Entries Tagged "academic papers"

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Power Analysis of RFID Tags

This is great work by Yossi Oren and Adi Shamir:

Abstract (Summary)

We show the first power analysis attack on passive RFID tags. Compared to standard power analysis attacks, this attack is unique in that it requires no physical contact with the device under attack. While the specific attack described here requires the attacker to actually transmit data to the tag under attack, the power analysis part itself requires only a receive antenna. This means that a variant of this attack can be devised such that the attacker is completely passive while it is acquiring the data, making the attack very hard to detect. As a proof of concept, we describe a password extraction attack on Class 1 Generation 1 EPC tags operating in the UHF frequency range. The attack presented below lets an adversary discover the kill password of such a tag and, then, disable it. The attack can be readily adapted to finding the access and kill passwords of Gen 2 tags. The main significance of our attack is in its implications ­ any cryptographic functionality built into tags needs to be designed to be resistant to power analysis, and achieving this resistance is an undertaking which has an effect both on the price and on the read range of tags.

My guess of the industry’s response: downplay the results and pretend it’s not a problem.

Posted on March 17, 2006 at 12:22 PM • View Comments

"Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode"

“Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode” is an interesting paper by J. Alex Halderman and Edward W. Felten.

Abstract: In the fall of 2005, problems discovered in two Sony-BMG compact disc copy protection systems, XCP and MediaMax, triggered a public uproar that ultimately led to class-action litigation and the recall of millions of discs. We present an in-depth analysis of these technologies, including their design, implementation, and deployment. The systems are surprisingly complex and suffer from a diverse array of flaws that weaken their content protection and expose users to serious security and privacy risks. Their complexity, and their failure, makes them an interesting case study of digital rights management that carries valuable lessons for content companies, DRM vendors, policymakers, end users, and the security community.

Posted on February 17, 2006 at 2:11 PM • View Comments

Windows Access Control

I just found an interesting paper: “Windows Access Control Demystified,” by Sudhakar Govindavajhala and Andrew W. Appel. Basically, they show that companies like Adobe, Macromedia, etc., have mistakes in their Access Control Programming that open security holes in Windows XP.

Abstract

In the Secure Internet Programming laboratory at Princeton University, we have been investigating network security management by using logic programming. We developed a rule based framework—Multihost, Multistage, Vulnerability Analysis(MulVAL)—to perform end-to-end, automatic analysis of multi-host, multi-stage attacks on a large network where hosts run different operating systems. The tool finds attack paths where the adversary will have to use one or more than one weaknesses (buffer overflows) in multiple software to attack the network. The MulVAL framework has been demonstrated to be modular, flexible, scalable and efficient [20]. We applied these techniques to perform security analysis of a single host with commonly used software.

We have constructed a logical model of Windows XP access control, in a declarative but executable (Datalog) format. We have built a scanner that reads access-control conguration information from the Windows registry, file system, and service control manager database, and feeds raw conguration data to the model. Therefore we can reason about such things as the existence of privilege-escalation attacks, and indeed we have found several user-to-administrator vulnerabilities caused by misconfigurations of the access-control lists of commercial software from several major vendors. We propose tools such as ours as a vehicle for software developers and system administrators to model and debug the complex interactions of access control on installations under Windows.

EDITED TO ADD (2/13): Ed Felten has some good commentary about the paper on his blog.

Posted on February 13, 2006 at 12:11 PM • View Comments

Petnames

Interesting paper:

Zooko’s Triangle argues that names cannot be global, secure, and memorable, all at the same time. Domain names are an example: they are global, and memorable, but as the rapid rise of phishing demonstrates, they are not secure.

Though no single name can have all three properties, the petname system does indeed embody all three properties. Informal experiments with petname-like systems suggest that petnames can be both intuitive and effective. Experimental implementations already exist for simple extensions to existing browsers that could alleviate (possibly dramatically) the problems with phishing. As phishers gain sophistication, it seems compelling to experiment with petname systems as part of the solution.

Posted on February 8, 2006 at 11:25 AM • View Comments

A Model Regime of Privacy Protection

Last year I blogged about an article by Daniel J. Solove and Chris Hoofnagle titled “A Model Regime of Privacy Protection.”

