long-term costs. To address this, let’s evaluate the UX of an election cycle from the point of view of the end user, the everyday citizen.

Specifically, how might we define the UX of an election cycle: the voter experience (VX)? A VX lens could help us see the full impact of the electoral cycle from the perspective that matters most: the voters’.

For example, what if we thought about elections in terms of questions like these?

  • How do voters experience an election cycle, from start to finish?
  • How do voters perceive their interactions with political campaigns?
  • What aspects of the election cycle do voters enjoy? What do they dislike? Do citizens currently feel fulfilled by voting?
  • If voters “tune out” of politics, what part of the process has made them want to not pay attention?
  • What experiences decrease the number of eligible citizens who register and vote?
  • Are we able to measure the cumulative impacts of political content interactions over the course of multiple election cycles?
  • Can polls or focus groups help researchers learn about longitudinal sentiment from citizens as they experience multiple election cycles?
  • If so, what would we want to learn in order to bolster democratic participation and trust in institutions?

Thinking in terms of VX can help answer these questions. Moreover, researching and designing around VX could help identify additional metrics, beyond traditional turnout and engagement numbers, that better reflect the collective impact of campaigning: of all those voter contact and persuasion efforts combined.

This isn’t a radically new idea, and earlier efforts to embed UX design into electoral work yielded promising early benefits. In 2020, a coalition of political tech builders created a Volunteer Experience program. The group held design sprints for political tech tools, such as canvassing apps and phone banking sites. Their goal was to apply UX principles to improve the volunteer user flow, enhance data hygiene, and improve volunteer retention. If a few sprints can improve the phone banking experience, imagine the transformative possibilities of taking this lens to the VX as a whole.

If we want democracy to thrive long-term, we need to think beyond short-term wins and table stakes. This isn’t about replacing grassroots organizing or civic action with digital tools. Rather, it’s about learning from UX research methodology to build lasting, meaningful engagement that involves both technology and community organizing. Often, it is indeed local, on-the-ground organizers who have been sounding the alarm about the long-term effects of prioritizing short-term tactics. A VX approach may provide additional data to bolster their arguments.

Learnings from a VX analysis of election cycles could also guide the design of new programs that not only mobilize voters (to contribute, to campaign for their candidates, and to vote), but also ensure that the entire process of voting, post-election follow-up, and broader civic participation is as accessible, intuitive, and fulfilling as possible. Better voter UX will lead to more politically engaged citizens and higher voter turnout.

VX methodology may help combine real-time citizen feedback with centralized decision-making. Moving beyond election cycles, focusing on the citizen UX could accelerate possibilities for citizens to provide real-time feedback, review the performance of elected officials and government, and receive help-desk-style support with the same level of ease as other everyday “products.” By understanding how people engage with civic life over time, we can better design systems for citizens that strengthen participation, trust, and accountability at every level.

Our hope is that this approach, and the new data and metrics uncovered by it, will support shifts that help restore civic participation and strengthen trust in institutions. With citizens oriented as the central users of our democratic systems, we can build new best practices for fulfilling civic infrastructure that foster a more effective and inclusive democracy.

The time for this is now. Despite hard-fought victories and lessons learned from failures, many people working in politics privately acknowledge a hard truth: our current approach isn’t working. Every two years, people build campaigns, mobilize voters, and drive engagement, but they are held back by what they don’t understand about the long-term impact of their efforts. VX thinking can help solve that.

This essay was written with Hillary Lehr, and originally appeared on the Harvard Kennedy School Ash Center’s website.

Posted on May 22, 2025 at 7:06 AM • View Comments

Reimagining Democracy

Imagine that all of us—all of society—have landed on some alien planet and need to form a government: clean slate. We do not have any legacy systems from the United States or any other country. We do not have any special or unique interests to perturb our thinking. How would we govern ourselves? It is unlikely that we would use the systems we have today. Modern representative democracy was the best form of government that eighteenth-century technology could invent. The twenty-first century is very different: scientifically, technically, and philosophically. For example, eighteenth-century democracy was designed under the assumption that travel and communications were both hard.

Indeed, the very idea of representative government was a hack to get around technological limitations. Voting is easier now. Does it still make sense for all of us living in the same place to organize every few years and choose one of us to go to a single big room far away and make laws in our name? Representative districts are organized around geography because that was the only way that made sense two hundred-plus years ago. But we do not need to do it that way anymore. We could organize representation by age: one representative for the thirty-year-olds, another for the forty-year-olds, and so on. We could organize representation randomly: by birthday, perhaps. We can organize in any way we want. American citizens currently elect people to federal posts for terms ranging from two to six years. Would ten years be better for some posts? Would ten days be better for others? There are lots of possibilities. Maybe we can make more use of direct democracy by way of plebiscites. Certainly we do not want all of us, individually, to vote on every amendment to every bill, but what is the optimal balance between votes made in our name and ballot initiatives that we all vote on?

