The Insecurity of Networks
Not computer networks, networks in general:
Findings so far suggest that networks of networks pose risks of catastrophic danger that can exceed the risks in isolated systems. A seemingly benign disruption can generate rippling negative effects. Those effects can cost millions of dollars, or even billions, when stock markets crash, half of India loses power or an Icelandic volcano spews ash into the sky, shutting down air travel and overwhelming hotels and rental car companies. In other cases, failure within a network of networks can mean the difference between a minor disease outbreak or a pandemic, a foiled terrorist attack or one that kills thousands of people.
Understanding these life-and-death scenarios means abandoning some well-established ideas developed from single-network studies. Scientists now know that networks of networks don’t always behave the way single networks do. In the wake of this insight, a revolution is under way. Researchers from various fields are rushing to figure out how networks link up and to identify the consequences of those connections.
[…]
Efforts by Havlin and colleagues have yielded other tips for designing better systems. Selectively choosing which nodes in one network to keep independent from the second network can prevent “poof” moments. Looking back to the blackout in Italy, the researchers found that they could defend the system by decoupling just four communications servers. “Here, we have some hope to make a system more robust,” Havlin says.
This promise is what piques the interest of governments and other agencies with money to fund deeper explorations of network-of-networks problems. It’s probably what attracted the attention of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency in the first place. Others outside the United States are also onboard. The European Union is spending millions of euros on Multiplex, putting together an all-star network science team to create a solid theoretical foundation for interacting networks. And an Italian-funded project, called Crisis Lab, will receive 9 million euros over three years to evaluate risk in real-world crises, with a focus on interdependencies among power grids, telecommunications systems and other critical infrastructures.
Eventually, Dueñas-Osorio envisions that a set of guidelines will emerge not just for how to simulate and study networks of networks, but also for how to best link networks up to begin with. The United States, along with other countries, have rules for designing independent systems, he notes. There are minimum requirements for constructing buildings and bridges. But no one says how networks of networks should come together.
It’s a pretty good primer of current research into the risks involved in networked systems, both natural and artificial.
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marco • October 10, 2012 9:14 AM
nice article, but isn’t this just a “logical/inevitable” extension of systems thinking, or dynamic systems? In an even broader sense, this is the same thinking that people are applying to climate studies. Obviously, we are somewhat limited by our resources, but to a greater extent we seem to be constantly limited by “our” imagination. I am sure there have been people screaming warnings about this for decades, but because of institutionalized confirmation bias, it takes something like this to break through the fog.
My science class was teaching this to middle school students over 20 years ago. As a nation we are having a recession of imagination and ideas. Just look at our pathetic space program. There is a great example of group think, creating a confirmation bias that demeans the net benefits of funding big, bold, daring projects. Just ask Neil Degrase Tyson about the benefits, that is very Multiplex. I hope that this will give the creative & imaginative people a bigger voice, and chance to solve our problems (or better yet prevent them), but this is going to just turn into a giant lobbying money sink.