Schneier on Security

Skeptical • February 17, 2014 5:59 AM

@uh huh: GMO violates a right to food eh? Certainly this is just as strong as your claim that Snowden was acting against capital punishment.

@Nick P: I don’t see anything wrong with a government conducting espionage in support of treaty negotiations. That’s squarely within the legitimate function of an intelligence service, in my view. I don’t think commercial espionage is, and I don’t think that the US engages in commercial espionage.

However, even as someone who is no fan of the Chinese government, I think the issue of commercial espionage is complicated when it comes to state-owned enterprises.

@Clive: What that poor woman went through is terrible, but The Intercept predictably gets the facts wrong in its pursuit of spin. Ultimately, there’s no question that there was a mistake, and that Ibrahim suffered considerable injustice as a result. The judge describes it as Kafkaesque, and I agree with him.

But, this has little to do with the state secrets privilege, and The Intercept fumbles so many facts in its effort to needlessly exaggerate the story that one wonders whether they think fact-checking is just a silly procedure for “traditional” journalists.

(unless you want a deep dive into the facts of the case and The Intercept’s misreporting, bail out now!)

Here’s what happened:

• Ibrahim was interviewed by the FBI while studying for her PhD in November 2004. The FBI agent then mistakenly placed her on the No-Fly List (though he did apparently intend to have her placed on a broader watchlist)
• When Ibrahim attempted to board a flight for Malaysia in January 2005, she was denied. She was then arrested, and detained for two hours
• the government removed Ibrahim from the No-Fly List the same day she was wrongly prevented from flying (see here, the district court’s opinion courtesy of The Wire, at page 16); this is not reported by The Intercept
• the TSA told her, after she was detained for hours, that she had been removed from the NFL, and helped her obtain a ticket for the following day; this is not reported by The Intercept

• she flew back the next day on her flight; this is incorrectly reported by The Intercept

• her visa was revoked while she was out of the country, in early February 2005, but was told that she could reapply; this is not reported by The Intercept, which never mentions visa issues

• sometime thereafter, she sued the city of San Francisco and its police department for false arrest (in 2009 they settled with her for $225,000); see page 27 of this opinion from the 9th Circuit (an appellate court in the US which heard Ibrahim’s appeal, and ruled in her favor, after her case was initially dismissed by a lower court)

• in 2009 she reapplied for a visa to travel to the US, and was denied; this is the first time she reapplied; this is not reported by The Intercept

The Intercept reports all of this entirely as “Shaking and in tears, she was eventually allowed to board her flight to Malaysia but found herself banned from returning on the way back.”

The Intercept implies that Ibrahim was wrongly on the No-Fly List for 8 years, preventing her return to the US, until the court finally forced the government to admit the mistake. But, obviously, the truth is a little more complicated. The story here doesn’t need to be hyped, as it’s quite terrible for the government as it is. The Intercept does so anyway, because it wants to focus on the state secrets privilege.

The government asserted the states secret privilege with respect to Ibrahim’s discovery demands. Ibrahim’s attorneys initially asked that the government produce, among other things, FBI call records, all documents used to determine Ibrahim’s status, the No-Fly List, and other items. See page 23 of the 9th Circuit’s decision.

The district court (the trial court), upon which we are all relying for the facts, upheld the government’s invocation of the state secrets privilege with respect to nearly all classified information. See the district court’s opinion at page 3.

The Intercept implies that the government invoked the privilege simply to protect against the admission of a mistake, and that the district court overruled it entirely, neither of which are true. The Attorney General’s statement is here.

Note that the Justice Department submitted the information it sought to withhold to the judge as part of its invocation of the privilege.

Now, it may well be that Ibrahim was treated shamefully by the SFPD upon being detained. But, in another example of spin, The Intercept neglects to mention that she sued San Francisco for that wrongful treatment, and agreed to a settlement of $225,000 (see page 27 of the 9th Circuit decision linked earlier). The federal government did not defend against claims arising directly from her mistreatment on arrest, nor use the state secrets doctrine to conceal it, nor prevent her from achieving compensation for that mistreatment.

