Louvre Jewel Heist

I assume I don’t have to explain last week’s Louvre jewel heist. I love a good caper, and have (like many others) eagerly followed the details. An electric ladder to a second-floor window, an angle grinder to get into the room and the display cases, security guards there more to protect patrons than valuables—seven minutes, in and out.

There were security lapses:

The Louvre, it turns out—at least certain nooks of the ancient former palace—is something like an anopticon: a place where no one is observed. The world now knows what the four thieves (two burglars and two accomplices) realized as recently as last week: The museum’s Apollo Gallery, which housed the stolen items, was monitored by a single outdoor camera angled away from its only exterior point of entry, a balcony. In other words, a free-roaming Roomba could have provided the world’s most famous museum with more information about the interior of this space. There is no surveillance footage of the break-in.

Professional jewelry thieves were not impressed with the four. Here’s Larry Lawton:

“I robbed 25, 30 jewelry stores—20 million, 18 million, something like that,” Mr. Lawton said. “Did you know that I never dropped a ring or an earring, no less, a crown worth 20 million?”

He thinks that they had a co-conspirator on the inside.

Museums, especially smaller ones, are good targets for theft because they rarely secure what they hold to its true value. They can’t; it would be prohibitively expensive. This makes them an attractive target.

We might find out soon. It looks like some people have been arrested

Not being out of the country—out of the EU—by now was sloppy. Leaving DNA evidence was sloppy. I can hope the criminals were sloppy enough not to have disassembled the jewelry by now, but I doubt it. They were probably taken apart within hours of the theft.

The whole thing is sad, really. Unlike stolen paintings, those jewels have no value in their original form. They need to be taken apart and sold in pieces. But then their value drops considerably—so the end result is that most of the worth of those items disappears. It would have been much better to pay the thieves not to rob the Louvre.

Posted on October 27, 2025 at 11:03 AM13 Comments

Comments

sle October 27, 2025 12:21 PM

Lucky we were, they were only burglars.
Given that the update of the anti-fire system is still ongoing despite it started in 2010. Should they have been crazy fire lovers, foolish crafters… nothing would be left.

Numerous security problems of the Louvres are reported by the serious financial auditor Cour des Comptes (French entity “similar” to the Government Accountability Office). This audit isn’t public yet.

Alan October 27, 2025 12:28 PM

You could pay 8 billion people not to rob the Louvre, or you could pay one person to be a security guard. Hummm…

Anonymous Cow October 27, 2025 1:29 PM

He thinks that they had a compatriot on the inside.

Compatriot? Did you (or Lawton, if that’s his wording) mean to say “co-conspirator”?

Clive Robinson October 27, 2025 4:04 PM

@ Anonymous Cow, ALL,

“Compatriot? Did you (or Lawton, if that’s his wording) mean to say “co-conspirator”?”

Compatriot and Co-conspirator are very far from being mutually exclusive.

However the use of “Co-Conspirator” is notoriously used by US Federal Law Enforcement / Guard Labour as a “legal catch all”. Basically to ensure a conviction such that they won’t have to pay out huge amounts of compensation to those they have accused effectively unlawfully.

You can be found guilty of it just by being in the same place as other people such as a public room or open space where refreshments are served.

Even though you had no communication with the other people, and in some cases could not (speaking only English when the alleged conspirators only spoke arabic).

Privacy October 28, 2025 6:18 AM

​I expected the thieves would hold the stolen items for ransom, for maybe at least a thousand bitcoin. Maybe they never thought of that.

Mexaly October 28, 2025 8:01 PM

Sorry to hear the joke at the end, Bruce. Considering the recent behavior of the US government pandering to crime, it isn’t funny now.

MrC October 28, 2025 9:38 PM

The whole thing is sad, really. Unlike stolen paintings, those jewels have no value in their original form. They need to be taken apart and sold in pieces. But then their value drops considerably—so the end result is that most of the worth of those items disappears. It would have been much better to pay the thieves not to rob the Louvre.

My immediate thought was that this was a job for hire — that some Musk-like billionaire paid these burglars enough to risk this caper so that they could have their very own crown jewels in a glass case on their super-yacht, whose they pay the crew enough to keep quiet.

jelo 117 October 29, 2025 4:17 PM

Unlike stolen paintings, those jewels have no value in their original form. They need to be taken apart and sold in pieces. But then their value drops considerably—so the end result is that most of the worth of those items disappears.

I don’t see the force of this. Why could the pieces intact not have an appeal to a connoisseur analogous to that of a painting ?

Saaaam October 30, 2025 10:43 AM

@jelo 117

Why could the pieces intact not have an appeal to a connoisseur analogous to that of a painting ?

A painting only has value in its original form. But that makes it very hot to handle, with a correspondingly smaller and riskier market.

