Entries Tagged "academic papers"

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Studying Airport Security

Alan A. Kirschenbaum, Michele Mariani, Coen Van Gulijk, Sharon Lubasz, Carmit Rapaport, and Hinke Andriessen, “Airport Security: An Ethnographic Study,” Journal of Air Transport Management, 18 (January 2012): 68-73 (full article is behind a paywall).

Abstract: This paper employs a behavioral science perspective of airport security to, examine security related decision behaviors using exploratory ethnographic observations. Sampling employees from a broad spectrum of departments and occupations in several major airports across Europe, over 700 descriptive items are transcribed into story scripts that are analyzed. The results demonstrate that both formal and informal behavioral factors are present when security decisions are made. The repetitive patterns of behavior allowed us to develop a generic model applicable to a wide range of security related situations. What the descriptions suggest is that even within the formal regulatory administrative framework of airports, actual real-time security behaviors may deviate from rules and regulations to adapt to local situations.

Posted on December 30, 2011 at 6:11 AM • View Comments

Multiple Protocol Attacks

In 1997, I wrote about something called a chosen-protocol attack, where an attacker can use one protocol to break another. Here’s an example of the same thing in the real world: two different parking garages that mask different digits of credit cards on their receipts. Find two from the same car, and you can reconstruct the entire number.

I have to admit this puzzles me, because I thought there was a standard for masking credit card numbers. I only ever see all digits except the final four masked.

Posted on December 20, 2011 at 6:24 AM • View Comments

Feeling vs. Reality of Security in Sparrows

Sparrows have fewer surviving offspring if they feel insecure, regardless of whether they actually are insecure. Liana Y. Zanette, Aija F. White, Marek C. Allen, and Michael Clinchy, “Perceived Predation Risk Reduces the Number of Offspring Songbirds Produce per Year,” Science, 9 Dec 2011:

Abstract: Predator effects on prey demography have traditionally been ascribed solely to direct killing in studies of population ecology and wildlife management. Predators also affect the prey’s perception of predation risk, but this has not been thought to meaningfully affect prey demography. We isolated the effects of perceived predation risk in a free-living population of song sparrows by actively eliminating direct predation and used playbacks of predator calls and sounds to manipulate perceived risk. We found that the perception of predation risk alone reduced the number of offspring produced per year by 40%. Our results suggest that the perception of predation risk is itself powerful enough to affect wildlife population dynamics, and should thus be given greater consideration in vertebrate conservation and management.

Seems as if the sparrows could use a little security theater.

Posted on December 14, 2011 at 1:22 PM • View Comments

Full-Disk Encryption Works

According to researchers, full-disk encryption is hampering police forensics.

The authors of the report suggest there are some things law enforcement can do, but they all must happen prior to a drive being buttoned up by encryption. Specifically, they say that law enforcement should stop turning computers off to bring them to another location for study, doing so only causes the need for a password to be entered to read the encrypted data. Also, in some cases, doing so causes the data to be automatically destroyed. Fortunately, there are some tools forensics experts can use to gather data if it sits untouched, such as copying everything in memory to a separate disk. The team also suggests that law enforcement look first to see if the drive has been encrypted before scanning it with their own software, as doing so will likely result in a lot of wasted time.

Paper, behind a paywall.

Posted on December 1, 2011 at 1:44 PM • View Comments

Journal Article on Cyberwar

From the Journal of Strategic Studies: “Cyber War Will Not Take Place“:

Abstract: For almost two decades, experts and defense establishments the world over have been predicting that cyber war is coming. But is it? This article argues in three steps that cyber war has never happened in the past, that cyber war does not take place in the present, and that it is unlikely that cyber war will occur in the future. It first outlines what would constitute cyber war: a potentially lethal, instrumental, and political act of force conducted through malicious code. The second part shows what cyber war is not, case-by-case. Not one single cyber offense on record constitutes an act of war on its own. The final part offers a more nuanced terminology to come to terms with cyber attacks. All politically motivated cyber attacks are merely sophisticated versions of three activities that are as old as warfare itself: sabotage, espionage, and subversion.

Here’s another article: “The Non-Existent ‘Cyber War’ Is Nothing More Than A Push For More Government Control.”