What else did The Intercept fail to mention, or misconstrue? Any number of things, but the most important:

• the reasons for the denial of her visa were held to be covered by the state secrets doctrine by the judge, and substantive information concerning it appears to have been redacted in the district court’s findings

The timeline of events, and more strongly some of the judge’s own comments, suggest that even if the FBI agent had correctly filled out the form, her visa may have been revoked and then denied on reapplication due to other, classified information. However, it’s equally plausible that her initial inclusion on the No-Fly List resulted in errors in other databases, leading to the visa issues. We don’t know at this point.

This is important, because the visa revocation and denial is what actually prevented her from returning to the United States. The judge hints that the visa decision may be predicated on grounds other than that she herself presents a threat, though the opinion is written somewhat awkwardly at points, and the inference I’m drawing is not logically compelled (though what hints are?).

The district court ordered the government to: assure Ibrahim that she is not on the No-Fly List and that any errors resulting from her placement on that No-Fly List have been corrected.

Skeptical • February 17, 2014 3:27 PM

@group: Legally, the so-called “targeted killing” conducted by the US in Pakistan and Yemen are likely ironclad, as the US is probably operating with the consent of the Yemeni and Pakistani governments in areas not properly controlled by those governments and is attempting to strike military targets. Whether it’s a good idea either ethically or prudentially would be a long discussion. My answer is a highly qualified yes.

Skeptical • February 18, 2014 7:35 AM

@AlanS: The self-defense argument is very dubious in the Pakistan context, as was pointed out by the QC who did the analysis for the UK parliament’s drones group.

I’d be happy to read the analysis. International law is vague enough on the question that it’s not an easy one, and perhaps not one with a determined answer. Those who think these strikes to be illegal commonly argue that int’l law requires that the US first attempt to effect an arrest of the individual(s) targeted, and that if this is not possible, then additional force may be used. They also argue that military force in self-defense requires an imminent threat, such that response by force is the only alternative to simply bearing the imminent attack.

In my personal view, though, the self-defense argument is quite strong. The US obviously can’t effect an arrest in the FATA, and it’s an area over which Pakistan does not exert control, so neither can the Pakistani government effect an arrest. The “imminent attack” criterion derives from the early 19th century, and while it once may have been useful, it does not fit well with the realities of contemporary warfare.

@Because: Right, repeat that unsupported claim about what ‘Pakistan’ wants, that’ll work, because nobody here will remember the Pakistan government’s repeated public statements that contradict it.

Evidence: 11. (C) Malik suggested we hold off alleged Predator attacks until after the Bajaur operation. The PM brushed aside Rehman,s remarks and said “I don,t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We,ll protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.” From a 2008 leaked State Department cable detailing a meeting with the Pakistani government, via The Guardian

Has Pakistan changed its mind since then? Possibly. It’s difficult to say. But, in any case, the right of self-defense applies.

The US tried that whopper last time it attacked Iran, Remember? They got their head handed to them in the Case concerning Oil Platforms. ICJ voided US claims of self defense.

I have no idea what that has to do with this. Very different events.

Now what’s ICJ going to do with a self-defense claim about an occupation manifestly in breach of UN Charter Chapter VII? (Feel free to search in vain for UNSC authority for use of force.)

Again no idea what you’re talking about here. NATO forces are in Afghanistan with the permission of its government, currently.

Skeptical • February 19, 2014 5:37 AM

@AlanS: You won’t “be happy to read the analysis” because the QC’s report contradicts your “personal view” that “the self-defense argument is quite strong”.

No, I’m always happy to read intelligent commentary on a subject, especially if it contradicts my views.

Here, though, the QC’s argument was no surprise. As I wrote in an earlier comment:

Those who think these strikes to be illegal commonly argue that int’l law requires that the US first attempt to effect an arrest of the individual(s) targeted, and that if this is not possible, then additional force may be used. They also argue that military force in self-defense requires an imminent threat, such that response by force is the only alternative to simply bearing the imminent attack.

On pages 24-25 of her Advice, she makes precisely this argument:

The doctrine of anticipatory self-defence provides that, where the target presents an ‘imminent’ or ‘immediate’ threat, a state may strike first in self-defence. In effect, the attacking party must strike or be struck. The US government relies on a broader formulation of that principle. They cannot know, or demonstrate, that the targets of any particular drone strike present an imminent threat to US interests. In effect, they rely on intelligence and other information to argue that the targets might present an imminent threat. That broader formulation of the doctrine has not yet become a part of the consensus of international law. Indeed, to the contrary, it was the rationale advanced by Israel in order to justify a pre-emptive bombing strike on an Iraqi nuclear reactor over 30 years ago. That justification was rejected by the Security Council.

