Schneier on Security

Skeptical • August 20, 2014 7:15 PM

@Jacob: So far, and for the foreseeable future, the US only fights Jihadists who ride Dushka-mounted Toyotas and their best tactical comm gear, besides the donkey express, is some old-school RF personal gear. And they are very effective at it.

Unfortunately war is not always foreseeable. The US prudently prepares for contingencies that may involve adversaries with high levels of technological sophistication. Were the US to permit its advantages in such contingencies to erode, the world would rapidly become a less stable place.

Skeptical • August 21, 2014 10:52 AM

@Clive: Since then US mainland soil has not been invaded in a similar way but it serves as one of the reminders that keep US war hawks eyes afire. So much so that untill recently the US was spending about 20 times the amount of any other nation to maintain a standing military for non domestic use.

I’m not going to rehash the causes of the War of 1812, nor the conduct of the involved parties.

But, you are mistaken as to the role it plays in modern American foreign policy.

Following the Revolutionary War (1776-1783), the distrust of a strong federal government and standing army (though finally strengthened by the replacement of the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution in 1787) combined with fear of foreign invasion led to a military policy which emphasized the use of coastal fortifications and coastal gunboats.

Indeed for many decades US military education consisted mainly of instruction on building fortifications.

The War of 1812 was in part responsible for that emphasis in the decades following, though for obvious reasons the US had been concerned of such a dangerous beforehand. The US Civil War, in many ways the first modern war which demonstrated the extent to which technology had outpaced certain aspects of Napoleonic strategy, had some impact on US military thought in the decades following (less so on European and British military thought, which dismissed the American experience as the consequences of amateurism – a conclusion that helped lay the foundation for the disastrous approaches in WW1). But that impact was largely lost as the US military demobilized at the end of the Civil War and became primarily concerned with keeping order in the West, fighting against various Native American tribes (one of the sadder, more unjust, chapters in US history).

By the late 19th century, with an improved Navy, the US had begun to assert itself more strongly, particularly in the Spanish-American War (1898). With the exception of a counter-insurgency campaign in the Philippines (1899-1902) and smaller actions in the Caribbean, the US was not heavily invested in the projection of military force abroad with the use of land forces, though the rise of Alfred Mahan’s theory of sea power in conjunction of growing US industrial power had led to an expanding naval force.

When the US did eventually resolve to enter WW1, it encountered enormous logistical problems in preparing a military force for modern war. Following WW1, that military force was largely disbanded – and matters were then repeated as the US entered WW2.

The experiences of WW1, and especially WW2, taught the US that the oceans were not the insulation they once were against wars abroad. Twice the US had sent massive amounts of people and resources overseas, to fight in wars begun by the aggression of other nations already embroiled in conflict.

Following WW2, impelled by certain Soviet actions, the US concluded that it was dangerous to permit the conditions that allowed WW2 to occur to ever come about again. It would fight smaller wars, if necessary, to prevent larger wars; and it would deter some nations from even considering war by establishing such superior forces that none would dare make the challenge.

As part of preventing the conditions which led to WW2, the US, along with other democratic allies, would attempt to construct a global trading system, tying together nations with commerce, further lowering the probability of armed conflict between them. Finally, where possible, the US would attempt to promote democratic self-governance.

That’s a two sentence summary of an incredibly complex foreign policy that is subject to varied particular contingencies and forces. Obviously in execution it has included mistakes, and abuses.

So the strategy you see today has nothing to do with the War of 1812. It has everything to do with the two world wars of the last century – and, of course, with the experience of the Cold War which followed, the rise of international terrorism as a potentially destabilizing force, and the challenge of integrating rising powers, such as China, peacefully into the global framework.

I highly recommend Russell Weigley’s The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Policy and Strategy as an overview of the foregoing (though published in the early 1970s, and obviously therefore not complete).

As has been pointed out, “A race horse is only a race horse as long as it races, otherwise it is a usless nag”. The same applies to armed forces, if they are not fighting then they are a dead weight on a narions economy, and often little or no use as a deterrent. This is because others nations see them as a threat and thus build up their standing military in response causing needless escelation (same reasoning as MAD).

It’s not quite that simple. First, whether another nation A sees the forces of nation B as a threat depends on a number of factors. Iceland, for example, does not view the US as a military threat despite an imbalance in forces. Second, you also must understand that since many nations distrust one another, they will arm against each other. It might be better if they all agreed not to, and had some way of relying on that agreement, but they don’t. Third, especially in the case of dictatorships, a government may believe that it can successfully use its military, aggressively, to decide some issue or another.

In short, because of the anarchic nature of the international system and the continued presence of authoritarian, non-liberal, anti-democratic governments, along with various non-state militant movements able to wage war to some degree, a military force remains useful, and indeed can be vital.

It’s a sick joke to hear US politicos and talking heads talk of the US being the “Worlds Police Force” when the politicos decided some years ago that the US military would be given no “policing training” –unlike other western nations where it is standard training– primarily because the US citizens would fear the US was in danger of becoming a police state…

You’re confusing two separate issues: to what extent should the US become involved in foreign conflicts or problems (usually the party arguing against involvement will deliver the old “we’re not the world’s policeman” somewhere in his talking points), and to what extent should the US military assume the role of acting as a police force in an occupied nation (the simplified model in the minds of some is that the US military engages to resolve a military problem, and then disengages once that military problem is resolved; that “the purpose of the US military is to fight and win wars, full stop”, and this never involves police-like operations).

Just to be clear, I think both talking points are silly. The US military is quite familiar with counter-insurgency and stabilization problems, and has extensive training and experience on the matters; and no foreign policy problem has ever been seriously discussed and analyzed with a “world’s police force” metaphor as a framework.

