Schneier on Security

Chris Allison • May 5, 2007 4:49 AM

@Richard Braakman:

“1. Steal bat detector
2. Cram bat detector full of explosives
3. Put bat detector back

Since this possibility means that even legitimately placed devices may be dangerous, I say we take no chances.”

I don’t know. A bat detector is tied to one place, and can’t get close to the really sensitive targets. I suggest something presumably more mobile:

1. Steal a “Richard Braakman”
2. Cram “Richard Braakman” full of explosives
3. Put “Richard Braakman” back

Since this possibility means that even legitimately placed “Richard Braakman”(s) may be dangerous, I say we take no chances.

All (of my) sarcasm aside, I hope you were kidding. The problem with your argument is: Where does it stop? Not everyone may recognize a bat detector under a bridge, or a lite-brite by a subway stop, but a backpack by a school yard? Is that that suspicious? How mundane must something be before we’re willing to trust it, and how must we secure the mundane and the “legitimate” so that we can trust that it hasn’t been modified to hurt us? (What’s “legitimate”? A government-placed bat detector? How about a piece of garbage or roadside litter? Is it “legitimate” because it’s trash and not a bomb, or “illegitimate” because there’s no official record of it being placed by the roadside by a government agency? Who decides? Does the road get shut down for each abandoned trash bag or cardboard box? What are the criteria for everything that isn’t a highway?)

The answer is that it doesn’t stop, and that there is no rational criteria we can use to answer those questions. Many American soldiers returning home from Iraq report being leery of overpasses and wary of roadside litter or debris. That’s because they stayed alive in Iraq by training themselves to fear anything that could hide an IED or a sniper, and they need time to unlearn the behavior upon returning to the states, where they aren’t likely to face those kinds of threats.

The soldiers’ fears of the everyday are perfectly rational and reasonable, given what they’re coming from. Similar or tangential fears (ie: of unknown objects) on the part of civilians who have not come from surviving in a war zone are not rational or reasonable. Without a reasonable basis for fear, your argument is specious. Like the analogy of IEDs on American roads vs. IEDs on Iraqi roads, the question is not “Is the threat possible?” The question is “Is the threat plausible? Is the threat probable?” Some defense against unlikely threats may be cheap and easy (cf. Schneier: In Praise of Security Theater), blocking off roads and calling in the bomb squad is not.

If we were having this discussion about police responses to suspicious objects somewhere else in the world, like Israel or Iraq, or about police actions around a high profile target (head of state motorcade route, Olympics, etc.), it would make a lot more sense, but in the context of everyday Boston or Sussex, it just isn’t grounded in a demonstrated threat or in a rational argument.