In the QC’s view, the an attack is “imminent” for the purposes of the right of self-defense only if the attack is at the point of being launched and one must either “strike or be struck” in her words.

I must underscore the shoddiness of one aspect of her analysis in particular (though in my haste it’s possible that I misread her).

UAV strikes are sometimes in support of a broader counterterrorism mission against groups located in the tribal areas of Pakistan or Yemen who actively prepare, and who have actually launched, attacks against the United States and its allies (such groups would include, for example, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula).

Strikes on these groups are part of an ongoing pattern of conflict in those two areas.

The doctrine of anticipatory self-defense that the QC describes applies to a “first strike.” Nations A and B are nominally at peace, Nation B has excellent reason to believe that Nation A is preparing to strike in the near future (but not immediately), and so Nation B hits first.

And whether that is included in the “right of self-defense” is indeed debated among international lawyers, as the QC notes, though the debate is with respect to the extent to which one can lawfully anticipate, not whether one can at all.

However and regardless, in Yemen and in Pakistan, the battle has long since been joined. The conflict is ongoing. And once a conflict is begun, one side need not wait until the other has finished preparations for yet another offensive operation before striking.

In addition to UAV strikes in support of a broader counterterrorism mission, UAV strikes are also used to support NATO and friendly forces. For example, a group of Pakistani Taliban might be in the process of moving towards the border for a raid (or moving back across the border from a raid). They’re spotted, identified, confirmed, and then perhaps reduced by an air strike. As in the broader counterterrorist mission context, these strikes form part of an ongoing conflict. Anticipatory self-defense does not need to be invoked.

The QC responds to the claim that these strikes form part of ongoing conflicts with the following:

In our view, the drone strikes carried out by the CIA in Yemen and Pakistan (amongst other places) are not carried out in the context of an ‘international armed conflict’. The US is not at war with Yemen or Pakistan. The individuals who are targeted are not, therefore, ‘combatants’ and their killers are not entitled to ‘combatant immunity’.

Note the exquisite logical deafness here. The QC’s argument is that:
1) The US is not at war with Pakistan or Yemen;
2) Strikes within Pakistan or Yemen could be part of a war only if the US were at war with Pakistan or Yemen;
3) Strikes within Pakistan or Yemen are therefore not part of an international armed conflict.

The QC fails to consider at all whether there can exist an international armed conflict between state and non-state actors (there can). She also fails to consider whether Pakistan or Yemen are able to exercise control in the areas where US strikes occur (they are not). So the idea that there can be an international armed conflict between non-state actors and state actors, in which non-state actors operate from regions uncontrolled by any states, is never raised by her.

And this is bizarre, as that is the most accurate description of what is occurring.

This is a remarkably weak analysis from the QC, and it does not change my view.

Skeptical • February 19, 2014 9:07 AM

@AlanS: I stated my reasons for thinking the argument bizarre. You’re free to disagree with those reasons, but I hardly simply called the argument “bizarre” and left it at that.

As to what constitutes an international armed conflict, that’s actually not defined in the Geneva Conventions. The Geneva Conventions do state that it exists when an armed conflict occurs between two or more states, regardless of whether the states involved recognize each other as states. However the Geneva Conventions do not limit international armed conflict to such circumstances either.

The Geneva Conventions also of course makes provision for armed conflict between insurgents and government forces (or among insurgent forces), which it describes as non-international conflict when it occurs on the territory of a single state.

Interpreted strictly, this would leave unaddressed the case where a group not recognized as a state launches attacks on another state, from the ungoverned territory of still a different state, and a conflict ensues between the group and the attacked state.

To do so would make a mockery of the purpose of the law of armed conflict, which is not intended to be bound by formalities such as declarations of war or de jure recognition of statehood or whether the armed conflict occurs across or within borders.

Indeed, the Geneva Conventions intentionally use flexible terms like “armed conflict” precisely so that its provisions can be adapted to the changing circumstances of warfare. And while one can certainly argue about whether US actions in Yemen or Pakistan are justified, it is indeed bizarre to argue that they are not warfare and governed by the laws of war.

As to whether a person of legal eminence can make shoddy or bizarre arguments, I would say that history furnishes an embarrassing wealth of evidence.