The paper has been revised a few times based on comments—some of them from readers of this blog and Crypto-Gram—and the final version has been published.

Abstract:
A series of major security breaches at companies with sensitive personal information has sparked significant attention to the problems with privacy protection in the United States. Currently, the privacy protections in the United States are riddled with gaps and weak spots. Although most industrialized nations have comprehensive data protection laws, the United States has maintained a sectoral approach where certain industries are covered and others are not. In particular, emerging companies known as “commercial data brokers” have frequently slipped through the cracks of U.S. privacy law. In this article, the authors propose a Model Privacy Regime to address the problems in the privacy protection in the United States, with a particular focus on commercial data brokers. Since the United States is unlikely to shift radically from its sectoral approach to a comprehensive data protection regime, the Model Regime aims to patch up the holes in existing privacy regulation and improve and extend it. In other words, the goal of the Model Regime is to build upon the existing foundation of U.S. privacy law, not to propose an alternative foundation. The authors believe that the sectoral approach in the United States can be improved by applying the Fair Information Practices—principles that require the entities that collect personal data to extend certain rights to data subjects. The Fair Information Practices are very general principles, and they are often spoken about in a rather abstract manner. In contrast, the Model Regime demonstrates specific ways that they can be incorporated into privacy regulation in the United States.

Definitely worth reading.

Posted on February 6, 2006 at 12:21 PM • View Comments

The Topology of Covert Conflict

Interesting research paper by Shishir Nagaraja and Ross Anderson. Implications for warfare, terrorism, and peer-to-peer file sharing:

Abstract:

Often an attacker tries to disconnect a network by destroying nodes or edges, while the defender counters using various resilience mechanisms. Examples include a music industry body attempting to close down a peer-to-peer file-sharing network; medics attempting to halt the spread of an infectious disease by selective vaccination; and a police agency trying to decapitate a terrorist organisation. Albert, Jeong and Barabási famously analysed the static case, and showed that vertex-order attacks are effective against scale-free networks. We extend this work to the dynamic case by developing a framework based on evolutionary game theory to explore the interaction of attack and defence strategies. We show, first, that naive defences don’t work against vertex-order attack; second, that defences based on simple redundancy don’t work much better, but that defences based on cliques work well; third, that attacks based on centrality work better against clique defences than vertex-order attacks do; and fourth, that defences based on complex strategies such as delegation plus clique resist centrality attacks better than simple clique defences. Our models thus build a bridge between network analysis and evolutionary game theory, and provide a framework for analysing defence and attack in networks where topology matters. They suggest definitions of efficiency of attack and defence, and may even explain the evolution of insurgent organisations from networks of cells to a more virtual leadership that facilitates operations rather than directing them. Finally, we draw some conclusions and present possible directions for future research.

Posted on February 6, 2006 at 7:03 AM • View Comments

Brian Snow on Security

Good paper (.pdf) by Brian Snow of the NSA on security and assurance.

Abstract: When will we be secure? Nobody knows for sure—but it cannot happen before commercial security products and services possess not only enough functionality to satisfy customers’ stated needs, but also sufficient assurance of quality, reliability, safety, and appropriateness for use. Such assurances are lacking in most of today’s commercial security products and services. I discuss paths to better assurance in Operating Systems, Applications, and Hardware through better development environments, requirements definition, systems engineering, quality certification, and legal/regulatory constraints. I also give some examples.

Posted on December 13, 2005 at 2:15 PM • View Comments

Snake-Oil Research in Nature

Snake-oil isn’t only in commercial products. Here’s a piece of research published (behind a paywall) in Nature that’s just full of it.

The article suggests using chaos in an electro-optical system to generate a pseudo-random light sequence, which is then added to the message to protect it from interception. Now, the idea of using chaos to build encryption systems has been tried many times in the cryptographic community, and has always failed. But the authors of the Nature article show no signs of familiarity with prior cryptographic work.

The published system has the obvious problem that it does not include any form of message authentication, so it will be trivial to send spoofed messages or tamper with messages while they are in transit.