For the past three years, I have organized a series of annual two-day workshops to discuss these and other such questions.1 For each event, I brought together fifty people from around the world: political scientists, economists, law professors, experts in artificial intelligence, activists, government types, historians, science-fiction writers, and more. We did not come up with any answers to our questions—and I would have been surprised if we had—but several themes emerged from the event. Misinformation and propaganda was a theme, of course, and the inability to engage in rational policy discussions when we cannot agree on facts. The deleterious effects of optimizing a political system for economic outcomes was another theme. Given the ability to start over, would anyone design a system of government for the near-term financial interest of the wealthiest few? Another theme was capitalism and how it is or is not intertwined with democracy. While the modern market economy made a lot of sense in the industrial age, it is starting to fray in the information age. What comes after capitalism, and how will it affect the way we govern ourselves?

Many participants examined the effects of technology, especially artificial intelligence (AI). We looked at whether—and when—we might be comfortable ceding power to an AI system. Sometimes deciding is easy. I am happy for an AI system to figure out the optimal timing of traffic lights to ensure the smoothest flow of cars through my city. When will we be able to say the same thing about the setting of interest rates? Or taxation? How would we feel about an AI device in our pocket that voted in our name, thousands of times per day, based on preferences that it inferred from our actions? Or how would we feel if an AI system could determine optimal policy solutions that balanced every voter’s preferences: Would it still make sense to have a legislature and representatives? Possibly we should vote directly for ideas and goals instead, and then leave the details to the computers.

These conversations became more pointed in the second and third years of our workshop, after generative AI exploded onto the internet. Large language models are poised to write laws, enforce both laws and regulations, act as lawyers and judges, and plan political strategy. How this capacity will compare to human expertise and capability is still unclear, but the technology is changing quickly and dramatically. We will not have AI legislators anytime soon, but just as today we accept that all political speeches are professionally written by speechwriters, will we accept that future political speeches will all be written by AI devices? Will legislators accept AI-written legislation, especially when that legislation includes a level of detail that human-based legislation generally does not? And if so, how will that change affect the balance of power between the legislature and the administrative state? Most interestingly, what happens when the AI tools we use to both write and enforce laws start to suggest policy options that are beyond human understanding? Will we accept them, because they work? Or will we reject a system of governance where humans are only nominally in charge?

Scale was another theme of the workshops. The size of modern governments reflects the technology at the time of their founding. European countries and the early American states are a particular size because that was a governable size in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Larger governments—those of the United States as a whole and of the European Union—reflect a world where travel and communications are easier. Today, though, the problems we have are either local, at the scale of cities and towns, or global. Do we really have need for a political unit the size of France or Virginia? Or is it a mixture of scales that we really need, one that moves effectively between the local and the global?

As to other forms of democracy, we discussed one from history and another made possible by today’s technology. Sortition is a system of choosing political officials randomly. We use it today when we pick juries, but both the ancient Greeks and some cities in Renaissance Italy used it to select major political officials. Today, several countries—largely in Europe—are using the process to decide policy on complex issues. We might randomly choose a few hundred people, representative of the population, to spend a few weeks being briefed by experts, debating the issues, and then deciding on environmental regulations, or a budget, or pretty much anything.

“Liquid democracy” is a way of doing away with elections altogether. The idea is that everyone has a vote and can assign it to anyone they choose. A representative collects the proxies assigned to him or her and can either vote directly on the issues or assign all the proxies to someone else. Perhaps proxies could be divided: this person for economic matters, another for health matters, a third for national defense, and so on. In the purer forms of this system, people might transfer their votes to someone else at any time. There would be no more election days: vote counts might change every day.

And then, there is the question of participation and, more generally, whose interests are taken into account. Early democracies were really not democracies at all; they limited participation by gender, race, and land ownership. These days, to achieve a more comprehensive electorate we could lower the voting age. But, of course, even children too young to vote have rights, and in some cases so do other species. Should future generations be given a “voice,” whatever that means? What about nonhumans, or whole ecosystems? Should everyone have the same volume and type of voice? Right now, in the United States, the very wealthy have much more influence than others do. Should we encode that superiority explicitly? Perhaps younger people should have a more powerful vote than everyone else. Or maybe older people should.