Skeptical • February 19, 2014 10:32 AM

Quite a bit of debate actually. See e.g. European Journal of International Law

Regardless of how one classifies it (international armed conflict or non-international armed conflict), military actions undertaken by the US in the ungoverned zones of Yemen and Pakistan are clearly part of an armed conflict. In both cases the armed conflict can be traced back to 9/11, for which Article V of NATO was invoked, and in response to which the UK pledged, and has followed through with, full assistance to the United States.

The QC’s avoidance of that obvious fact is in part what enables her to claim that GCHQ employees could be considered accessories to murder under British law for passing information to the US for use in military strikes in those areas.

Skeptical • February 21, 2014 7:34 AM

@AlanS: I think we’ll have to agree to disagree on this. I can agree that matters of interpretation are in flux when it comes to understanding how conflicts between NSAs such as AQ and States fit into international law, but that is something that, at the very least, should have been mentioned in the legal opinion. Nor, again, is this the only problem I have with the opinion.

@Clive: However there are what are sometimes called the “clear ans present danger” defences for war crimes. I suspect unless brain washed in some way juries would find it hard to see why a man hiding in a cave in eastern Afghanistan represents any kind of danger lett alone on that is clear and present to those on US soil. And if such argument is found not to meet the requirment then drone strikes are either criminal acts or war crimes.

I assure you that quite a few courts would have little trouble believing that an international terrorist organization can pose a threat against which a state is entitled to act, regardless of where some of the ITO’s personnel happen to take refuge.

The strikes are undertaken in areas not within the control of any government, where arrest or non-lethal prevention is impractical. They comply with the principle of proportionality, in that they strive to avoid civilian casualties and tailor the use of force (to the extent possible) to that necessary to eliminate the threat.

The alternative is to simply hope that when attacks are launched we are able to thwart them. That’s unlikely to be either a successful strategy or a politically acceptable strategy.

Skeptical • February 22, 2014 6:41 PM

@Nick P: Actually, the “profits” are the several hundred billion dollars in interest that go FROM the Federal govt to the lenders.

I disagree with nearly everything you’ve written in what I’ve quoted, so I want to clarify at the outset that my tone throughout here is intended to be one of friendly, respectful disagreement and nothing more.

Not sure what you’re referring to in the above quote. The interest paid by the Fed on required/excess reserves? If so this comes to about 2.8 billion per year. While the Federal Reserve historically did not pay interest on required reserves, that policy shifted in 2008 for obvious reasons. The .25% paid by the Fed is a paltry return for the money deposited. You can see the weekly numbers in the H.3 release, <a href=http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/current/”>here.

Incidentally, most of the Fed’s “income” derives from interest payments that it receives on US Government securities that it holds, and that income dwarfs the interest it pays on reserves.

So, imagine printing money out of thin air, lending it at interest, and then getting to spend that interest within the system.

Here I’m guessing you’re referring to the discount window.

The discount window is a program in which the Fed lends money to certain qualified entities in exchange for collateral that fully secures the loan. Interest of course is charged for the loan.

These loans are usually very short duration (overnight), and the volume of lending is rather low (on any given day, there are usually under 20 million dollars outstanding).

The purpose is to offer a source of liquidity to the system, which helps mitigate and forestall liquidity crises.

Outside times of crisis, this is a pretty small part of the Fed in comparison to its most significant programs.

“The FOMC sets monetary policy, and a majority of its members come from the Board of Governors, who are appointed by the President.”

That’s an illusion. Reportedly, we had a treasury dept overseeing the likes of Goldman Sach’s too. In reality, the bankers used their superior buying power to buy policitians and put their own people into the treasury. So many people there are ex-Goldman it’s not funny. The head of treasury, who orchestrated bailout, was ex-CEO. It’s one of the oldest and most effective attacks on representative government.

The FOMC is quite transparent and very closely followed. I haven’t seen any serious allegation that it’s corrupt or that it’s acting in anything other than what it sees to be in the twin missions given to it: control inflation and encourage employment.

That members of the Treasury Dept. once worked for GS doesn’t show us anything about the FOMC.

