Friday Squid Blogging: Squid Jigging
Good news from Malaysia:
The Terengganu International Squid Jigging Festival (TISJF) will be continued and become an annual event as one of the state’s main tourism products, said Menteri Besar Datuk Seri Ahmad Said.
He said TISJF will become a signature event intended to enhance the branding of Terengganu as a leading tourism destination in the region.
“Beside introducing squid jigging as a leisure activity, the event also highlights the state’s beautiful beaches, lakes and islands and also our arts, culture and heritage,” he said.
I assume that Malaysian squid jigging is the same as American squid jigging. But I don’t really know.
As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.
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name.withheld.for.obvious.reasons • April 18, 2014 4:27 PM
@ Bruce Schneier, moderator
My apologies for the previous off topic post. This seems the more appropriate forum.
TWO STATEMENTS ABOUT PPD 20
(A) Presidential Policy Directive 20, or PPD-20, authorizes the United
States Defense Department, the Pentagon, on the finding by Secretary of
Defense, the Undersecretary of Defense, and all Intelligence Community
Department heads that have agreed to the authority with the aforementioned
secretaries; the non-legislative, non-statutory prerogative to declare war
in the case of a “cyber warfare” attack. Presidential authority to devolve
the extraordinary authority-by definition the greatest constitutional
prerogative-to unelected agency and department heads within the executive
branch is unprecedented. There is no historic equivalent in the United
States of America that divests constitutionally held privileges to parties
that are not enumerated in the constitution itself.
(B) The Department of Defense, along with most of the 17 identified
intelligence community members including the Central Intelligence Agency,
National Security Agency, Department of Homeland Security, and Defense
Intelligence Service(s) report to an agency within the DoD’s sphere of
operations. The National Director of Intelligence was born out of
recommendations from the 9/11 Commission Report of 2004 and is the oversight
agency to the other intelligence agencies; including agencies outside of DoD
command. This is an odd arrangement, as it asserts a quasi-civilian
authority outside of DoD’s mandate to the rule-makings of the NDI. In
essence, the separation of military command from the civilian domain has
been breached-in a less than obvious scheme to maintain “complete control of
all intelligence activities”.
This are statements of fact that are of concern, a third is currently under
review with respect to the overt coupe of civilian law and authority. Which
leads me to provide the an extract from a recent research project I’ve
undertaken…
1 INTRODUCTION
The democratic republic of the United States of America, a “representative
democracy” by function, as a simple statement of fact is not rational, but
descriptive and the basis for doctrine and law. Stated more simply, the
United States of America is a system using the applied theory of
“representative democracy”. The loci, of two terminus functions; the
theoretical basis for the governance of peoples, in this case by the people,
and the use of rational law for managing the application of the theoretical
system, denote a co-linear relationship between these distinct functions.
Elucidating the vectors of subordinate functions to these two primary
functions clearly begins by identifying the basis in law extrapolated from
the non-rational (the theory, in this case the “Declaration of Independence”
and the Constitution of the United States of America) as theoretical
postulates. Additionally, public law and statues of the United States of
America represent the basis for defining rational functions codified
separately as lemmas. To calculate the “efficacy” of the applied theory,
public law and statue, as it relates to the theoretical statements, the
founding documents, may be considered and exercise of limited use-but-it
could be argued that making such measurements could prove instructive to
scholars, political scientists, and other researchers.
Further research based on this research could be stated as follows:
Measuring the direct and causal relationships of U.S. Federal systems to
other entities and governmental systems is not possible today. The task of
enumerating the Unites States Federal government, which demonstrates
complete knowledge of all the member and component systems, exceeds our
capacity to define to a degree of certainty. However, the instruments of
governance can be gauged and calibrated; the foundation, procedural and
operational rules, authorities, and the institutional supports for the task
of governance can be finely measured-the problem is in that it is not well
understood. Formal descriptions of the means of governance, the historic
record in use and exercise, and current legislative analysis provide a basis
for scientific research as to produce a finite and elemental governance
model affected by judiciousness of law. Currently the Supreme Court is
unable to conduct this type of analysis and it is suggested that “not
performing a robust level of analysis” amounts to intellectual fraud and at
a minimum demonstrates professional incompetence.