In the workshops, those questions led to others about the limits of democracy. All democracies have boundaries limiting what the majority can decide. We are not allowed to vote Common Knowledge out of existence, for example, but can generally regulate speech to some degree. We cannot vote, in an election, to jail someone, but we can craft laws that make a particular action illegal. We all have the right to certain things that cannot be taken away from us. In the community of our future, what should be our rights as individuals? What should be the rights of society, superseding those of individuals?

Personally, I was most interested, at each of the three workshops, in how political systems fail. As a security technologist, I study how complex systems are subverted—hacked, in my parlance—for the benefit of a few at the expense of the many. Think of tax loopholes, or tricks to avoid government regulation. These hacks are common today, and AI tools will make them easier to find—and even to design—in the future. I would want any government system to be resistant to trickery. Or, to put it another way: I want the interests of each individual to align with the interests of the group at every level. We have never had a system of government with this property, but—in a time of existential risks such as climate change—it is important that we develop one.

Would this new system of government even be called “democracy”? I truly do not know.

Such speculation is not practical, of course, but still is valuable. Our workshops did not produce final answers and were not intended to do so. Our discourse was filled with suggestions about how to patch our political system where it is fraying. People regularly debate changes to the US Electoral College, or the process of determining voting districts, or the setting of term limits. But those are incremental changes. It is difficult to find people who are thinking more radically: looking beyond the horizon—not at what is possible today but at what may be possible eventually. Thinking incrementally is critically important, but it is also myopic. It represents a hill-climbing strategy of continuous but quite limited improvements. We also need to think about discontinuous changes that we cannot easily get to from here; otherwise, we may be forever stuck at local maxima. And while true innovation in politics is a lot harder than innovation in technology, especially without a violent revolution forcing changes on us, it is something that we as a species are going to have to get good at, one way or another.

Our workshop will reconvene for a fourth meeting in December 2025.

Note

  1. The First International Workshop on Reimagining Democracy (IWORD) was held December 7—8, 2022. The Second IWORD was held December 12—13, 2023. Both took place at the Harvard Kennedy School. The sponsors were the Ford Foundation, the Knight Foundation, and the Ash and Belfer Centers of the Kennedy School. See Schneier, “Recreating Democracy” and Schneier, “Second Interdisciplinary Workshop.”

This essay was originally published in Common Knowledge.

Posted on April 10, 2025 at 8:35 PM • View Comments

AI and Civil Service Purges

Donald Trump and Elon Musk’s chaotic approach to reform is upending government operations. Critical functions have been halted, tens of thousands of federal staffers are being encouraged to resign, and congressional mandates are being disregarded. The next phase: The Department of Government Efficiency reportedly wants to use AI to cut costs. According to The Washington Post, Musk’s group has started to run sensitive data from government systems through AI programs to analyze spending and determine what could be pruned. This may lead to the elimination of human jobs in favor of automation. As one government official who has been tracking Musk’s DOGE team told the Post, the ultimate aim is to use AI to replace “the human workforce with machines.” (Spokespeople for the White House and DOGE did not respond to requests for comment.)

Using AI to make government more efficient is a worthy pursuit, and this is not a new idea. The Biden administration disclosed more than 2,000 AI applications in development across the federal government. For example, FEMA has started using AI to help perform damage assessment in disaster areas. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has started using AI to look for fraudulent billing. The idea of replacing dedicated and principled civil servants with AI agents, however, is new—and complicated.

The civil service—the massive cadre of employees who operate government agencies—plays a vital role in translating laws and policy into the operation of society. New presidents can issue sweeping executive orders, but they often have no real effect until they actually change the behavior of public servants. Whether you think of these people as essential and inspiring do-gooders, boring bureaucratic functionaries, or as agents of a “deep state,” their sheer number and continuity act as ballast that resists institutional change.

This is why Trump and Musk’s actions are so significant. The more AI decision making is integrated into government, the easier change will be. If human workers are widely replaced with AI, executives will have unilateral authority to instantaneously alter the behavior of the government, profoundly raising the stakes for transitions of power in democracy. Trump’s unprecedented purge of the civil service might be the last time a president needs to replace the human beings in government in order to dictate its new functions. Future leaders may do so at the press of a button.

To be clear, the use of AI by the executive branch doesn’t have to be disastrous. In theory, it could allow new leadership to swiftly implement the wishes of its electorate. But this could go very badly in the hands of an authoritarian leader. AI systems concentrate power at the top, so they could allow an executive to effectuate change over sprawling bureaucracies instantaneously. Firing and replacing tens of thousands of human bureaucrats is a huge undertaking. Swapping one AI out for another, or modifying the rules that those AIs operate by, would be much simpler.