An regulated private corporation is created, its ownership is secret, and begins making money for its owners. It also has a Board that supposedly regulates it. So, these bankers at that time had bought politicians, possibly rigged financial crises, and dodged plenty regulation. And yet you think that this Board wasn’t bought out too? If old and recent historical precedents are an indicator, that Board is controlled by the Fed’s owners not the other way around. It’s there to obscure that the Fed is a private money making machine that Americans should have dealt with a long time ago.

Your basis for thinking that the majority of the Board of Governors who are appointed by the President (7 of them) is corrupt is what, exactly? Again, there is zero evidence of corruption, and this is an extremely closely followed institution.

As to the idea of getting rid of the Federal Reserve, I’m not sure why you would want to do so, or what you would want to replace it with. The FR did an outstanding job during the last financial crisis. It would be a massively damaging mistake, in my view, to even attempt to replace it.

Skeptical • February 22, 2014 10:07 PM

@Nick P: How is a missile strike “less harmful” than sending elite commandos to grab or assassinate a target? Commandos often get the job done with little collateral damage, often with few ever knowing they were there until someone writes their bio. Professionals on the ground using right tools for the job, optionally with drone strike available, are a much safer proposition for individuals over there.

In many circumstances, the risk of a scenario involving a high number of civilian casualties would greater with the use of men on the ground than it would be with an air strike.

And in many circumstances the UAV gets it done without any civilian casualties.

Skeptical • February 26, 2014 11:12 AM

@AlanS: The USG hasn’t provided evidence of anything so there isn’t “ample evidence” for their claims. Then you go on to claim they have no need to be transparent. Which is it?

I said that there is ample evidence that the US respected the principle of distinction in that strike.

The principle of distinction requires that one distinguish between combatant targets and non-combatant civilians in the use of force. Deliberately striking civilians, or firing indiscriminately, would violate this principle.

That evidence is, again, the fact that 2 precision guided missiles were used to destroy 2 vehicles out of a larger convoy of vehicles. This isn’t indiscriminate firing, but rather obviously highly targeted firing. Given what we do know of the US purpose in using UAVs in Yemen, and what we know of the procedures and policies followed by the US in assessing and authorizing strikes, it is highly unlikely that the US intentionally targeted civilians.

Now, whether the strike conformed to the principle of proportionality is a much harder question. On this question, there is not ample evidence. However, consider the two most likely possibilities: (1) the US made a mistake, and the men in those vehicles were not who the US thought they were, or (2) there were AQAP targets in the vehicles, but there were also civilians.

If a mistake, then this isn’t criminal on proportionality grounds (there would still be “feasible precautions” to consider, assuming that rule applied). If not a mistake, but there were civilians in the vehicles as well as AQAP targets, then the question becomes one of weighing the military value of the targets against the civilian lives lost in the strike. That kind of weighing is imprecise, highly subjective, and outside of clear cases of violation should not be for a court to consider.

And, indeed, much of the reasoning I’ve given here is precisely that given by Moreno-Ocampo as Prosecutor of the ICC in declining to initiate actions on allegations of war crimes in Iraq. See here.

I wasn’t suggesting, by the way, that they need to share everything. At the moment they share more or less nothing. Much more could be shared without compromising counter-terrorism.

Well, what do you think they should share about how they identified the men in the vehicles prior to the strike, and how they determined when to launch the strike?

The bit about representative government completely misses the point. The US was founded on a distrust of government. Many of the founders appreciated that concentrated power corrupts and tried to establish checks and balances. (Go read Federalist 51.) What we’ve seen since 9/11, initially under Bush, has been a massive expansion of the power and secrecy of the executive, and so far little push back from the other branches.

I’ve read Federalist 51 many times in my life. So I’m quite familiar with it.

And the US was not founded simply on a distrust of government. Remember that the reason for the Constitutional Convention was that the federal government under the Articles of Confederation was too weak to be effective. Don’t misunderstand me: distrust of government was indeed a major theme of the time, but effectiveness of government was just as important.

I raised the fact that we have a representative government in response to the notion that the government must disclose all details about UAV strikes so that the public can debate it. But some government operations, particularly in the military and intelligence sphere, must be secret (or mostly so) in order to succeed. This was something known and practiced by the first members of the US Government, and it is something that continues to this day. It is also something of which the US public approves. Remember: the public has the right to enable its government to carry out clandestine and covert operations.