EDITED TO ADD (11/4): A reader complained to the publication, and they removed the paywall from the first article.

Posted on November 3, 2011 at 1:22 PM • View Comments

New Attacks on CAPTCHAs

Nice research:

Abstract: We report a novel attack on two CAPTCHAs that have been widely deployed on the Internet, one being Google’s home design and the other acquired by Google (i.e. reCAPTCHA). With a minor change, our attack program also works well on the latest ReCAPTCHA version, which uses a new defence mechanism that was unknown to us when we designed our attack. This suggests that our attack works in a fundamental level. Our attack appears to be applicable to a whole family of text CAPTCHAs that build on top of the popular segmentation-resistant mechanism of “crowding character together” for security. Next, we propose a novel framework that guides the application of our well-tested security engineering methodology for evaluating CAPTCHA robustness, and we propose a new general principle for CAPTCHA design.

Posted on October 12, 2011 at 6:57 AM • View Comments

Identifying Speakers in Encrypted Voice Communication

I’ve already written how it is possible to detect words and phrases in encrypted VoIP calls. Turns out it’s possible to detect speakers as well:

Abstract: Most of the voice over IP (VoIP) traffic is encrypted prior to its transmission over the Internet. This makes the identity tracing of perpetrators during forensic investigations a challenging task since conventional speaker recognition techniques are limited to unencrypted speech communications. In this paper, we propose techniques for speaker identification and verification from encrypted VoIP conversations. Our experimental results show that the proposed techniques can correctly identify the actual speaker for 70-75% of the time among a group of 10 potential suspects. We also achieve more than 10 fold improvement over random guessing in identifying a perpetrator in a group of 20 potential suspects. An equal error rate of 17% in case of speaker verification on the CSLU speaker recognition corpus is achieved.

Posted on September 16, 2011 at 12:31 PM • View Comments

Sharing Security Information and the Prisoner's Dilemma

New paper: Dengpan Liu, Yonghua Ji, and Vijay Mookerjee (2011), “Knowledge Sharing and Investment Decisions in Information Security,” Decision Support Systems, in press.

Abstract: We study the relationship between decisions made by two similar firms pertaining to knowledge sharing and investment in information security. The analysis shows that the nature of information assets possessed by the two firms, either complementary or substitutable, plays a crucial role in influencing these decisions. In the complementary case, we show that the firms have a natural incentive to share security knowledge and no external influence to induce sharing is needed. However, the investment levels chosen in equilibrium are lower than optimal, an aberration that can be corrected using coordination mechanisms that reward the firms for increasing their investment levels. In the substitutable case, the firms fall into a Prisoners’ Dilemma trap where they do not share security knowledge in equilibrium, despite the fact that it is beneficial for both of them to do so. Here, the beneficial role of a social planner to encourage the firms to share is indicated. However, even when the firms share in accordance to the recommendations of a social planner, the level of investment chosen by the firms is sub-optimal. The firms either enter into an “arms race” where they over-invest or reenact the under-investment behavior found in the complementary case. Once again, this sub-optimal behavior can be corrected using incentive mechanisms that penalize for over-investment and reward for increasing the investment level in regions of under-investment. The proposed coordination schemes, with some modifications, achieve the socially optimal outcome even when the firms are risk-averse. Implications for information security vendors, firms, and social planner are discussed.

Posted on September 15, 2011 at 12:45 PM • View Comments

Risk Tolerance and Culture

This is an interesting study on cultural differences in risk tolerance.

The Cultures of Risk Tolerance

Abstract: This study explores the links between culture and risk tolerance, based on surveys conducted in 23 countries. Altogether, more than 4,000 individuals participated in the surveys. Risk tolerance is associated with culture. Risk tolerance is relatively low in countries where uncertainty avoidance is relatively high and in countries which are relatively individualistic. Risk tolerance is also relatively low in countries which are relatively egalitarian and harmonious. And risk tolerance is relatively high in countries where trust is relatively high. Culture is also associated with risk tolerance indirectly, through the association between culture and income-per-capita. People in countries with relatively high income-per-capita tend to be relatively individualistic, egalitarian, and trusting. Risk tolerance is relatively high in countries with relatively low income-per-capita.

Posted on September 14, 2011 at 2:02 PM • View Comments

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Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.