Social-welfare programs, if automated with AI, could be redirected to systematically benefit one group and disadvantage another with a single prompt change. Immigration-enforcement agencies could prioritize people for investigation and detainment with one instruction. Regulatory-enforcement agencies that monitor corporate behavior for malfeasance could turn their attention to, or away from, any given company on a whim.

Even if Congress were motivated to fight back against Trump and Musk, or against a future president seeking to bulldoze the will of the legislature, the absolute power to command AI agents would make it easier to subvert legislative intent. AI has the power to diminish representative politics. Written law is never fully determinative of the actions of government—there is always wiggle room for presidents, appointed leaders, and civil servants to exercise their own judgment. Whether intentional or not, whether charitably or not, each of these actors uses discretion. In human systems, that discretion is widely distributed across many individuals—people who, in the case of career civil servants, usually outlast presidencies.

Today, the AI ecosystem is dominated by a small number of corporations that decide how the most widely used AI models are designed, which data they are trained on, and which instructions they follow. Because their work is largely secretive and unaccountable to public interest, these tech companies are capable of making changes to the bias of AI systems—either generally or with aim at specific governmental use cases—that are invisible to the rest of us. And these private actors are both vulnerable to coercion by political leaders and self-interested in appealing to their favor. Musk himself created and funded xAI, now one of the world’s largest AI labs, with an explicitly ideological mandate to generate anti-“woke” AI and steer the wider AI industry in a similar direction.

But there’s a second way that AI’s transformation of government could go. AI development could happen inside of transparent and accountable public institutions, alongside its continued development by Big Tech. Applications of AI in democratic governments could be focused on benefitting public servants and the communities they serve by, for example, making it easier for non-English speakers to access government services, making ministerial tasks such as processing routine applications more efficient and reducing backlogs, or helping constituents weigh in on the policies deliberated by their representatives. Such AI integrations should be done gradually and carefully, with public oversight for their design and implementation and monitoring and guardrails to avoid unacceptable bias and harm.

Governments around the world are demonstrating how this could be done, though it’s early days. Taiwan has pioneered the use of AI models to facilitate deliberative democracy at an unprecedented scale. Singapore has been a leader in the development of public AI models, built transparently and with public-service use cases in mind. Canada has illustrated the role of disclosure and public input on the consideration of AI use cases in government. Even if you do not trust the current White House to follow any of these examples, U.S. states—which have much greater contact and influence over the daily lives of Americans than the federal government—could lead the way on this kind of responsible development and deployment of AI.

As the political theorist David Runciman has written, AI is just another in a long line of artificial “machines” used to govern how people live and act, not unlike corporations and states before it. AI doesn’t replace those older institutions, but it changes how they function. As the Trump administration forges stronger ties to Big Tech and AI developers, we need to recognize the potential of that partnership to steer the future of democratic governance—and act to make sure that it does not enable future authoritarians.

This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders, and originally appeared in The Atlantic.

Posted on February 14, 2025 at 8:03 AM • View Comments

Third Interdisciplinary Workshop on Reimagining Democracy (IWORD 2024)

Last month, Henry Farrell and I convened the Third Interdisciplinary Workshop on Reimagining Democracy (IWORD 2024) at Johns Hopkins University’s Bloomberg Center in Washington DC. This is a small, invitational workshop on the future of democracy. As with the previous two workshops, the goal was to bring together a diverse set of political scientists, law professors, philosophers, AI researchers and other industry practitioners, political activists, and creative types (including science fiction writers) to discuss how democracy might be reimagined in the current century.

The goal of the workshop is to think very broadly. Modern democracy was invented in the mid-eighteenth century, using mid-eighteenth-century technology. If democracy were to be invented today, it would look very different. Elections would look different. The balance between representation and direct democracy would look different. Adjudication and enforcement would look different. Everything would look different, because our conceptions of fairness, justice, equality, and rights are different, and we have much more powerful technology to bring to bear on the problems. Also, we could start from scratch without having to worry about evolving our current democracy into this imagined future system.

We can’t do that, of course, but it’s still still valuable to speculate. Of course we need to figure out how to reform our current systems, but we shouldn’t limit our thinking to incremental steps. We also need to think about discontinuous changes as well. I wrote about the philosophy more in this essay about IWORD 2022.

IWORD 2024 was easily the most intellectually stimulating two days of my year. It’s also intellectually exhausting; the speed and intensity of ideas is almost too much. I wrote about the format in my blog post on IWORD 2023.

Summaries of all the IWORD 2024 talks are in the first set of comments below. And here are links to the previous IWORDs:

IWORD 2025 will be held either in New York or New Haven; still to be determined.