Jewellery may have a higher ‘true’ value in its original form, but broken up can be sold much faster and with much less risk of being caught. So while it could be ‘theft for hire’ to be kept in a private display, much more likely it will be broken up. Still millions of euros, for 7 minutes work. Not bad.

MarkH November 6, 2025 1:38 AM

Breaking news: the password for the system controlling the Louvre’s surveillance cameras was ‘Louvre’ (reported in numerous outlets)

Clive Robonson November 6, 2025 5:18 AM

@ MarkH,

It’s funny that you should mention,

“the password for the system controlling the Louvre’s surveillance cameras was ‘Louvre’”

Because it reminded me of a similar issue in a well known UK “Building Society”[1] way back last century. I should warn you this falls into the classification of “war story”, where tales of heroic wins and total failure are recounted for others to enjoy and learn from. Unfortunately this one falls entirely on the “fails” side of things…

It involved the Building Societies network of ATMs and the passwords for them.

The bank tried and failed to run it as a “two key” physical security system which was the sort of a standard system when both safe locks and keys were “turn together” like those “Two Man” nuclear launch systems you see in a movie. With one Key held by the Branch manager and one held by the Assistant manager.

This sort of physical security does not map back into information security for various reasons, but in the case of this Building Society the attempt to do so made everything insecure at so many levels and thus a total failure.

Firstly due to the fact the then ATM network used “apparently” required all the ATMs on it to use the same “password”. For reasons still not clear to this day if actually true. One possibility was a botched centralized security system. But that is just a probabilistic argument based on “knowledge of security malpractice” endemic at the time five decades ago.

Also somebody in senior management steeped in the old physical security ways picked the Key…

Further the password was only the then computer industry standard “eight characters”… To try and make it into two keys they split it into two halves… And due to “human memory issues” it was decided to make them “4 digit PINs” in form…

But there was another issue they tried to solve. In a physical “two key” system it does not matter what order you put the two keys into the safe as long as they are both in and then turned together. To stop this issue of PINs being put in the wrong order arising with the split in half password they made the Branch and Assistant manager PINs the same…

But they clearly did not understand the difference between physical keys and information keys such as PINs…

Because as happens when an Assistant manager gets promoted they take over at a different branch. Under the physical “two key system” they would hand back the Assistant Key at the branch they were from, and get given the Branch Manager key at the new branch they were taking over. Which is all well and good for physical keys that are different for every branch and the keys “supposedly” only could be cut by “specialists in the lock industry”[2]…

To cut the story short, all new Branch Managers became aware that the two PINs were the same, and it did not take much longer for all the Assistant managers to work it out either. Likewise others such as service technicians became aware, and like the ripples on a pond the password spread.

The other thing you need to know was like physical keys that don’t change with time, the Building Society never changed the password…

So it became known to many others that the PINs were “1234” and thus the password “12341234”…

Eventually somebody who knew blabbed and a tech journalist got to hear about it over a social pint of beer as a “war story” one evening, and wrote it up into a “no name” story, and their editor ran with it.

Thus “changes had to be made” but I’m told by a journalist, that “no heads rolled” in “Senior Management”. But one or two had taken a well greased early retirment a very short while later.

Proof if you will that “secrets escape” and “ripple out” when they do.

[1] It can be hard to describe accurately what a “Building Society” was in the UK back then because of Thatcher prescribed “Deregulation”. Now you would be hard pushed to tell them apart from a bank. They however started by groups of people forming a “mutual society” finance organisation to help mutual members buy their homes and share in any profits. As what was technically a partnership not a company there were quite strict business and finance rules put upon them. Deregulation was portrayed as a massive opportunity. However predictably for Thatcher Mantra Deregulation was without doubt a disaster, and “the country very much the worse for it”. Amongst other things it brought us the sociopath “Fred the Shred” who gained control of the Halifax Building Society and ran the share price up in a process that hollowed out the business into a fragile bubble. In the scandal he created, the business had to be put on “life support” by the UK Government followed by a forced breakup and sale to another bank, where the influence of Fred spread out like a plague, and the bank that took over the “retail bank” side of Fred’s empire became diseased as well.

[2] This idea of an “uncopyable” physical key is a compleat nonsense as any honest working locksmith knows about. It’s a myth the industry used and still does as a “Guild Secret” to make their members more money in various ways. There is an old saying that,

“Only three numbers make sense in our physical universe zero, one, and infinity.”

The reasoning is that a physical object.

1, Does not exist thus there are “zero” of it.

2, It can be unique thus there is only “one” of it.

3, If not unique there can be any unknown number of them thus there could be an “infinity” of them

Further is the old saying of,

“What can be done by man, can be undone by man, and done again”.

Thus all physical keys have to be considered “infinite” that is copyable by a craftsman. Or just a curious kid under ten with a birthday present set of “needle files” which is where my key duplication and lock picking abilities started over a half century ago unconstrained by “Guild Secrets”.

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