The war on terrorism for the most part has been a phony war. Other countries treat terrorists as criminals and prosecute them as such. It’s ironic that for a good part of the three decades prior to 9/11 America looked the other way while terrorist organizations raised millions of dollars in the US and shipped arms out of US ports to commit atrocities in Europe.

Some terrorists are indeed susceptible to apprehension by ordinary law enforcement means. No question. However, in the case of international terrorist organizations that lie beyond traditional law enforcement and pose a continuing threat to US interests, especially in light of the massive damage such organizations may be capable of committing or may become capable of committing, the US has determined that a military line of effort, in addition to diplomatic, political, economic, and informational lines of effort, is needed to best protect against such organizations.

One of the ultimate goals is for these organizations to be so reduced in power that local governments can deal with them via ordinary law enforcement.

Skeptical • February 26, 2014 3:10 PM

@AlanS:

On the number of vehicles in the convoy, those hit, and the likely weapons used see e.g. NBC News, particularly: In a report Shiban filed for Reprieve, and which the group shared with NBC News, he said local villagers told him the drone attack had taken place on a convoy of 11 cars and trucks carrying about 60 people traveling from the home of the bride to the neighboring village of the groom

You can find similar reports from other journalists. This makes it very unlikely that the US indiscriminately fired on the convoy.

As to the role of attorneys in signing off on UAV strikes, see e.g. The Guardian. This is also something that has been widely reported, and can be found (perhaps with more detail) elsewhere.

As to the training and procedures of the US military with respect to the principles of distinction and proportionality, I’m guessing that these aren’t in contention. If so, FM 27-10 and the LOAC Deskbook would serve as initial points.

I wish to stress that the evidence above bears upon the question of distinction. As to the question of proportionality, while US officials have made claims on this question, see e.g. Time, they have not put forward evidence to substantiate those claims.

It’s possible that investigations into the matter have not yet been finalized, or that a decision as to whether to release any the results has not yet been made, I suppose. Perhaps we will yet see such evidence forthcoming.

What information do you think the US can release without revealing how it may identify and track targets?

Skeptical • February 27, 2014 9:19 AM

@AlanS: The sources you cite are not exactly a stellar endorsement for your argument.

I cited sources to substantiate particular factual claims regarding the UAV strike with respect to the use of the principle of distinction, as you asked. Did they not do so?

They could release the video taken of the attacks. It might substantiate or contradict some of the claims being made e.g. there are conflicting reports about the number of missiles fired and number of vehicles targeted.

It seems clear from video and photographic evidence that there were two vehicles struck, presumably by two missiles.

I don’t think the release of US footage would do anything more than serve as propaganda for AQAP.

It’s claimed to be a wedding convoy. Is there anything that distinguishes it as such or not? Were they dressed up? Were there women and children in the group? Some of the party were apparently in a pickup trucks so would have been clearly visible. This doesn’t give away any details related to tracking etc. but politically it might not be so good, especially if it doesn’t support their claims.

As far as I can tell, the US hasn’t denied that the convoy was en route to a wedding party. The claim is rather that two of the vehicles were carrying AQAP targets, and that those vehicles were targeted and destroyed.

As to women and children, there were none among the dead. I don’t know whether there were any in the convoy, but, again, the entire convoy was not attacked.

The problem is that their strategy is long on technology and short on imagination. As has been pointed out by others, they are heavily dependent of SIGINT which means the chances of a mistake are high. You have operators (who are often thousands of miles away) who are given a target and there are lawyers that can be consulted. But you have little or no HUMINT or even input from someone with local knowledge or cultural competence (i.e. the video might obviously show a wedding party to some people but not to a drone operator living in Virginia or wherever).

This is implausible speculation. The US has worked with the Yemeni government and other intelligence agencies in the region for some years now, and the US knows very well the value of cultural expertise. You’re forgetting that the US hired large numbers of anthropologists and area experts to help them understand the “human terrain” of Afghanistan, and that large portions of the military’s special operations forces, and certainly the CIA, emphasize and develop area and cultural expertise.

So the picture of clueless folks in Virginia analyzing vague non-human intelligence without any input from those with cultural expertise or from anyone on the ground somewhere in Yemen is deeply unlikely to be true.

And, again, the question is not whether the convoy is mostly composed of civilians. The question is whether the vehicles destroyed contained AQAP targets. Those particular vehicles, not the entire convoy, were attacked.