Posted on January 23, 2025 at 9:58 AM • View Comments

Algorithms Are Coming for Democracy—but It’s Not All Bad

In 2025, AI is poised to change every aspect of democratic politics—but it won’t necessarily be for the worse.

India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, has used AI to translate his speeches for his multilingual electorate in real time, demonstrating how AI can help diverse democracies to be more inclusive. AI avatars were used by presidential candidates in South Korea in electioneering, enabling them to provide answers to thousands of voters’ questions simultaneously. We are also starting to see AI tools aid fundraising and get-out-the-vote efforts. AI techniques are starting to augment more traditional polling methods, helping campaigns get cheaper and faster data. And congressional candidates have started using AI robocallers to engage voters on issues. In 2025, these trends will continue. AI doesn’t need to be superior to human experts to augment the labor of an overworked canvasser, or to write ad copy similar to that of a junior campaign staffer or volunteer. Politics is competitive, and any technology that can bestow an advantage, or even just garner attention, will be used.

Most politics is local, and AI tools promise to make democracy more equitable. The typical candidate has few resources, so the choice may be between getting help from AI tools or getting no help at all. In 2024, a US presidential candidate with virtually zero name recognition, Jason Palmer, beat Joe Biden in a very small electorate, the American Samoan primary, by using AI-generated messaging and an online AI avatar.

At the national level, AI tools are more likely to make the already powerful even more powerful. Human + AI generally beats AI only: The more human talent you have, the more you can effectively make use of AI assistance. The richest campaigns will not put AIs in charge, but they will race to exploit AI where it can give them an advantage.

But while the promise of AI assistance will drive adoption, the risks are considerable. When computers get involved in any process, that process changes. Scalable automation, for example, can transform political advertising from one-size-fits-all into personalized demagoguing—candidates can tell each of us what they think we want to hear. Introducing new dependencies can also lead to brittleness: Exploiting gains from automation can mean dropping human oversight, and chaos results when critical computer systems go down.

Politics is adversarial. Any time AI is used by one candidate or party, it invites hacking by those associated with their opponents, perhaps to modify their behavior, eavesdrop on their output, or to simply shut them down. The kinds of disinformation weaponized by entities like Russia on social media will be increasingly targeted toward machines, too.

AI is different from traditional computer systems in that it tries to encode common sense and judgment that goes beyond simple rules; yet humans have no single ethical system, or even a single definition of fairness. We will see AI systems optimized for different parties and ideologies; for one faction not to trust the AIs of a rival faction; for everyone to have a healthy suspicion of corporate for-profit AI systems with hidden biases.

This is just the beginning of a trend that will spread through democracies around the world, and probably accelerate, for years to come. Everyone, especially AI skeptics and those concerned about its potential to exacerbate bias and discrimination, should recognize that AI is coming for every aspect of democracy. The transformations won’t come from the top down; they will come from the bottom up. Politicians and campaigns will start using AI tools when they are useful. So will lawyers, and political advocacy groups. Judges will use AI to help draft their decisions because it will save time. News organizations will use AI because it will justify budget cuts. Bureaucracies and regulators will add AI to their already algorithmic systems for determining all sorts of benefits and penalties.

Whether this results in a better democracy, or a more just world, remains to be seen. Keep watching how those in power uses these tools, and also how they empower the currently powerless. Those of us who are constituents of democracies should advocate tirelessly to ensure that we use AI systems to better democratize democracy, and not to further its worst tendencies.

This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders, and originally appeared in Wired.

Posted on December 3, 2024 at 7:00 AM • View Comments

More on My AI and Democracy Book

In July, I wrote about my new book project on AI and democracy, to be published by MIT Press in fall 2025. My co-author and collaborator Nathan Sanders and I are hard at work writing.

At this point, we would like feedback on titles. Here are four possibilities:

  1. Rewiring the Republic: How AI Will Transform our Politics, Government, and Citizenship
  2. The Thinking State: How AI Can Improve Democracy
  3. Better Run: How AI Can Make our Politics, Government, Citizenship More Efficient, Effective and Fair
  4. AI and the New Future of Democracy: Changes in Politics, Government, and Citizenship

What we want out of the title is that it convey (1) that it is a book about AI, (2) that it is a book about democracy writ large (and not just deepfakes), and (3) that it is largely optimistic.

What do you like? Feel free to do some mixing and matching: swapping “Will Transform” for “Will Improve” for “Can Transform” for “Can Improve,” for example. Or “Democracy” for “the Republic.” Remember, the goal here is for a title that will make a potential reader pick the book up off a shelf, or read the blurb text on a webpage. It needs to be something that will catch the reader’s attention. (Other title ideas are here).