But a closer examination of the paper’s figures suggests a far more fundamental problem. There’s no key. Anyone with a valid receiver can decode the ciphertext. No key equals no security, and what you have left is a totally broken system.

I e-mailed Claudio R. Mirasso, the corresponding author, about the lack of any key, and got this reply: “To extract the message from the chaotic carrier you need to replicate the carrier itself. This can only be done by a laser that matches the emitter characteristics within, let’s say, within 2-5%. Semiconductor lasers with such similarity have to be carefully selected from the same wafer. Even though you have to test them because they can still be too different and do not synchronize. We talk abut a hardware key. Also the operating conditions (current, feedback length and coupling strength) are part of the key.”

Let me translate that. He’s saying that there is a hardware key baked into the system at fabrication. (It comes from manufacturing deviations in the lasers.) There’s no way to change the key in the field. There’s no way to recover security if any of the transmitters/receivers are lost or stolen. And they don’t know how hard it would be for an attacker to build a compatible receiver, or even a tunable receiver that could listen to a variety of encodings.

This paper would never get past peer review in any competent cryptography journal or conference. I’m surprised it was accepted in Nature, a fiercely competitive journal. I don’t know why Nature is taking articles on topics that are outside its usual competence, but it looks to me like Nature got burnt here by a lack of expertise in the area.

To be fair, the paper very carefully skirts the issue of security, and claims hardly anything: “Additionally, chaotic carriers offer a certain degree of intrinsic privacy, which could complement (via robust hardware encryption) both classical (software based) and quantum cryptography systems.” Now that “certain degree of intrinsic privacy” is approximately zero. But other than that, they’re very careful how they word their claims.

For instance, the abstract says: “Chaotic signals have been proposed as broadband information carriers with the potential of providing a high level of robustness and privacy in data transmission.” But there’s no disclosure that this proposal is bogus, from a privacy perspective. And the next-to-last paragraph says “Building on this, it should be possible to develop reliable cost-effective secure communication systems that exploit deeper properties of chaotic dynamics.” No disclosure that “chaotic dynamics” is actually irrelevant to the “secure” part. The last paragraph talks about “smart encryption techniques” (referencing a paper that talks about chaos encryption), “developing active eavesdropper-evasion strategies” (whatever that means), and so on. It’s just enough that if you don’t parse their words carefully and don’t already know the area well, you might come away with the impression that this is a major advance in secure communications. It seems as if it would have helped to have a more careful disclaimer.

Communications security was listed as one of the motivations for studying this communications technique. To list this as a motivation, without explaining that their experimental setup is actually useless for communications security, is questionable at best.

Meanwhile, the press has written articles that convey the wrong impression. Science News has an article that lauds this as a big achievement for communications privacy.

It talks about it as a “new encryption strategy,” “chaos-encrypted communication,” “1 gigabyte of chaos-encrypted information per second.” It’s obvious that the communications security aspect is what Science News is writing about. If the authors knew that their scheme is useless for communications security, they didn’t explain that very well.

There is also a New Scientist article titled “Let chaos keep your secrets safe” that characterizes this as a “new cryptographic technique, ” but I can’t get a copy of the full article.

Here are two more articles that discuss its security benefits. In the latter, Mirasso says “the main task we have for the future” is to “define, test, and calibrate the security that our system can offer.”

And their project web page says that “the continuous increase of computer speed threatens the safety” of traditional cryptography (which is bogus) and suggests using physical-layer chaos as a way to solve this. That’s listed as the goal of the project.

There’s a lesson here. This is research undertaken by researchers with no prior track record in cryptography, submitted to a journal with no background in cryptography, and reviewed by reviewers with who knows what kind of experience in cryptography. Cryptography is a subtle subject, and trying to design new cryptosystems without the necessary experience and training in the field is a quick route to insecurity.

And what’s up with Nature? Cryptographers with no training in physics know better than to think they are competent to evaluate physics research. If a physics paper were submitted to a cryptography journal, the authors would likely be gently redirected to a physics journal—we wouldn’t want our cryptography conferences to accept a paper on a subject they aren’t competent to evaluate. Why would Nature expect the situation to be any different when physicists try to do cryptography research?

Posted on December 7, 2005 at 6:36 AM • View Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.