An Economic Analysis of Airport Security Screening
Interesting paper: “Passenger Profiling, Imperfect Screening, and Airport Security,” by Nicola Persico and Petra E. Todd. The authors use game theory to investigate the optimal screening policy, in a scenario when there are different social groups (separated by felons, race, religion, etc.) with different preferences for crime and/or terrorism.
Pat Cahalan • March 30, 2006 2:51 PM
Interesting paper.
The only problem I have with applying game theory to something like airport screening is that this conclusion: “Better targeting does not necessarily decrease the overall crime rate, although it will decrease crime in the group that is targeted” depends on the proposition that a passenger will commit a crime whenever the utility of committing the crime exceeds the expected utility of not committing the crime.
For purely fiscal criminal activities, this proposition has some truth. However, for crimes where the utility cannot be measured in easily quantifiable terms (such as a successful terrorist attack), this proposition may or may not be true, which damages the conclusion.
There is also the fact that particularly for terrorist activities, the agent of the crime usually is not the person measuring utility. If I’m being ordered to carry out a suicide attack, and when I get to the airport the screening methods themselves will not change my value estimation. The expectation of a successful attempt has less impact upon the decision making process, due to the impact of the proxy.