Also, FYI, this is the current table of contents:

Introduction
1. Introduction: How AI will Change Democracy
2. Core AI Capabilities
3. Democracy as an Information System

Part I: AI-Assisted Politics
4. Background: Making Mistakes
5. Talking to Voters
6. Conducting Polls
7. Organizing a Political Campaign
8. Fundraising for Politics
9. Being a Politician

Part II: AI-Assisted Legislators
10. Background: Explaining Itself
11. Background: Who’s to Blame?
12. Listening to Constituents
13. Writing Laws
14. Writing More Complex Laws
15. Writing Laws that Empower Machines
16. Negotiating Legislation

Part III: The AI-Assisted Administration
17. Background: Exhibiting Values and Bias
18. Background: Augmenting Versus Replacing People
19. Serving People
20. Operating Government
21. Enforcing Regulations

Part IV: The AI-Assisted Court
22. Background: Being Fair
23. Background: Getting Hacked
24. Acting as a Lawyer
25. Arbitrating Disputes
26. Enforcing the Law
27. Reshaping Legislative Intent
28. Being a Judge

Part V: AI-Assisted Citizens
29. Background: AI and Power
30. Background: AI and Trust
31. Explaining the News
32. Watching the Government
33. Moderating, Facilitating, and Building Consensus
34. Acting as Your Personal Advocate
35. Acting as Your Personal Political Proxy

Part VI: Ensuring That AI Benefits Democracy
36. Why AI is Not Yet Good for Democracy
37. How to Ensure AI is Good for Democracy
38. What We Need to Do Now
39. Conclusion

Everything is subject to change, of course. The manuscript isn’t due to the publisher until the end of March, and who knows what AI developments will happen between now and then.

EDITED: The title under consideration is “Rewiring the Republic,” and not “Rewiring Democracy.” Although, I suppose, both are really under consideration.

Posted on October 11, 2024 at 3:00 PM • View Comments

AI and the 2024 US Elections

For years now, AI has undermined the public’s ability to trust what it sees, hears, and reads. The Republican National Committee released a provocative ad offering an “AI-generated look into the country’s possible future if Joe Biden is re-elected,” showing apocalyptic, machine-made images of ruined cityscapes and chaos at the border. Fake robocalls purporting to be from Biden urged New Hampshire residents not to vote in the 2024 primary election. This summer, the Department of Justice cracked down on a Russian bot farm that was using AI to impersonate Americans on social media, and OpenAI disrupted an Iranian group using ChatGPT to generate fake social-media comments.

It’s not altogether clear what damage AI itself may cause, though the reasons for concern are obvious—the technology makes it easier for bad actors to construct highly persuasive and misleading content. With that risk in mind, there has been some movement toward constraining the use of AI, yet progress has been painstakingly slow in the area where it may count most: the 2024 election.

Two years ago, the Biden administration issued a blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights aiming to address “unsafe or ineffective systems,” “algorithmic discrimination,” and “abusive data practices,” among other things. Then, last year, Biden built on that document when he issued his executive order on AI. Also in 2023, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer held an AI summit in Washington that included the centibillionaires Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, and Elon Musk. Several weeks later, the United Kingdom hosted an international AI Safety Summit that led to the serious-sounding “Bletchley Declaration,” which urged international cooperation on AI regulation. The risks of AI fakery in elections have not sneaked up on anybody.

Yet none of this has resulted in changes that would resolve the use of AI in U.S. political campaigns. Even worse, the two federal agencies with a chance to do something about it have punted the ball, very likely until after the election.

On July 25, the Federal Communications Commission issued a proposal that would require political advertisements on TV and radio to disclose if they used AI. (The FCC has no jurisdiction over streaming, social media, or web ads.) That seems like a step forward, but there are two big problems. First, the proposed rules, even if enacted, are unlikely to take effect before early voting starts in this year’s election. Second, the proposal immediately devolved into a partisan slugfest. A Republican FCC commissioner alleged that the Democratic National Committee was orchestrating the rule change because Democrats are falling behind the GOP in using AI in elections. Plus, he argued, this was the Federal Election Commission’s job to do.

Yet last month, the FEC announced that it won’t even try making new rules against using AI to impersonate candidates in campaign ads through deepfaked audio or video. The FEC also said that it lacks the statutory authority to make rules about misrepresentations using deepfaked audio or video. And it lamented that it lacks the technical expertise to do so, anyway. Then, last week, the FEC compromised, announcing that it intends to enforce its existing rules against fraudulent misrepresentation regardless of what technology it is conducted with. Advocates for stronger rules on AI in campaign ads, such as Public Citizen, did not find this nearly sufficient, characterizing it as a “wait-and-see approach” to handling “electoral chaos.”