And it’s always dangerous to understand a nation’s foreign policy simply on the basis of the soundbite of a politician who’s managed to win some air time.

Skeptical • August 21, 2014 2:12 PM

@Nick: Merely listing every military operation, including the use of cavalry to break up a gunfight in Wyoming and a peacekeeping mission in East Timor, won’t give anyone an understanding of US policy.

Nor does it make any sense to derive a conclusion of imperialism from the presence of US military bases. Does the US rule Britain, Germany, Israel, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Italy, Turkey, etc? Does Britain rule Germany, since the British have a base there? Does Russia rule Vietnam, since Russia has a naval base there?

Skeptical • August 23, 2014 2:28 PM

@Nick: People like you present it like it’s minimal and sensible activities.

I’ve never used the word “minimal” to describe contemporary US policy. US foreign policy, since WW2, has been highly active, for the reasons I’ve given. I said that it was a highly complex policy, in which mistakes and abuses have occurred.

First example of that was Gen Butler’s War is a Racket book. (Free here). You could probably read it in an hour or so. He straight up confessed why they did it, who each military action benefited, and how the economics of it cost the many to benefit those few.

General Smedley Butler’s courage as a United States Marine is indisputable.

His analysis of policy is questionable at best, and of course has nothing to do with post WW2 American policy. He also claimed that a group of financiers had organized 500,000 men, which he was to lead to overthrow FDR.

He wrote the book you cite in the same year that he became the spokesperson for the American League Against War and Fascism – 1935. It is not a study, and is not considered authoritative or scholarly; it is a pamphlet, delivered in the cause of isolationism during the 1930s, as Europe was already descending into darkness. For the most part he repeats what others had long since alleged regarding US involvement overseas in the late 19th and very early 20th century.

Anyone who wants to understand US policy would not be well served by relying on his work. Weigley’s The American Way of War, by contrast, is considered to be one of the major works in the field, and is not written for any political purpose. It is of course focused heavily on military policy.

A double Medal of Honor winner who led many wars and had access to internal justifications is also a respectable source of information on what we were doing.

One is awarded the Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of one’s life above and beyond the call of duty. Knowledge of US foreign policy is not a pre-requisite, nor does courage in battle by itself endow one with such knowledge, any more than it might make one an expert on monetary policy.

The common thread? Imperialism that benefited rich capitalists.

Unfortunately that’s highly simplistic, and, today, generally just incorrect. The factors that determined US involvement in Honduras in 1903, for example, where such analysis would be closer to the mark, are not the same as those which determine US involvement in NATO in the latter half of the 20th century, or Iraq, or Somalia, or Bosnia.

Skeptical • August 24, 2014 12:08 AM

@Gerard: OBL put an 500.000 USD operation into action and got ~3000 people killed and a couple of billion USD in damage. The response was 2 wars with hundreds of thousands killed and trillions USD to be paid by the taxpayer.

You’re conflating Iraq and Afghanistan. While I agree that the two wars are related, their causes are not identical.

So let’s focus on Afghanistan for a moment. You’re comparing the costs of the event which started the war (which you’ve underestimated) to the costs of the entire course of the war. This is analogous to someone comparing the costs of Pearl Harbor to the costs incurred by the US over all of WW2.

If you want to ask whether it was rational for the US to invade Afghanistan post 9/11, you’d need to ask what the costs of not invading after 9/11, and undertaking some alternative course of action, would have been.

That’s something extremely difficult to determine. But, it’s clear that post 9/11, the judgment of the US Government and that of the American people was that the invasion was the best option.

Who won here?

The industrialists.

Again, your determination of “who wins” seems to rest entirely upon a comparison of a single event that starts a war, or at least furnishes casus belli, and the costs of the entirety of the war. But that’s not the way anyone rationally thinking about entering a war calculates.

Moreover, you must understand that most of the US economy isn’t composed of companies that supply the Defense Department with goods or services. So when resources in the economy are diverted into defense spending, those other sectors, i.e. the vast majority of what you call “industrialists”, actually lose.

Immediately following 9/11 the equity markets remained closed for several days in anticipation of panic selling. When they did re-open, while the overall market declined, certain companies that would do well in a war were valued more highly.

But there’s no indication, of any kind, that these few companies somehow inveigled the US Government into invading Afghanistan. It’s somewhat mind-boggling to me that anyone would think the US invasion of Afghanistan had anything to do with something other than the fact that al Qaeda killed 3000 people on a single morning, promised to do more, and were being sheltered by the Taliban. Pull that kind of action on the US and you can expect certain destruction. UBL thought the US was a paper tiger. His mistake. Who won in that fight? The United States. At a high cost? Yes. War is costly and war is hell. Nonetheless war is sometimes better than the alternatives.

Skeptical • August 24, 2014 11:39 PM

Gerard, I think you’re missing my point. There are many differences between WW2 and Afghanistan, and between AQ and the last imperial Japanese Government.

The point of my analogy is very limited. It concerns the methodology you are using to determine whether the US invasion of Afghanistan was rational.

You compared the costs of the precipitating event of a war (9/11) to the costs of the entire war which followed. By this measure, the invasion of Afghanistan certainly looks foolish.

My point is that the comparison is mistaken. You need to compare the costs of alternative courses of action to the invasion, not merely the cost of the precipitating event.

The analogy with Pearl Harbor is limited to that point. In deciding whether to declare war against Japan, for example, the US did not weigh the damage incurred by Pearl Harbor against the damage likely to be incurred over the course of the entire war in the Pacific.