Perhaps this is to be expected: The freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment generally permits lying in political ads. But the American public has signaled that it would like some rules governing AI’s use in campaigns. In 2023, more than half of Americans polled responded that the federal government should outlaw all uses of AI-generated content in political ads. Going further, in 2024, about half of surveyed Americans said they thought that political candidates who intentionally manipulated audio, images, or video should be prevented from holding office or removed if they had won an election. Only 4 percent thought there should be no penalty at all.

The underlying problem is that Congress has not clearly given any agency the responsibility to keep political advertisements grounded in reality, whether in response to AI or old-fashioned forms of disinformation. The Federal Trade Commission has jurisdiction over truth in advertising, but political ads are largely exempt—again, part of our First Amendment tradition. The FEC’s remit is campaign finance, but the Supreme Court has progressively stripped its authorities. Even where it could act, the commission is often stymied by political deadlock. The FCC has more evident responsibility for regulating political advertising, but only in certain media: broadcast, robocalls, text messages. Worse yet, the FCC’s rules are not exactly robust. It has actually loosened rules on political spam over time, leading to the barrage of messages many receive today. (That said, in February, the FCC did unanimously rule that robocalls using AI voice-cloning technology, like the Biden ad in New Hampshire, are already illegal under a 30-year-old law.)

It’s a fragmented system, with many important activities falling victim to gaps in statutory authority and a turf war between federal agencies. And as political campaigning has gone digital, it has entered an online space with even fewer disclosure requirements or other regulations. No one seems to agree where, or whether, AI is under any of these agencies’ jurisdictions. In the absence of broad regulation, some states have made their own decisions. In 2019, California was the first state in the nation to prohibit the use of deceptively manipulated media in elections, and has strengthened these protections with a raft of newly passed laws this fall. Nineteen states have now passed laws regulating the use of deepfakes in elections.

One problem that regulators have to contend with is the wide applicability of AI: The technology can simply be used for many different things, each one demanding its own intervention. People might accept a candidate digitally airbrushing their photo to look better, but not doing the same thing to make their opponent look worse. We’re used to getting personalized campaign messages and letters signed by the candidate; is it okay to get a robocall with a voice clone of the same politician speaking our name? And what should we make of the AI-generated campaign memes now shared by figures such as Musk and Donald Trump?

Despite the gridlock in Congress, these are issues with bipartisan interest. This makes it conceivable that something might be done, but probably not until after the 2024 election and only if legislators overcome major roadblocks. One bill under consideration, the AI Transparency in Elections Act, would instruct the FEC to require disclosure when political advertising uses media generated substantially by AI. Critics say, implausibly, that the disclosure is onerous and would increase the cost of political advertising. The Honest Ads Act would modernize campaign-finance law, extending FEC authority to definitively encompass digital advertising. However, it has languished for years because of reported opposition from the tech industry. The Protect Elections From Deceptive AI Act would ban materially deceptive AI-generated content from federal elections, as in California and other states. These are promising proposals, but libertarian and civil-liberties groups are already signaling challenges to all of these on First Amendment grounds. And, vexingly, at least one FEC commissioner has directly cited congressional consideration of some of these bills as a reason for his agency not to act on AI in the meantime.

One group that benefits from all this confusion: tech platforms. When few or no evident rules govern political expenditures online and uses of new technologies like AI, tech companies have maximum latitude to sell ads, services, and personal data to campaigns. This is reflected in their lobbying efforts, as well as the voluntary policy restraints they occasionally trumpet to convince the public they don’t need greater regulation.

Big Tech has demonstrated that it will uphold these voluntary pledges only if they benefit the industry. Facebook once, briefly, banned political advertising on its platform. No longer; now it even allows ads that baselessly deny the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. OpenAI’s policies have long prohibited political campaigns from using ChatGPT, but those restrictions are trivial to evade. Several companies have volunteered to add watermarks to AI-generated content, but they are easily circumvented. Watermarks might even make disinformation worse by giving the false impression that non-watermarked images are legitimate.

This important public policy should not be left to corporations, yet Congress seems resigned not to act before the election. Schumer hinted to NBC News in August that Congress may try to attach deepfake regulations to must-pass funding or defense bills this month to ensure that they become law before the election. More recently, he has pointed to the need for action “beyond the 2024 election.”

The three bills listed above are worthwhile, but they are just a start. The FEC and FCC should not be left to snipe with each other about what territory belongs to which agency. And the FEC needs more significant, structural reform to reduce partisan gridlock and enable it to get more done. We also need transparency into and governance of the algorithmic amplification of misinformation on social-media platforms. That requires that the pervasive influence of tech companies and their billionaire investors should be limited through stronger lobbying and campaign-finance protections.

Our regulation of electioneering never caught up to AOL, let alone social media and AI. And deceiving videos harm our democratic process, whether they are created by AI or actors on a soundstage. But the urgent concern over AI should be harnessed to advance legislative reform. Congress needs to do more than stick a few fingers in the dike to control the coming tide of election disinformation. It needs to act more boldly to reshape the landscape of regulation for political campaigning.

This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders, and originally appeared in the Atlantic.

Posted on September 30, 2024 at 7:00 AM • View Comments

Upcoming Book on AI and Democracy

If you’ve been reading my blog, you’ve noticed that I have written a lot about AI and democracy, mostly with my co-author Nathan Sanders. I am pleased to announce that we’re writing a book on the topic.

This isn’t a book about deep fakes, or misinformation. This is a book about what happens when AI writes laws, adjudicates disputes, audits bureaucratic actions, assists in political strategy, and advises citizens on what candidates and issues to support. It’s a book that tries to look into what an AI-assisted democratic system might look like, and then at how to best ensure that we make use of the good parts while avoiding the bad parts.

This is what I talked about in my RSA Conference speech last month, which you can both watch and read. (You can also read earlier attempts at this idea.)

The book will be published by MIT Press sometime in fall 2025, with an open-access digital version available a year after that. (It really can’t be published earlier. Nothing published this year will rise above the noise of the US presidential election, and anything published next spring will have to go to press without knowing the results of that election.)

Right now, the organization of the book is in six parts:

AI-Assisted Politicians
AI-Assisted Legislators
The AI-Assisted Administration
The AI-Assisted Legal System
AI-Assisted Citizens
Getting the Future We Want

It’s too early to share a more detailed table of contents, but I would like help thinking about titles. Below are my current list of brainstorming ideas: both titles and subtitles. Please mix and match, or suggest your own in the comments. No idea is too far afield, because anything can spark more ideas.

Titles:

AI and Democracy
Democracy with AI
Democracy after AI
Democratia ex Machina
Democracy ex Machina
E Pluribus, Machina
Democracy and the Machines
Democracy with Machines
Building Democracy with Machines
Democracy in the Loop
We the People + AI
Artificial Democracy
AI Enhanced Democracy
The State of AI
Citizen AI

Trusting the Bots
Trusting the Computer
Trusting the Machine

The End of the Beginning
Sharing Power
Better Run
Speed, Scale, Scope, and Sophistication
The New Model of Governance
Model Citizen
Artificial Individualism

Subtitles:

How AI Upsets the Power Balances of Democracy
Twenty (or So) Ways AI will Change Democracy
Reimagining Democracy for the Age of AI
Who Wins and Loses
How Democracy Thrives in an AI-Enhanced World
Ensuring that AI Enhances Democracy and Doesn’t Destroy It
How AI Will Change Politics, Legislating, Bureaucracy, Courtrooms, and Citizens
AI’s Transformation of Government, Citizenship, and Everything In-Between
Remaking Democracy, from Voting to Legislating to Waiting in Line
How to Make Democracy Work for People in an AI Future
How AI Will Totally Reshape Democracies and Democratic Institutions
Who Wins and Loses when AI Governs
How to Win and Not Lose With AI as a Partner
AI’s Transformation of Democracy, for Better and for Worse
How AI Can Improve Society and Not Destroy It
How AI Can Improve Society and Not Subvert It
Of the People, for the People, with a Whole lot of AI
How AI Will Reshape Democracy
How the AI Revolution Will Reshape Democracy

Combinations:

Imagining a Thriving Democracy in the Age of AI: How Technology Enhances Democratic Ideals and Nurtures a Society that Serves its People

Making Model Citizens: How to Put AI to Use to Help Democracy
Modeling Citizenship: Who Wins and Who Loses when AI Transforms Democracy
A Model for Government: Democracy with AI, and How to Make it Work for Us

AI of, By, and for the People: How Artificial Intelligence will reshape Democracy
The (AI) Political Revolution: Speed, Scale, Scope, Sophistication, and our Democracy
Speed, Scale, Scope, Sophistication: The AI Democratic Revolution
The Artificial Political Revolution: X Ways AI will Change Democracy…Forever

EDITED TO ADD (7/10): More options:

The Silicon Realignment: The Future of Political Power in a Digital World
Political Machines
EveryTHING is political

Posted on July 2, 2024 at 2:11 PM • View Comments

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Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.